Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co. of Des Moines, Iowa
Decision Date | 09 January 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 14384.,14384. |
Citation | 193 F.2d 255 |
Parties | STOLL v. HAWKEYE CAS. CO. OF DES MOINES, IOWA. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
H. L. Fuller, Sioux Falls, S. D. (C. L. Morgan, H. T. Fuller, Mitchell, S. D., M. T. Woods, J. B. Shultz, T. M. Bailey, Jr., and F. M. Smith, all of Sioux Falls, S. D., on the brief), for appellant.
Gale B. Braithwaite, Sioux Falls, S. D. (M. Q. Sharpe, Kennebec, S. D., and Joe W. Cadwell, Sioux Falls, S. D., on the brief), for appellee.
Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH, and JOHNSEN, Circuit Judges.
Joyce Stoll, who will be referred to as the plaintiff, was injured on September 19, 1947, in Chamberlain, South Dakota, when a pickup motor truck driven by Emil Wagaman, and owned by Walter Manhalter, tipped over while she, at the invitation of Wagaman, was riding on a running board of the truck.
She sued both the owner and the driver of the truck for damages in a State court of South Dakota.She obtained a judgment only against Wagaman, the driver, which was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Dakota.Stoll v. Wagaman, 40 N.W.2d 393.The State trial court directed a verdict in favor of Manhalter, the owner.The plaintiff did not appeal from the judgment in Manhalter's favor.
After her judgment against Wagaman became final, the plaintiff garnished the Hawkeye Casualty Company of Des Moines, Iowa, the liability insurer of Manhalter, in the State court action, asserting that under the "omnibus clause" of its policy covering the truck, the Company was indebted to Wagaman, as an insured, in the amount of her judgment against him.The clause reads as follows: "The unqualified word `insured' wherever used in coverages A and B and in other parts of this policy when applicable to such coverages includes the named insured and, except where specifically stated to the contrary, also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named insured."
The Company removed the garnishment action to the federal court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy.It denied that it was indebted to Wagaman.The issue of the policy liability of the Company to him was tried to a jury.At the close of the evidence, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict upon the ground that the evidence conclusively showed that at the time of the accident the "actual use" of the truck by Wagaman was with the permission of Manhalter, "the named insured."The motion was denied.
The Company moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence established as a matter of law that the "actual use" of the truck by Wagaman was without permission from Manhalter, and that the State court judgment in Manhalter's favor was res judicata of that issue.The District Court directed a verdict for the Company, and this appeal followed.
The first witness called by the plaintiff at the trial was Emil Wagaman, the driver of the truck (who in 1947 was twenty-five years old).He testified that he went to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Davis on Main Street in Chamberlain, South Dakota, at about 6:30 p. m. on September 19, 1947; that the Davis house is on the west side of the street and about three or four blocks south of the business section of the town; that his cousins Jimmy Wagaman(fifteen years of age in 1947) and Walter Manhalter were there with Mr. and Mrs. Davis and others; and that he(Emil Wagaman) knew that Walter Manhalter's pickup truck was at the Davis home.He then testified as follows:
* * * * * *
On cross-examination, Emil Wagaman testified:
On redirect examination, Emil Wagaman testified that it was not more than six blocks from the Davis house to the sanitarium, and the distance to town from the house was a few blocks, "so the area in which I was operating this truck extended simply for a few blocks in either direction from the Davis home."
At the conclusion of the testimony of Emil Wagaman, the plaintiff rested.The Company then moved for a directed verdict in its favor on the ground that the actual use being made by Wagaman of the truck at the time of the accident was not only a substantial deviation but a complete departure from any purpose for which he was permitted to use the truck, and that the jury could not find otherwise.The court reserved its ruling on the motion, and the Company put in its evidence.Its witnesses were Walter Manhalter and Jimmy Wagaman.Their testimony did not differ materially from that given by Emil Wagaman with respect to the permission granted him to use the truck after he had volunteered to get cigarettes.
A portion of Manhalter's testimony, on cross-examination, is as follows: "
Manhalter also testified that he did not see Emil and Jimmy when they drove away, and did not see the girls at that time; that about ten or fifteen minutes after the boys left, he saw the truck again; that he was then on the front porch of the Davis home, and, as they drove in front of the house going south down the street, he hollered: He also testified that he saw the truck stop about two blocks south after it passed the Davis house, and saw the girls get in the truck and the truck go on south; that he never told Emil or Jimmy that it would be all right for them to pick up the girls; and that he had a date and intended to use the truck later that evening.
Jimmy Wagaman corroborated Manhalter's testimony.Jimmy testified that,...
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...to the liability of his insurer. See McCann v. Iowa Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 1942, 231 Iowa 509, 1 N.W.2d 682 and Stoll v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 8 Cir., 1952, 193 F.2d 255. However, the fact that a certain person is a proper party defendant in a federal court action does not of itself give ......
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