Stone v. Heckler, 82-1374
| Decision Date | 19 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-1374,82-1374 |
| Citation | 715 F.2d 179 |
| Parties | , 2 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 458 Oretta J. STONE (Sawyer, Danny D., deceased wage earner, S.S. # 462-62-0293), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
James Q. Smith, Wichita Falls, Tex., Michael S. Fawer, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Anthony W. Vaughn, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fort Worth, Tex., Charlene Seifert, Asst. Reg. Atty., U.S. Dept. of H.H.S., Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before BROWN, WISDOM and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
In this case involving a challenge by an ex-spouse to the granting of surviving child's benefits under the Social Security Act to the stepchildren of the deceased wage earner, this court must determine whether the Secretary's decision that the stepchildren of the deceased wage earner were eligible for such benefits is based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole. This determination revolves around the question of whether the wage earner's death was accidental within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 416(k)(1) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335 and 404.357. Because the Secretary's interpretation of that term was permissible, and because we find substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the Secretary's determination that the wage earner's death was accidental, we hold that the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary was correct and affirm.
The wage earner, Danny Sawyer, and Oretta Stone, the appellant in this case, were divorced by a decree of a Texas court entered on July 7, 1972. Four children, Stephen, Kendell, Robbin, and Paul Sawyer were born of their marriage, and custody was awarded to Oretta.
On September 8, 1975, Joyce Browning was divorced from Jimmy Browning by a Texas decree. Joyce had three children of a previous marriage, Steven, Tammie and James Ball.
Danny Sawyer and Joyce Browning were married in Mexico on August 9, 1975, 30 days before the Browning divorce decree was signed, and 60 days before the 30-day waiting period under Texas law could have expired. On September 27, 1975, nineteen days after the Browning divorce decree was signed but within the 30-day waiting period, Danny died due to stab wounds. Soon thereafter, a grand jury returned an indictment against Joyce charging that she caused the death of Danny Dean Sawyer by stabbing him with a knife.
In the meantime, both Oretta and Joyce filed separate applications for surviving child's benefits on behalf of their respective children. Oretta's four children were found eligible. The determination of the eligibility of the stepchildren was deferred pending the disposition of the charges brought against Joyce for the death of Danny Sawyer.
On April 10, 1978 Joyce entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter charges with a stipulation of evidence that "On the 27th day of September 1975, in Ector County, Texas, she did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Danny D. Sawyer, by stabbing him with a knife, at which time she was laboring under the influence of a sudden passion arising from adequate cause." Joyce was sentenced to a 10-year probated prison term.
In May, 1979, James and Steven Ball, the stepchildren of Danny Sawyer, were determined to have been eligible for surviving child's insurance benefits from September, 1975. Benefits were also awarded Tammie from September, 1975 through August, 1978, the month preceding her marriage. Oretta Stone was notified that, because of Tammie's marriage, Tammie was no longer eligible for benefits and that, therefore, the monthly benefit to Oretta's children would increase. Oretta thereafter objected to the stepchildren's receiving benefits on Danny's earning's record and requested reconsideration of that decision.
A reconsideration notice dated September 6, 1979, affirmed the initial determination that the stepchildren of the deceased wage earner were eligible for surviving child's benefits.
Oretta requested that the decision to grant the stepchildren benefits be considered de novo by an administrative law judge of the Social Security Administration. This request was granted and a full hearing was conducted. The ALJ found that the stepchildren of the deceased wage earner were entitled to surviving child's benefits under the Social Security Act. Stone sought review of the decision before the Appeals Council.
After considering all of the evidence in the record, the ALJ's determination, the applicable regulations, and Oretta's arguments in support of her claim, the Appeals Council concluded that there was no basis for granting the appellant's request for review and affirmed the decision of the ALJ awarding benefits to the stepchildren. Oretta sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On review, cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by Oretta and by the Secretary. On June 22, 1982, the district judge granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment which had the effect of affirming the Secretary's decision that the deceased wage earner's stepchildren were entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act and regulations. Oretta appeals.
Oretta seeks to terminate Social Security benefits which are being received by Danny's stepchildren. 1 To be eligible for such benefits, the stepchildren must meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(2) which provides for benefits to be paid to
(2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for not less than one year immediately preceding the day on which application for child's insurance benefits is filed or (if the insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months immediately preceding the day on which such individual died ...
Since Danny died only 47 days after his marriage to Joyce, his stepchildren would be ineligible for Social Security benefits as not having met the nine-month requirement of § 416(e)(2) were it not for an exception to this general rule.
42 U.S.C. § 416(k). Thus, the central issue in this case is whether or not the death of Danny was accidental. Under the facts of the present case and in accordance with the above statutory provisions, only if Danny's death was accidental would his stepchildren be entitled to benefits.
The Social Security regulations define "accidental" as follows:
For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, the death of an individual is accidental if he receives bodily injuries solely through violent, external, and accidental means and, as a direct result of the bodily injuries and independently of all other causes, loses his life not later than three months after the day on which he receives such bodily injuries.
42 U.S.C. § 416(k). In addition, 20 C.F.R. 404.1114(b) 2 (1979) further defines accidental death as "an event that was unpremeditated and unforeseen from the standpoint of the deceased individual." In this regard, homicides are considered accidental "unless the deceased clearly provokes his death by an assault or other provocation." Social Security Claims Manual, § 2474.4. 3 Oretta argues that by pleading guilty to voluntary manslaughter, thereby admitting that she "intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Danny by stabbing him with a knife, at which time she was laboring under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause", Joyce judicially admitted that the decedent provoked his own death which was reasonably foreseeable by him at the time. Thus, Oretta argues that it was not reasonable for the Secretary or his delegate to presume that Danny's death was accidental. We disagree.
We observe initially that much deference is due the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with its administration. "To sustain the Commission's application of a statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965), quoting, Unemployment Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153, 67 S.Ct. 245, 250, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946); see also, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583, 50 S.Ct. 422, 423, 74 L.Ed. 1051 (1930). "Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake 'involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the man charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.' " Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S.Ct. 1529, 1535, 6 L.Ed. 924 (1961). When the construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is issued, deference is even more clearly in order. Udall, 380 U.S. at 16, 85 S.Ct. at 801.
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt.... [T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes the controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
Id. at 16-17, 85 S.Ct. at 801-802, quoting Bowles...
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