Stone v. City of Mount Vernon
| Decision Date | 30 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 1158,1158 |
| Citation | 118 F.3d 92 |
| Parties | 6 A.D. Cases 1685, 23 A.D.D. 180, 10 NDLR P 139 Matthew T. STONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MOUNT VERNON and James Gleason, Individually and as Commissioner of the Fire Department of the City of Mount Vernon, New York, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 96-7976. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Donald L. Sapir, White Plains, NY (William D. Frumkin, Louis G. Santangelo, Sapir & Frumkin, White Plains, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Terence M. O'Neil, Mineola, NY (Ernest R. Stolzer, Richard G. Kass, Jessica S. Weinstein, Rains & Pogebrin, Mineola, NY, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: OAKES, KEARSE, and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Matthew T. Stone, a firefighter employed by defendant City of Mount Vernon (the "City"), appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles L. Brieant, Judge, dismissing his complaint alleging that defendants City and Fire Commissioner James Gleason (collectively the "Fire Department" or "Department") violated his rights under, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) ("ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994) ("Rehabilitation Act") (collectively the "federal disability statutes"), principally by refusing to assign him to a light-duty position after an off-duty accident that left him a paraplegic. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that no rational trier of fact could conclude that Stone was able to perform the essential functions of the job of firefighter, and therefore he was not qualified within the meaning of the federal disability statutes. On appeal, Stone contends principally that summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried as to whether fire suppression is an essential function of a position in certain of the Department's specialized bureaus, and whether the Department could reasonably accommodate his disability by assigning him to such a position. For the reasons that follow, we agree, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.
The events leading to this litigation are largely undisputed. The record, taken in the light most favorable to Stone as the party opposing summary judgment, with all permissible inferences drawn in his favor, reveals the following.
The City's Fire Department employs 109 firefighters. It has mutual-aid agreements with neighboring towns for assistance during multi-alarm fires. To the extent pertinent here, the Department has two "light-duty" bureaus: the Fire Alarm Bureau ("FAB") and the Fire Prevention Bureau ("FPB"). The duties of employees assigned to FAB include receiving and transmitting alarms of fires, answering telephones, and performing related paperwork; firefighters assigned to FAB assist non-firefighter dispatchers in dispatching firefighters to calls for service. The principal duties of employees assigned to FPB are enforcing the New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code and the Department's Fire Prevention Code, reviewing architectural plans and designs, meeting with builders, and performing inspections of buildings. Firefighters assigned to FPB may also be called upon to serve as guides to assist mutual-aid fire companies by meeting them at the City's border and leading them to the site of the fire; the guide travels either in the visiting fire rig or in a separate car.
Stone was hired by the Department in January 1990 and entered service as an active firefighter; he was assigned to fire-suppression duties, which principally include extinguishing fires, entering burning buildings, and performing rescues. In December 1992, while off-duty, he was helping friends to remove from a house a tree that had been uprooted by a storm; the tree suddenly sprang upright, throwing Stone to the ground. He sustained injuries inducing paraplegia, and was initially paralyzed from the waist down. After undergoing physical rehabilitation, Stone is able, with the assistance of leg braces, to walk for a few hours at a time. He also uses a wheelchair, in which he can negotiate curbs and ramps; and he has a car that is outfitted with special hand controls that enable him to drive. Stone can get into and out of his car and his wheelchair without assistance. He is also able to climb and descend stairs out of his wheelchair while pulling the chair along with him.
Since his accident, Stone has remained an employee of the Department, on leave of absence with pay, thanks to contributions of accrued paid leave by his fellow firefighters. During this time, he has served as an instructor at the Westchester County Career Chiefs' Fire Academy, where he teaches fire-and-rescue-related courses to probationary firefighters from Westchester County. As an adjunct instructor at the New York State Fire Academy, he has taught a similar course to probationary firefighters from around New York State.
In November 1994, Stone, who passed an examination qualifying him for promotion to lieutenant, requested that he be returned to active duty and assigned a position in which his disability could be accommodated. His request identified FAB as one possible assignment. Stone received no response to his request. After attempting unsuccessfully to get a response, he wrote to Commissioner Gleason in January 1995, renewing his requests. In May 1995, Stone was informed that he would not be accommodated and that he could not return to work.
Stone commenced the present action in October 1995, alleging principally that defendants' refusal to accommodate his disability by giving him a light-duty assignment, such as to FAB, violated his rights under the federal disability statutes. The complaint alleged that a February 1994 Department order stated (a) that Department members who were hired after July 1993 or who were injured in the line of duty and assigned to light duty were to be assigned to FAB as needed, and (b) that other Department firefighters not within those categories could request assignment to FAB; such requests would be granted at the discretion of the commissioner. The complaint alleged that Stone was qualified to perform the essential functions of a position in FAB and other light-duty positions.
Following a period of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Relying principally on affidavits of Commissioner Gleason, defendants argued that all of the Department's active firefighters, regardless of the bureau to which they are assigned, must be available and ready to perform fire-suppression duties. According to Gleason, the Department's 109-firefighter staff was "thinly spread"; there was "no possibility of increasing the firefighting force beyond 109, because of budget constraints"; in Gleason's "opinion, the Mount Vernon Fire Department would not be able to provide satisfactory public safety services if it did not have the flexibility to assign Fire Prevention Bureau firefighters to firefighting duties when necessary"; and "a reduction of the number of firefighters available to fight fires would be unnecessarily dangerous." (Affidavit of James D. Gleason, dated June 7, 1996, p 20.) Further, according to Gleason, it was the Department's practice to assign only two categories of firefighter to FAB: (a) those who were unable to perform regular duties because of an on-duty injury and were statutorily entitled to receive full salary indefinitely, and who would therefore otherwise collect a salary without working, and (b) those who had suffered disabling off-duty injuries that were temporary. (Id. p 11.) Stone, with a permanent injury suffered while he was off duty, did not fit into either category. Firefighters assigned to FPB included both those who had been injured on the job and those who were not injured but could fulfill the bureau's personnel needs. (Id. p 17.)
Gleason acknowledged that at or after the end of 1994, two vacancies had occurred in FPB. He testified that he did not consider Stone for assignment on either occasion because the Department's policy was to assign to that bureau "a full-time firefighter"; he stated, "It doesn't come across my mind to put Mr. Stone in there because he's not at this time capable of doing fire duties." (Deposition of James D. Gleason, April 12, 1996, at 128.)
In opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion, Stone argued principally that fire suppression is not an essential function of a position in FAB or FPB and that the Department could reasonably accommodate his disability by assigning him to either of those bureaus. He submitted an affidavit describing his physical abilities and the responsibilities of firefighters assigned to those bureaus and stating his view that he could perform those assignments. He stated that defendants had never conducted or requested an examination of him to determine his physical capabilities, mobility, or ability to perform in FAB or FPB. (Affidavit of Matthew T. Stone dated June 26, 1996, p 12.)
In support of his contention that fire suppression is not an essential function of a FPB position, Stone cited the deposition testimony of former FPB members John Koch and Nicholas Ionta. Koch, who entered service as a firefighter in 1972, was first assigned to FPB temporarily after hurting his back while on duty. He was reassigned to active duty after his injury healed, but thereafter, in or around 1985, he was assigned to FPB permanently and continued to serve in FPB at the time of his 1996 deposition. Koch testified that during all his years in FPB, he once, while a guide, operated a firehose at a major fire, without being asked to do so; while assigned to FPB, he never operated a...
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