Stone v. Signode Indus. Grp., LLC

Decision Date25 March 2022
Docket Number17-cv-05360
Citation594 F.Supp.3d 993
Parties Harold STONE and John Woestman, for themselves and others similarly-situated, and United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, Plaintiffs, v. SIGNODE INDUSTRIAL GROUP, LLC and Illinois Tool Works, Inc., jointly and severally, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

John G. Adam, Law Office of John G. Adam, PLLC, Stuart M. Israel, Legghio & Israel, P.C., Royal Oak, MI, George A. Luscombe, III, Stephen Anthony Yokich, Dowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Joseph James Torres, Emma O'Connor, Jennifer Thompson Beach, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants Signode Industrial Group LLC, Illinois Tool Works Inc.

ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS

JOHN F. KNESS, United States District Judge Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt. 138) for Class Certification and Appointment of Class Representative and Class Counsel under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants (1) agree that the Rule 23(a)(1)-(3) standards are met, (2) do not contest the Rule 23(a)(4) and (g) adequacy of Woestman and plaintiffscounsel, and (3) do not oppose Rule 23(b)(1)(A)-(B) and (b)(2) certification. (Dkt. 143.)

In view of the foregoing, the Court FINDS as follows:

1. Plaintiffs Stone and Woestman, for themselves and the proposed class of similarly-situated retirees and the retirees’ surviving spouses and other eligible dependents (collectively, the "retirees"), sued defendants Signode Industrial Group, LLC and Illinois Tool Works, Inc., under Sections 502(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (e), and (f) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (e), and (f), and under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185.

2. On behalf of the class, plaintiffs Stone and Woestman sued to enforce the 2002 Pensioners’ and Surviving Spouses’ Health Insurance Agreement and earlier agreements (collectively, the "2002 Pensioners’ CBA"), and for damages and other remedies for defendantsERISA violations and contract breaches. Stone and Woestman joined with plaintiff USW, the retirees’ former union. USW is a party to the 2002 Pensioners’ CBA, and sues defendants ITW and Signode under LMRA Section 301.

3. Stone, et al., v. Signode Industrial Group, LLC and Illinois Tool Works, Inc. , 943 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2019), reh. en banc den. (2020), cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 246, 208 L.Ed.2d 22 (2020), aff'g 365 F.Supp.3d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (R55, 64, 95, 108, 116-118, 136), determined that defendants ITW and Signode improperly discontinued the retirees’ collectively-bargained lifetime company-paid family healthcare on January 1, 2016.

4. Remaining are issues concerning "class certification, class notice, damages and remedies, and other proceedings." (R136). After the plaintiffs filed their certification motion (R138-139), plaintiff Harold Stone passed away. (R158). Plaintiffs now ask the Court (1) to certify the class and (2) to appoint Woestman as class representative and Stuart M. Israel, John G. Adam, and Stephen Yokich as class counsel, pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1)-(4), (b)(1) and (b)(2), (c)(1)(B), and (g). Plaintiffs define the class as:

All (1) employees who retired under the 2002 Pensioners’ and Surviving Spouses’ Health Insurance Agreement or earlier agreements (collectively, the "2002 Pensioners’ CBA"), from the USW-represented unit at the Riverdale, Illinois steel manufacturing and packaging plant and who received, or were or are eligible to receive, company-provided healthcare under the 2002 Pensioners’ CBA and (2) the retirees’ spouses, other eligible dependents, and surviving spouses who received, or who were or are eligible to receive, company-provided healthcare under the 2002 Pensioners’ CBA.

5. Class Action Standards. A "principal" purpose of Rule 23 is to promote "efficiency and economy of litigation." American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah , 414 U.S. 538, 553, 555, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). Rule 23 "must be" liberally interpreted as its "policy is to favor maintenance of class actions." King v. Kansas City Southern Indus. , 519 F.2d 20, 25-26 (7th Cir. 1975). a. Under Rule 23(a)(1)-(4), one or more class members "may sue" on "behalf of all members" if there is "numerosity," "commonality," "typicality," and "adequacy of representation." Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp. , 167 F.R.D. 51, 55 (N.D. Ill. 1996). If these standards are met, a "class action may be maintained" (1) under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) or (B) —to avoid the "risk" of "inconsistent" adjudications and "incompatible" standards or to avoid impairing or impeding the ability of non-parties "to protect their interests"—and (2) under Rule 23(b)(2) —where "final injunctive" or "declaratory" relief is appropriate "respecting the class as a whole."

b. Retirees’ ERISA/LMRA lawsuits to enforce collectively-bargained healthcare promises are well-suited to resolution in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. See, e.g. , (1) Temme v. Bemis Co. , 47 Employee Benefits Cas. 1877 (E.D. Wisc. 2009) (retiree healthcare ERISA/LMRA action certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) ) and (2) Zielinski v. Pabst Brewing Co. , 2005 WL 3240590 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) (retiree healthcare ERISA/LMRA action certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) and (b)(2) ).

6. Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity. Rule 23(a)(1) "numerosity" is determined by "the specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations." Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W., Inc. v. EEOC , 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). A class of as "few" as 40 may be warranted, "especially when the members are ‘widely scattered.’ " Quiroz v. Revenue Production Mgt., Inc. , 252 F.R.D. 438, 441 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, there are more than 100 retirees and surviving spouses remaining in the proposed class, residing in 13 states. The "numerosity" requirement is met.

7. Rule 23(a)(2) commonality. There need only be "one question of law or fact common to the class." A "common nucleus of operative fact" is "usually enough" to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), which is a "low hurdle easily surmounted." Gaspar , 167 F.R.D. at 57 (citations omitted). Here, the proposed class members all present ERISA/LMRA healthcare claims under the 2002 Pensioners’ CBA, and satisfy the "commonality" standard.

8. Rule 23(a)(3) typicality. Rule 23(a)(3) requires only that the class representative's claims be "typical" of those of the other class members, as when their claims arise from the "same event or practice or course of conduct" or "are based on the same legal theory." Rosario v. Livaditis , 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992) (reh. en banc den. ), cert. den. 506 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 972, 122 L.Ed.2d 127 (1993). Here, all class members sue to enforce the 2002 Pensioners’ CBA and challenge the termination of their healthcare, and satisfy the "typicality" standard.

9. Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy. Class representatives must have "a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to ensure vigorous advocacy" for the class with the aid of "competent, qualified, experienced counsel." Quiroz , 252 F.R.D. at 442 (citations omitted). Here, retirees Stone and Woestman have effectively prosecuted this action, as shown by the rulings of this Court and the Seventh Circuit, and the "adequacy" standard is satisfied.

10. Rule 23(g) class counsel. A district court certifying a class action "must appoint class counsel," considering counsel's work "in the action," other experience, legal knowledge, resources, and anything else "pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class." Rule 23(g)(1)(A) and (B). Here, as reflected in their qualifications and experience summarized in R139-2 and as demonstrated by their work in this action, plaintiffscounsel met the Rule 23(g) standard.

11. Rule 23(b)(1) risks of inconsistent adjudications. Absent class certification, there would be substantial risk of "inconsistent" or "varying" adjudications and "incompatible standards" for measuring defendants’ healthcare obligations and for rectifying the harm done to class members and their families who reside in 13 states, satisfying Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) certification standards.

12. Rule 23(b)(2) generally applicable conduct. Defendants "acted" on "grounds that generally apply to the class"—discontinuing the collectively-bargained family...

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