Stone v. Author

• Decision Date: 27 January 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14-3697 (MCA)
• Parties: LUCRETIA STONE, Petitioner, v. VALERIE AUTHOR, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

LUCRETIA STONE, Petitioner, v. VALERIE AUTHOR, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 14-3697 (MCA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 27, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter has been opened to the Court by Respondent's filing of a motion to dismiss the habeas Petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by pro se Petitioner Lucretia Stone,¹ a prisoner confined at Edna Mahan Correctional Facility. Respondent has moved to dismiss the Amended Petition ("Petition") on timeliness grounds. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motion at this time, and direct Respondent to file a full and complete Answer to the Petition. If appropriate, Respondent may renew its timeliness argument in its Answer.

The Court recounts only the facts necessarily to this Memorandum Opinion. The case was previously assigned to the Honorable Faith S. Hochberg. Petitioner's initial habeas petition is dated June 3, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) The Court administratively terminated the action for failing to use the correct habeas form. (ECF No. 2.) Petitioner subsequently submitted an Amended Petition on the correct form. (ECF No. 3.) Judge Hochberg issued an Order to Show Cause as to why the Amended Petition should not be dismissed as time barred under the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). (ECFNo. 4.) Petitioner submitted a response to the Order to Show Cause addressing the issue of timeliness. (ECF No. 5.) The case was subsequently transferred to the undersigned. (ECF No. 6.) On May 4, 2016, the Court reserved decision on the issue of timeliness, and ordered Respondent to file a full answer to the Petition. (ECF No. 9.) On June 7, 2016, however, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition on timeliness grounds only.² (See ECF No. 11.)

The state court record submitted by Respondent establishes the following timeline. Petitioner's conviction was entered on January 13, 2000. (ECF No. 11-2 Judgment of Conviction ("JOC").) Petitioner appealed to the New Jersey Appellate Division and her conviction was affirmed, but her sentence was modified on August 4, 2003. (ECF No. 11-3.) Petitioner's Petition for Certification on direct appeal was denied by the New Jersey Supreme Court on October 29, 2003. (State v. Stone, 178 N.J. 36 (2003)). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which was denied by the PCR court on March 30, 2006. (ECF No. 11-6, PCR Tr. dated Mar. 30, 2006.)) On or about November 10, 2007, while Petitioner's appeal from the order denying the PCR was pending before the Appellate Division, Petitioner filed a Motion for a New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence.³ (See 5-1, Petitioner'sAnswer to OTSC; ECF No. 11-1, Respondent's Br. at 2.) On February 29, 2008, the Appellate Division in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the order denying the PCR. (State v. Stone, 2008 WL 539254 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 29, 2008.) The New Jersey Supreme Court denied the petition for certification on May 30, 2008. See State v. Stone, 195 N.J. 524 (2008). On April 29, 2011, the Law Division entered an order denying the Motion for a New Trial. (ECF No. 11-11, Tr. dated Apr. 29, 2011.) Petitioner appealed, and, on May 22, 2013, the Appellate Division affirmed the order denying the New Trial Motion. State v. Stone, 2013 WL 2217493 (App. Div. May 22, 2013.) On December 6, 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied the petition for certification. State v. Stone, 216 N.J . 366 (2013).

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the November 10, 2007 motion because was untimely under state law, and, as such, her Petition is untimely under ADEPA's one-year statute of limitation. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Respondent has not met its burden to show that the Petition is untimely, and, as such, the Court will Order Respondent to provide a full and complete answer to the Petition. In that Answer, Respondent may renew its argument that Petitioner's Petition is untimely.

Under AEDPA, Congress prescribed a one-year period of limitation for the filing of federal habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners. See Douglas v. Horn, 359 F.3d 257, 261 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1), [t]he limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Under 28 U.S.C. 2241(d)(2),"[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section." This exception to the one-year limitation period is known as statutory tolling and provides that the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time a properly filed application for post-conviction relief is pending.⁴ See Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2003). An application for post-conviction relief is considered "pending" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) during the period between a lower state court's ruling and the period a petitioner has to seek review of the decision, whether or not the appeal was actually sought. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir.2000). However, "the time during which a state prisoner may file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court from the denial of his state post-conviction petition does not toll the one-year state of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)." Stokes v. D.A. of the County of Phila., 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 2001).

A petitioner is only entitled to statutory tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2) for the time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To fall within the AEDPA tolling provision, the petition for state post-conviction review must have been both pending and "properly filed." Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Horn v. Fahy, 534 U.S. 944 (2001).

In determining whether a petition is "properly filed" under the AEDPA, a federal court "must look to the state law governing when a petition for collateral relief is properly pending." Douglas v. Horn, 359 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 43 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An application is "filed" when it "is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record." Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted): An application is "properly" filed

when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee .... In some jurisdictions the filing requirements also include, for example, preconditions imposed on particular abusive filers, or on all filers generally .... But in common usage, the question whether an application has been "properly filed" is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.

Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8-9 (citations omitted); As explained by the Third Circuit in Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 85-86 (3d Cir. 2013),

if a state court determines that an application is untimely, "'that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of" statutory tolling of AEDPAs limitation period, id. at 414 (quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)), "regardless of whether [the state court] also addressed the merits of the claim, or whether [the state court's] timeliness ruling was 'entangled' with the merits[,]" Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. But if a state court fails to rule clearly on the timeliness of an application, a federal court "must ... determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness." Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006).

It is well established that a petition for state post-conviction relief that was rejected by the state courts as untimely is not "properly filed" under § 2244(d)(2). See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) ("When a postconviction relief petition is untimely under state law, that [is] the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3 (2007). However, in the absence of a "clear indication" by the state courts that a post-conviction relief petition is untimely, the federal court "must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness." Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006); accord Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 85-86 (3d Cir. 2013) ("But if a state court fails to rule clearly on the timeliness of an application, a federal court 'must ... determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.' ") (quoting Evans, 546 U.S. at 198)).

Here, Respondent's motion to dismiss fails to address the pivotal issues, i.e., whether the ...