Stone v. Cook

• Decision Date: 30 September 1875
• Citation: 79 Ill. 424,1875 WL 8650
• Parties: MARSHALL STONEv.JOHN A. COOK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

79 Ill. 424

1875 WL 8650 (Ill.)

MARSHALL STONE

v.JOHN A. COOK.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1875.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Kendall county; the Hon. SILVANUS WILCOX, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. ELDRIDGE & LEWIS, and Mr. J. HALE FOWLER, for the appellant.

Messrs. BROWN & SOUTHWORTH, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

Appellant filed his bill in the court below alleging, in substance, that in 1855 Whitman Stone and Freelove, his wife, being seized of nineteen and one-half acres of land, particularly described, entered into a verbal agreement with appellant, whereby he was to clothe, support, provide for and pay all their expenses, during their lives; and in consideration thereof, they were to make and deliver to him a warranty deed to the land, and also sell and deliver to him all their personal property, which property was then by them delivered to him, as was also possession of the land, as part performance of the contract on their part; that appellant has held uninterrupted possession of the land and goods and chattels ever since the making of the agreement, and that he has made improvements of value on the land. It is further alleged that the agreement has been fully performed by appellant; that Whitman and Freelove died intestate, leaving appellant and one Hannah Carr their only children and heirs at law; that in February, 1873, Hannah Carr made a pretended sale of her undivided half interest in the land to appellee, and executed to him a deed for the same; that such sale and deed were fraudulent, and made with intent to defraud appellant of his rights under his contract with Whitman and Freelove Stone; that no consideration passed from appellee to Hannah Carr on account thereof, or if he paid anything, he did so knowing that appellant claimed and was in possession of the premises as sole owner; and that appellee holds the legal title to said half of the premises in trust for appellant.

Hannah Carr and appellee are made defendants, and required to answer under oath. Bill prays that appellee be required to convey to appellant.

Hannah Carr answered, but during the progress of the trial the bill was dismissed as to her.

Appellee answered under oath, alleging that he bought the interest in the land of Hannah Carr about a year before, and paid her $300 in cash; that he then had no notice, and did not suppose appellant had, or claimed, any right to Hannah Carr's interest in the land; that he bought in good faith, and took a deed from her and her husband; that the land joins appellee's farm, upon which he lived before and at the time of Whitman Stone's decease; that he frequently conversed with said Whitman and his family about their affairs, and they never informed or intimated to him that said Stone had agreed to sell, or had sold his property, or any part thereof, to appellant, as claimed in his bill; that if there had been such an agreement or sale, appellee believes he would have been informed of it. He denies the making of improvements by appellant, except some slight repairs of fences, and some small and cheap out-sheds, not exceeding $50 or $100 in value. He further alleges, that when appellant went on the premises he had no property, except a little clothing and furniture; that he had a wife and large family of children with him; that he also took with him his wife's sister, who likewise had several children; that the father, Whitman Stone, took them all in, and chiefly supported them as long as he lived--at least did as much toward supporting them as appellant did toward supporting him and his wife; that three or four years after they went there to live, appellant's wife died, leaving a large family of children, and Freelove Stone took care of them for several years, and brought them up. He denies, on information and belief, that appellant ever made any agreement relative to the land, or bought the premises, as alleged in the bill; denies that he ever took possession of it, but alleges that he went on it to live with his father, and that his father managed and controlled the farm, and did more toward supporting his son than his son did toward supporting him and his wife; alleges that after Whitman Stone's decease, appellant's mother, Freelove Stone, for most...