Stone v. Earp
| Decision Date | 03 December 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 75,75 |
| Citation | 50 N.W.2d 172,331 Mich. 606 |
| Parties | STONE v. EARP. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William J. Eggenberger, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant.
Carroll & Gallagher, Van Dyke, for defendant and appellee.
Before the Entire Bench, except BUTTZEL, J.
This is a chancery suit in which plaintiff asks that he be decreed the legal and equitable owner of a 1948 International dump truck and Fruehauf dump trailer. Defendant filed a cross-bill in which he asks for an accounting for monies received by plaintiff in payment for the employment of the vehicles under a 'lease agreement.'
In September 1949, plaintiff was associated with his brother in the business of hauling sand and gravel under the name of the Allstate Supply Company. He owned several heavy dump trucks and trailers, among them being a 1948 International dump truck and a 1948 Fruehauf trailer. Some time prior to September 19, 1949, plaintiff had an argument with two of the drivers in his employ regarding wages and the number of trips that were being made, which resulted in plaintiff offering to let them maintain the trucks and take the responsibility of their operation with payment to plaintiff for such use. This conversation was overheard by defendant, Vallie Earp, who subsequently offered to accept the proposition that plaintiff had offered his two employees.
At this time, defendant was a crane operator for Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. William L. Hendon was a son-in-law of defendant and had been employed by plaintiff's brother as a driver for the Allstate Supply Company. Plaintiff's trucks worked out of the yards of the Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. Plaintiff's equipment was usually laid off from about the first of November through the following March or April. Plaintiff was approached by defendant who informed him that if he (defendant) had a truck it would have a preference at Ready Mix Concrete, Inc., and urged plaintiff to transfer title to him so that the same could be displayed to the yard owner and the truck kept operating. After some discussion, plaintiff agreed to transfer title to defendant and put William Hendon on his payroll. Plaintiff took a lease back on this equipment. After the title was transferred, William Hendon was placed on plaintiff's payroll and drove the equipment until April 1950. The arrangement with Earp continued until the middle of January 1950, when William Hendon had an accident and was informed by plaintiff that there was no liability insurance.
The cause came on for trial at which time defendant claimed that he purchased plaintiff's equipment for the sum of $6,500 on September 20, 1949, which was paid at defendant's home.
During the course of the trial the court indicated he wanted lie detector tests before deciding the issues. He said:
The trial resumed and later, the following took place in the court's chambers.
'The Court: I will put this on the record. Both counsel are present and I want to confirm the agreement of counsel that their clients have consented voluntarily to submit to this polygraph test. They are each paying half of the expense of the test. This is $25.00 cash. Have you collected that?
'Mr. Gallagher: I have.
'The Court: Have you?
'Mr. Eggenberger: I will.
'The Court: You also consent to have your client answer any questions that the operator feels might aid the court in reaching a decision and having the questions and answers taken by the operator and then read in court afterwards subject to your cross-examination?
'Mr. Eggenberger: As far as the plaintiff is concerned it is so agreed and I will stipulate upon the same lines with Mr. Gallagher, counsel for the defendant.
'Mr. Gallagher: We will enter our agreement on the record and make the same stipulation.
'The Court: As to all those matters.
(Thereupon the polygraph tests were given in a private room, after which at 1:05 o'clock P.M. all parties returned to the courtroom.)
Alex L. Gregory, the witness called by stipulation of counsel, testified that he was a personnel consultant and conducts lie detector examinations. He stated: 'I have formed an opinion with relation to that matter and it is my opinion that Garrett Stone is not telling the entire truth regarding the matter and that Vallie Earp has told me the truth regarding the payment of money.'
At the close of the proofs, the trial court filed an opinion decreeing defendant to be the legal and equitable owner of the vehicles in question. The court's opinion contains the following:
'The polygraph tests were a definite aid to the court in this case, in supporting what appeared to be the preponderance of evidence, and in removing doubt in the court's mind as to the possibility of fraud owing to the fact all of defendant's three witnesses to the payment were his own immediate family.
'The court is satisfied from the testimony and the written instruments that a sale and purchase and payment in full ($6,500.00) took place, vesting title in the defendant.'
Plaintiff appeals and urges that it was error to give consideration and weight to the opinion of the polygraph operator. In our opinion it was error to introduce in evidence the result of the tests, but such error was not prejudicial for reasons hereinafter discussed.
In People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503, 139 A.L.R. 1171, we held that it was not error to refuse admission in evidence of the result of such tests for the reason that such tests used in ascertaining the truthfulness of a witness are still too much in the experimental field for courts to approve of their general use. We find no reason why a different rule should be followed in civil cases than in criminal cases.
Defendant urges that the use of the polygraph and resultant opinion evidence given at the trial were not necessary for decision and relies on Central Rent-A-Car & Garages, Inc., v. Franklin Mutual Insurance Company of Illinois, 291 Mich. 578, 289 N.W. 261, 262, where we said:
We are not unmindful of the fact that the direction of the trial court, the parties agreed to submit to the tests, but whether by voluntary agreement, court...
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People v. Barbara
...to civil cases, and test results may not be admitted in either civil or criminal cases pursuant to stipulation. Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 611, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951). We have applied this rule to other types of evidence. For example, in determining the admissibility of drunkometer results......
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Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dept.
...admissible at trial, either civil or criminal. People v. Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 68, 155 N.W.2d 830, 832 (1968), and Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951). Our Supreme Court has never been asked to decide whether the results of polygraph examinations may be admitted into evide......
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Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan v. Milliken
...the party asserting the claim. McCormick, Evidence (2d ed.), § 339, p. 793; 30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 1163, p. 337; Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 611, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); Martucci v. Detroit Police Comm'r., 322 Mich. 270, 274, 33 N.W.2d 789 (1948). In Aquilina v. General Motors Corp., 403......
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Romero v. State
...results inadmissible, the written agreement that such might be introduced was not binding.' 382 S.W.2d at 867. In Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951) (a civil case in which results of a lie-detector test were rejected), the court 'We are not unmindful of the fact that at the ......