Stone v. E. Coast Swappers, LLC
| Decision Date | 11 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | SC 20382 |
| Citation | 337 Conn. 589,255 A.3d 851 |
| Parties | Thomas G. STONE III v. EAST COAST SWAPPERS, LLC |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
William J. O'Sullivan, with whom, on the brief, was Michelle M. Seery, Wethersfield, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Mario Cerame, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy Brignole, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).
J.L. Pottenger, Jr., Jeffrey Gentes, and Sophie Laing and Stefanie Ostrowski, law student interns, filed a brief for the Housing Clinic of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization et al. as amici curiae.
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.
This certified appeal requires us to consider the circumstances under which a plaintiff may be denied attorney's fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff, Thomas G. Stone III, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court, which found that the defendant, East Coast Swappers, LLC, had violated CUTPA and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, but declined to award punitive damages or attorney's fees. See Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC , 191 Conn. App. 63, 65, 213 A.3d 499 (2019). The plaintiff contends that we should adopt a presumption whereby a plaintiff prevailing in a CUTPA action should ordinarily recover attorney's fees under General Statutes § 42-110g (d) unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Regardless of whether we adopt such a presumption, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it failed to award the plaintiff attorney's fees. Although we decline to adopt the plaintiff's suggested presumption, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
The Appellate Court's decision sets forth a detailed recitation of the facts as found by the trial court; see id., at 65–71, 213 A.3d 499 ; which we summarize in relevant part. Patrick Keithan, who was the plaintiff's son-in-law at the time, purchased a 2008 Mitsubishi Lancer Evolution from a car dealership in Georgia, where he was stationed for his military service. He financed the purchase, in part, through a loan from Wachovia Dealer Services, Inc.1
Thereafter, Keithan experienced performance issues with the car's engine. He towed the car from Georgia to Windsor Locks, Connecticut, where the defendant, a motor vehicle repair shop, was located. The defendant initially replaced the car's turbocharger, but the engine still experienced performance issues. Keithan returned to Georgia to fulfill his military service obligations and left the car with the defendant. Keithan ultimately decided to have the defendant install a Buschur Racing short block.2 A co-owner of the defendant, Paul Scott, drafted an estimate for this work, which he sent to Keithan. The estimate referenced the purchase of the Buschur Racing short block and its installation and provided an estimated cost of more than $9000.
The plaintiff loaned Keithan the money to pay the defendant. A promissory note for the loan was executed by Keithan and his wife, the plaintiff's daughter. Keihan's
wife subsequently sent a check to the defendant for the contracted amount.
Upon receipt of the payment, the defendant shipped the car's engine to Buschur Racing, which performed the requested work on the engine and returned the modified engine to the defendant. As Scott prepared the modified engine for installation, his foreman informed him that additional parts were needed to install the engine. The foreman discovered that these parts were damaged when he took the original engine apart to prepare to send it to Buschur Racing. A request for additional funding for the parts was communicated to Keithan, but he did not want to pay the extra money, and the modified engine was never installed in the car.3 The car remained in the defendant's possession.
Keithan never repaid the plaintiff any portion of the loan. Consequently, the plaintiff attempted to obtain title to the car by filing a title application with the motor vehicle division of the Georgia Department of Revenue. He was unsuccessful because the title application required Keithan's signature, which was missing.
The plaintiff subsequently traveled from his residence in Maryland to the defendant's location and asked to see the car. Scott refused to allow the plaintiff to look at the car or the modified engine and informed him that the engine had never been reinstalled and that Keithan had refused to pay for any of the extra work or parts involved. Thereafter, another co-owner of the defendant sent a letter to Keithan, in which she indicated that she had been contacted by the plaintiff. The letter referenced the sum of $14,151.71 being owed to the defendant, which represented the costs of additional shipping, engine parts, and storage over the previous year.
The plaintiff subsequently filed an action against Keithan in Maryland and obtained a judgment in the amount of $10,348. This judgment permitted the plaintiff to eventually secure a lien on the car subsequent in right to that of Wells Fargo Auto Finance. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The lien was reflected in a certificate of title, which was issued by the Georgia Department of Revenue.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a "Notice of Intent to Sell" or an "Artificer's Lien"4 with the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, claiming a lien of $1792. The Department of Motor Vehicles issued the defendant an "Affidavit of Compliance and Ownership Transfer" for use in providing valid title to a purchaser for a vehicle subject to an artificer's lien.
Extensive communications took place between the plaintiff, the plaintiff's wife, and the defendant's owners regarding the plaintiff's obtaining the car in satisfaction of his lien. During these communications, the plaintiff informed the defendant that he had secured his status as a second position lienholder on the Georgia title. The plaintiff, however, had not provided the defendant with a copy of the new Georgia title.
Keithan filed for bankruptcy protection in Maryland and secured the discharge of the plaintiff's judgment. Wells Fargo's security interest was identified as $10,700 at the time of the bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy petition, which was obtained by the defendant's counsel, identified the plaintiff as an unsecured creditor.
Thereafter, both parties retained counsel who exchanged communications regarding their clients’ respective claims related to the vehicle. In September, 2013, the plaintiff commenced the underlying action against the defendant, alleging, among other things, that the defendant had violated CUTPA.5 In November, 2013, the defendant, on the advice of its counsel, sold the car at an auction for $19,000. Although he had provided notice of the auction to Keithan and Wells Fargo and published notice in a local newspaper, Scott, on behalf of the defendant, did not provide notice of the auction to the plaintiff.
The record reveals the following procedural history. In December, 2016, the plaintiff filed the operative, single count complaint, alleging that the defendant had violated CUTPA by refusing to perform the work that had been paid for—namely, failing to install the modified engine in the car—and by failing to provide the plaintiff, a lienholder, with statutory notice of the auction.6 The case was tried to the court in January, 2017.
The trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it concluded that the plaintiff "has proven a violation of CUTPA7 [but] has not proven the evil motive or malice necessary to award punitive damages, and [the trial court] exercise[d] its discretion by finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
Damages [were] awarded in the amount of $8300." (Footnote added.)
In declining to award either punitive damages or attorney's fees, the court reasoned:
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to award him attorney's fees. While the appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the trial court articulate the factual and legal bases for its decision not to award attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiff requested that the court clarify its use of the phrase "[f]or similar reasons" in its memorandum of decision. The trial court issued an articulation, explaining: " (Emphasis in original.)
The Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that it should...
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