Stokes v. Stirling

Decision Date28 September 2018
Docket NumberCivil Action No.: 1:16-cv-00845-RBH
PartiesSammie Louis Stokes, Petitioner, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections; and Willie D. Davis, Warden of Kirkland Correctional Institution, Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
ORDER

Petitioner Sammie Louis Stokes, a state prisoner sentenced to death and represented by counsel, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter is before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges, who recommends granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment and denying and dismissing Petitioner's habeas petition with prejudice.1 The Court adopts the R & R as modified herein.

Background2

In 1999 an Orangeburg County, South Carolina jury convicted Petitioner of murder, kidnapping, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and criminal conspiracy, and he was sentenced to death for the murder conviction.3 The facts giving rise to these convictions are summarized in the South CarolinaSupreme Court's opinion rejecting Petitioner's direct appeal:

Stokes was hired by Patti[e] Syphrette to kill her daughter-in-law, 21-year-old Connie Snipes, for $2000.00. On May 22, 1998, Syphrette called Stokes and told him Connie "got to go and tonight." At 9:30 pm that evening, Syphrette and Snipes picked up Stokes at a pawn shop, and the three of them went to Branchville and picked up Norris Martin.2 The four of them then drove down a dirt road in Branchville and stopped. Syphrette remained in the car while Stokes, Martin and Snipes walked into the woods. When they got into the woods, Stokes told Snipes, "Baby, I'm sorry, but it's you that Pattie wants dead . . . [.]"
FOOTNOTE 2: Allegedly, Snipes accompanied the others on the premise that they were going to Branchville to kill a man named Doug Ferguson, whom Syphrette and Stokes had tied up in the woods.
According to Norris Martin, Stokes forced Snipes to have sex with Martin at gunpoint. After Martin was finished, Stokes had sex with Snipes. While doing so, Stokes grabbed her breast and stabbed her in the chest, cutting both her nipples. Stokes then rolled her over and began having anal sex with her. When Stokes was finished, he and Martin each shot the victim one time in the head,3 and then dragged her body into the woods. Stokes then took Martin's knife and scalped her, throwing her hair into the woods. According to Martin, Stokes then cut Snipes' vagina out.4
FOOTNOTE 3: Martin testified that Stokes placed the gun into his (Martin's) hand and then pulled the trigger.
FOOTNOTE 4: According to the pathologist, Snipes' injuries were consistent with having been scalped, had the nipple area cut from each breast, and having had the vaginal area cut out.
Snipes' body was found by a farmer on May 27th, and Martin's wallet was found in the field near it. Martin was interviewed by police the following morning, after which police went to the Orangeburg home of Pattie Syphrette's husband Poncho; by the time police arrived at the home on May 28, 1998, Stokes and Syphrette had already murdered Doug Ferguson by wrapping duct tape around his body and head, suffocating him.5
FOOTNOTE 5: Stokes pleaded guilty to Ferguson's murder in a separate proceeding and was sentenced to life.

State v. Stokes, 548 S.E.2d 202, 203-04 (S.C. 2001). Attorneys Thomas Ray Sims and Virgin Johnson Jr. (collectively, "trial counsel") were appointed to represent Petitioner. In 2001, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and death sentence, denied his petition for rehearing, and remitted the case. See id. at 206-07; ECF Nos. 18-4 through 18-7.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in state court and amended it twice. Attorneys Keir Weyble, Robert Lominack, and Susan Hackett (collectively, "PCR counsel") were appointed to represent Petitioner. In 2009, the state PCR court conducted an evidentiary hearing, and in 2010, it issued a written order denying and dismissing Petitioner's PCR application with prejudice. See App.4 2139-84. In 2013, the PCR court denied Petitioner's motion to alter or amend the judgment. See App. 2373-95. Petitioner appealed the denial of his PCR application to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which summarily denied certiorari in February 2016. See ECF Nos. 18-8 through 18-12. In May 2016 (after the instant § 2254 action was filed), Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.5 In December 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court. See Stokes v. South Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 589 (Dec. 12, 2016).6

On March 9, 2016, Petitioner commenced the instant § 2254 action by filing a motion to stay his execution and a motion to appoint counsel. See ECF No. 1. The Court granted the motions, seeECF Nos. 8 & 12, and Petitioner subsequently filed his § 2254 petition and a supplemental petition. See ECF Nos. 22, 51, & 75. Respondents answered and moved for summary judgment, see ECF Nos. 56, 89, 160, 161, & 175; Petitioner responded to the motion for summary judgment, see ECF Nos. 74, 96, & 172; and the Magistrate Judge determined an evidentiary hearing was necessary for Petitioner's Martinez7 claims.8 See ECF No. 101.

In January 2018, the Magistrate Judge held a four-day evidentiary hearing on the Martinez claims; Petitioner himself did not testify but he called other witnesses. See ECF Nos. 101, 195-99, & 204-07. In May 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment and denying and dismissing Petitioner's habeas petition with prejudice. Petitioner filed timely objections to the R & R, and Respondents filed a reply to Petitioner's objections. See ECF Nos. 221 & 222.

The matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's three remaining grounds for relief: Grounds Three, Six and Seven.9 These grounds are, verbatim, as follows:

Ground Three (exhausted claim): "[Petitioner's] right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution was violated as a result of representation by counsel who labored under an actual conflict of interest." ECF No. 22 at p. 9.
Ground Six (Martinez claim): "Trial and collateral counsel were ineffective to the prejudice of [Petitioner] by failing to investigate, develop[,] and present any mitigation evidence." ECF No. 75 at p. 5.
Ground Seven (Martinez claim): "[Petitioner's] Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated when his trial counsel offered an expert witness not suitable for the case and failed to prepare[] that witness." ECF No. 75 at p. 32.
Legal Standards
I. Review of the Magistrate Judge's R & R

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis,718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).

II. Summary Judgment

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see generally Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . , to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules."); Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2011) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 'applies to habeas proceedings.'" (quoting Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 412 (4th Cir. 1991))). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . ; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in that party's favor. The court therefore cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations." Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Discussion

As indicated above, Petitioner presently seeks habeas relief on three grounds: a conflict of interest claim (Ground Three) and two Martinez claims (Grounds Six and Seven).10 The MagistrateJudge recommends granting summary judgment on all three grounds.11 See R & R at pp. 88-120, 133-93. Petitioner has filed objections to the R & R. See Pet.'s Objs. [ECF No. 221].

I. Exhausted Claim...

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