Stone v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: VanVALKENBURG
• Citation: Stone v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 224 N.W.2d 77, 56 Mich.App. 330 (Mich. App. 1974)
• Decision Date: 06 November 1974
• Docket Number: Docket No. 16393,No. 1,1
• Parties: Finis STONE and Edith Marie Stone, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER CO., an Ohio Corporation, Defendant-Appellee

Page 77

224 N.W.2d 77

56 Mich.App. 330

Finis STONE and Edith Marie Stone, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER CO., an Ohio Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 16393.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

Nov. 6, 1974.

Released for Publication Dec. 18, 1974.

Leave to Appeal Denied Feb. 19, 1975.

Barry P. Waldman, Rothe, Marston, Mazey, Sachs, O'Connell, Nunn & Freid, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

James A. Sullivan, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and J. H. GILLIS and VanVALKENBURG,* JJ.

VanVALKENBURG, Judge.

It is uncontroverted that plaintiff Finis Stone was severely injured when a tire manufactured by defendant tire company exploded while Stone was attempting to mount the tire on a rim. Stone purchased the tire in question from an undisclosed customer of the service station at which Stone worked. At the time of Stone's purchase of the tire it had an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 miles of use. On the day prior to the accident Stone mounted the subject tire on his rim and placed it in his automobile as a spare. On the day of the accident one of the tires on his automobile went flat and plaintiff placed the tire in question on his automobile. The subject tire also went flat after about a block and a half of driving. Stone removed the tire for the purpose of repair and then, as he was attempting to remount the tire on the rim by means of a Coats 10--10 tire changer, it exploded causing substantial injuries to plaintiff.

It is further uncontroverted that the tire exploded when the bead wires gave way while the tire was being filled with air during the mounting operation. The sole question at trial was whether the bead failure was attributable to a defect caused by defendant company's manufacturing process. Plaintiffs' expert opined that four layers of the five layer bead bundle were broken on the vulcanizing machine at defendant's plant and that defect lay hidden until the fifth bundle broke during the mounting by plaintiff. Plaintiffs' expert was of the opinion, based upon his examination of the tire, that the bead break was not a result of any prior mismounting or damage in use although the prior history of the tire was unknown. This expert admitted his theory of causation was based upon his empirical study rather than experimental data obtained from the actual use of a vulcanizer, and the chances of such a defect being caused in this manner would be in the order of one in a million.

Defendant's two experts, on the other hand, opined that it was impossible to develop the amount of force necessary to break the tire bead wires in the vulcanizer. Both of defendant's experts testified that they had never seen or heard of broken bead wires resulting from the use of the vulcanizer. Both of these witnesses were of the opinion that this bead failure was the result of the bead hanging up on the rim during the mounting of the tire on the rim and that a tire with a bead break such as theorized by plaintiffs' expert would not survive the 3,000 to 5,000 mile use this tire had undergone before one of the plaintiffs purchased it.

Upon these proofs the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, which was denied and now appeals as of right.

The sole issue raised by plaintiffs in this appeal is whether the trial court erred reversibly in refusing to allow plaintiffs to offer evidence with respect to a new Goodyear tire with a broken bead which plaintiffs' expert allegedly observed in a tire store. The trial court refused to permit plaintiff's expert to testify as to this other tire.

Plaintiffs' counsel made an oral offer of proof with respect to what he intended to prove concerning this other tire. Counsel indicated that plaintiffs' expert would testify that he saw a Goodyear tire in a Goodyear dealership with a broken tire bead. Counsel further indicated that the employees of the tire store would testify that the tire had not been mounted and that plaintiffs' expert would testify that it appeared that the tire had not been mounted. Although defense counsel strenuously objected to plaintiffs' counsel's characterization of what the testimony of the store employees would be, the trial court assumed that the offer of proof was accurate and, nevertheless, ruled that the evidence was inadmissible because it had no relevancy or probative value, since it would require the jury to weigh the plaintiffs' expert's testimony as to his theory of causation and his belief that the tire had not been mounted against defendant's experts' testimony that if such defect existed the tire must have been mounted or otherwise physically damaged because the vulcanizer could not cause a bead break. The trial court thus premised his ruling on the conclusion that at best it would be cumulative and at worst it would introduce an entirely separate conflict between the opinions of the opposing experts which the jury would...