Stone v. State, 1198
Decision Date | 10 September 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 1198,1198 |
Citation | 405 A.2d 345,43 Md.App. 329 |
Parties | , 6 A.L.R.4th 439 Calvin STONE v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Martha Weisheit, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief, for appellant.
Ray E. Stokes, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Warren B. Duckett, Jr., State's Atty. for Anne Arundel County and William D. Roessler, Asst. State's Atty. for Anne Arundel County, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before MOORE, MASON and LISS, JJ.
In this case we are concerned with whether a term of imprisonment can be validly imposed as a condition of probation.
On October 25, 1976, Calvin Stone, appellant, entered a plea of guilty in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to the crime of robbery. He was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment; the sentence was suspended, and appellant was placed on supervisory probation for five years and ordered to make restitution and pay court costs. On December 23, 1977, appellant was found guilty of violating the terms of his probation and the previously imposed five year sentence was reinstated. Appellant appeared before Judge Childs on March 15, 1978, for a sentence modification hearing. At this time the court issued the following "Order of Probation" which provided, among other things, that:
Thereafter, appellant was released from the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections and committed to the jurisdiction of the Warden of the Anne Arundel County Detention Center. On October 6, 1978, appellant was convicted of escape from the Anne Arundel County Detention Center. He appeared before Judge Thieme on October 30, 1978, and was found guilty of violating the terms of his probation, including the special condition that he serve eighteen months at the Anne Arundel County Detention Center on a live-in, work-out basis. Thereupon, appellant's original five year sentence was reinstated with credit for time served at the detention center.
Ignoring the order of probation and relying on a handwritten notation on the criminal hearing sheet which said:
appellant argues, in effect, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to find him guilty of violating the terms of his probation because he was not on probation, but was still serving the eighteen month sentence imposed on March 15, 1978. Stated another way, that until he had completed his eighteen month sentence at the Anne Arundel County Detention Center on a live-in, work-out basis, he was not on probation and, therefore, could not be found guilty of violating probation.
The State, in response to appellant's argument, merely stated in its brief:
We, of course, are bound by the provisions and conditions contained in the order of probation and not the handwritten notation appearing on the criminal hearing sheet.
As we perceive it, the issue is whether the trial court could validly impose, as a special condition of probation, an eighteen month sentence to be served in the Anne Arundel County Detention Center on a live-in, work-out basis. Although this is an issue of first impression in this State, it has been considered in other jurisdictions and different results have been reached. Jurisdictions holding that imprisonment is a valid condition of probation have generally relied on express statutory authority permitting such action. For example, See State v. Iverson, 269 N.W.2d 390 (S.D.1978); State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 126, 592 P.2d 175 (1978); State v. Gloudemans, 73 Wis.2d 514, 243 N.W.2d 222 (1976); State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18 (Fla.1976); Prue v. State, 63 Wis.2d 109, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974); In Re: Williams Petition, 145 Mont. 45, 399 P.2d 732 (1965).
On the other hand, jurisdictions holding that imprisonment is not a valid condition of probation generally rely on the lack of express statutory authority permitting such action.
In State v. Nuss, 190 Neb. 755, 212 N.W.2d 565 (1973) the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary and was placed on probation for a period of three years. One of the conditions of probation required that he serve 14 days in the county jail. The trial court, in explaining the reason he was sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment as a condition of probation indicated that he wanted the defendant to get a pretty good idea of what imprisonment was like; how frustrating, useless and degrading it is; and to reflect upon what a three to five or ten year sentence would mean. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held:
"Although the trial court's motivation was admirable, imprisonment as a condition of probation must rest on statutory authority.
In State v. Evans, 109 Ariz. 491, 512 P.2d 1225 (1973) the defendant was found guilty of assault with intent to commit robbery, and was sentenced to ten years probation, conditioned upon serving eight to ten years in the state prison. The Supreme Court of Arizona, in holding that the trial court had no statutory authority for imposing an eight to ten year prison sentence as a condition for probation, said:
"In State v. Van Meter, 7 Ariz.App. 422, 440 P.2d 58 (1968), a similar conditional probation was ordered. There the defendant was placed on probation conditioned upon his serving four months in county jail. The court said:
See also People v. Ledford, 173 Colo. 194, 477 P.2d 374 (1970). In that case the defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. His application for probation was granted, and as one of the conditions of probation he was ordered to serve ninety days in the county jail. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in holding that the county court did not have authority or power to impose a jail sentence as a condition of probation, said:
Of like import see Boyne v. State, 586 P.2d 1250 (Alaska, 1978); State v. Harris, 251 N.W.2d 483 (Iowa, 1977); State v. Marshall, 247 N.W.2d 484 (S.D.1976).
The statutory provisions granting trial judges of this State discretion to suspend sentences or parts...
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