Stone v. McMeekin Const. Co., s. 40866

• Decision Date: 09 October 1964
• Docket Number: Nos. 40866,No. 1,40867,s. 40866,1
• Citation: 110 Ga.App. 546,139 S.E.2d 421
• Parties: Ralph M. STONE v. McMEEKIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al. Carola V. STONE v. McMEEKIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 421

139 S.E.2d 421

110 Ga.App. 546

Ralph M. STONE v. McMEEKIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al.

Carola V. STONE v. McMEEKIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al.

Nos. 40866, 40867.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Oct. 9, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 27, 1964.

David H. Fritts, Savannah, for plaintiffs in error.

Bouhan, Lawrence, Williams & Levy, Walter C. Hartridge, II, Savannah, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Richard L. Chamber, Asst. Atty. Gen., E. J. Summerour, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, John W. Sognier, Savannah, for defendants in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

PANNELL, Judge.

1. The present companion cases are here on separate bills of exceptions, each bill of exceptions being brought by the single plaintiff in the respective suits against the same defendants assigning error on the sustaining of the defendant's general demurrers to the respective petitions. A motion is made to dismiss the two bills of exceptions under authority of § 5 of Georgia Laws 1957, pp. 224, 234 (Code Ann. § 6-919), and Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga.App. 42, 118 S.E.2d 193, and Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Blanton, 109 Ga.App. 116, 135 S.E.2d 437, construing said Act. This Act relates solely to the requirements necessary for the filing of a single bill of exceptions by two different plaintiffs in error. Here we have no such situation. The motion to dismiss is denied.

2. 'While a county is not liable to suit unless made so by statute, it has been provided by a statute of this State, that a county is primarily liable for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges, whether erected by contractors or county authorities; * * *' Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga.App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619. 'When the contract for a public bridge, ferry, or causeway is let, the contractor's bond shall be conditioned also to keep it in good repair for at least seven years, and as many more years as may be covered by the contract: Provided, that such contract may be let under existing laws without requiring the aforesaid condition in the contractors' bonds, if in the opinion of the commissioners of roads and revenues, or of the ordinary in counties where there are no such commissioners, it would be to the public interest to dispense with said condition in said bond: Provided, however, that in every case the county shall be primarily liable for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges, whether erected by contractors or county authorities. The term 'bridges' in this section shall be defined as a structure erected to afford unrestricted vehicular traffic over an obstruction in the public highways of the State, including rivers, streams, ponds, lakes, bays, ravines, gullies, railroads, public highways and canals; the term bridge as defined in this section shall include the approaches to the structure previously defined within 50 feet of either end of said structure except where the bridge itself measures 100 feet or more and in said event within 100 feet of either end of said structure.' Code Ann. § 95-1001. The language of the statute, 'that in every case the county shall be primarily liable for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges, whether erected by contractors or county authorities,' is plain and unambiguous and must be construed to include temporary as well as permanent bridges.

3. 'It is the duty of the proper county authorities to construct and maintain bridges across streams in a workmanlike and proper manner, so that any person may use them with safety, in the exercise of ordinary travel, but this duty is not one of extraordinary care and diligence, nor does its exercise extend to extraordinary occasions, beyond the ken of general experience. The law does not make the county authorities insurers of the safety of any of those who use bridges.' Stamps v. Newton County, 8 Ga.App. 229(5), 68 S.E. 947. Lincoln County v. Gazzaway, 43 Ga.App. 358, 359, 158 S.E. 647; Cox v. Ware County, 52 Ga.App. 45, 46, 182 S.E. 408; Grady County v. Banker, 81 Ga.App. 701(6), 59 S.E.2d 732.

4. 'In a suit against a county for damages alleged to have been caused by a defective bridge, the plaintiff cannot recover unless the proper county authorities had knowledge of the defective condition, or unless the defect had existed for such a length of time that knowledge thereof on the part of the county authorities would be presumed (Stamps v. Newton County, 8 Ga.App. [229,] 230, 68 S.E. 947 [3b]); and it is a jury question as to what length of time a defect in a bridge must exist before a county is charged with knowledge of negligence (City of Rome v. Brooks, 7 Ga.App. 244, 66 S.E. 627; Enright v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. [288,] 289).' Nunez v. Emanuel County, 22 Ga.App. 219, 95 S.E. 718, 721.

5. 'A defect in a bridge, which serves as the basis for liability by a county for injuries received by reason thereof, includes any condition of the bridge which renders the bridge unsafe for travelers passing over the bridge.' Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga.App. 580(3), 171 S.E. 220.

6. While a county may be under no duty to place signs warning of the defective condition of a bridge upon its highway, and a failure to so do might not be accounted negligence, Wilkes County v. Tankersley, 29 Ga.App. 624(3), 116 S.E. 212, Newberry v. Hall County, 52 Ga.App. 472(6), 183 S.E. 664, still the absence of any such warning signs may be considered by the jury in determining whether or not a person approaching the bridge has exercised the care and diligence required of him to avoid injury. Meriwether County v. Gilbert, 42 Ga.App. 500, 156 S.E. 472. And the fact that the county is under no such duty does not relieve the contractor of a duty to erect warning signs although his duty to erect warning signs might be limited to that portion of the highway under his control as decided in Murdock v. Ledbetter-Johnson Co., 105...