Stone v. Stone
| Decision Date | 29 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 12576.,12576. |
| Citation | 405 F.2d 94 |
| Parties | Daisy B. STONE, Appellant, v. Edley Craighill Nicholas STONE and Richard Fielding Stone, III, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Richard F. Stone, Lynchburg, Va., for appellant.
William Rosenberger, Jr., Lynchburg, Va., for appellees.
Before SOBELOFF, BRYAN and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges.
This case presents an interesting question concerning the proper coordination of the jurisdictional requirements of the Judicial Code in diversity cases with provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring liberal joinder of claims and parties.
Plaintiff Daisy Stone brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against her daughter-in-law and grandson, relying upon diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy as the basis for federal jurisdiction.1 She is a citizen of California and the defendants are citizens of Virginia. In her complaint, Mrs. Stone alleged that she had created separate trusts for the purpose of providing for the education of her granddaughter Edley C. Stone and her grandson Richard F. Stone, III. The latter is a defendant in this action. Edley C. N. Stone, the other defendant, is the daughter-in-law of the plaintiff and the mother of the two grandchildren for whose benefit the plaintiff established the trusts. Edley C. Stone, the granddaughter, is not a party as she has moved to Tennessee and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
The complaint alleged that both trusts have terminated and that, according to the terms of the trust instruments, the remaining trust assets reverted to the plaintiff but have been misappropriated by the defendants. Inexplicably, the certificates of corporate stock which were donated to the trusts were not transferred to the trustee's name but were placed and permitted to remain in the names of the trust beneficiaries. Defendant Edley C. N. Stone is charged in one count of the complaint with unlawfully and wilfully diverting from the plaintiff the stock which had been held in trust for Edley C. Stone's benefit. Of the total damages sought, the amount attributable to this claim is $8,321.05.
In a second count, the defendant grandson, Richard F. Stone, III, is charged with wrongfully refusing to endorse to the plaintiff the stock certificates which were part of the trust established for his benefit. Edley C. N. Stone, mother of the grandchildren, is alleged to have "aided and abetted" this tortious conduct and is named co-defendant in this count of the complaint. The value of this stock, including accumulated dividends, for which the plaintiff seeks redress is $5,583.00.
Both defendants moved to dismiss for lack of the the requisite jurisdictional amount on the theory that distinct claims against several defendants may not be aggregated for the purpose of satisfying the jurisdictional requirement. The District Judge concluded that the defendants' point was well taken and ordered dismissal of the action. The plaintiff appeals.
We think the case should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff has stated two separate claims against her daughter-in-law and a single claim against her grandson. Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the claims against the daughter-in-law to be joined in a single action. Under the rule, a plaintiff may join "as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing party." The fact that joinder is permitted does not of course mean that the requisite amount in controversy is present. However, it is settled law that a plaintiff may aggregate his claims against an opposing party and thereby satisfy the monetary requirement for federal jurisdiction. Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 24, at 117 n. 56.4 (Rules ed. 1960); 1 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.97, at 882 (2d ed. 1964); Wright, Federal Courts, § 36, at 102 (1963). See, e. g., Alberty v. Western Surety Co., 249 F.2d 537 (10 Cir. 1957); Pearson v. National Society of Public Accountants, 200 F.2d 897 (5 Cir. 1953); Snyder v. Wylie, 239 F.Supp. 999 (W.D.N.C.1965). Judge Chesnut, speaking for this court in Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Parsons, 70 F.2d 863, 864 (4 Cir. 1934), stated that "a single plaintiff having several claims, each less than the jurisdictional amount, may properly combine them for the purpose of establishing the requisite amount in controversy where they can be properly joined in one suit."
The District Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain the claims against the defendant Edley C. N. Stone, since their aggregate is in excess of $10,000.
II
The question remains whether the plaintiff's claim against Richard F. Stone, III, may be litigated in the District Court along with the claims against his mother. For reasons to be stated, we conclude that the District Court also has jurisdiction to decide the claim against him.
Although neither in the District Court nor on appeal did the parties advert to the question of joinder, it should be noted that Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 permits the claim against the grandson to be joined with the claims against the daughter-in-law. The rule provides in part:
All persons * * * may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
It seems clear that the count charging the defendants with conspiracy in the tortious refusal of the grandson to endorse the stock certificates does assert a right to relief against them jointly which arises out of the same occurrences. The common question of fact presented is whether the grandson's conduct was in fact tortious, for if it was not, the daughter-in-law cannot be said to have aided and abetted his wrongful activity.
We now consider the question of jurisdiction over the claim against the grandson. Since this claim is for no more than $5,583.00 it falls below the minimum jurisdictional amount. However, this is not dispositive of the issue. The requirement of § 1332(a) is an "action" in which the "matter in controversy" exceeds $10,000, and we think the critical inquiry is whether the entire lawsuit may be treated as an "action" that meets the monetary test.
In a recent case, Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital, 392 F.2d 149 (1968), the Third Circuit had before it the precise question presented here: when there exists the requisite amount in controversy as to claims against one or more defendants but not as to a claim against another defendant, may a federal court sitting in a diversity action exercise jurisdiction over the claim which, if litigated alone, admittedly would not satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement? In Jacobson, the plaintiff-executor sought redress for the personal injuries and subsequent death of his decedent allegedly resulting from the negligence of the defendants, two physicians and a hospital. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Damages well in excess of $10,000 were sought against the doctors but a state statute limited liability of the hospital to a maximum of $10,000. The plaintiff could therefore not have sued the hospital alone in a federal diversity action.
The District Court dismissed the action as to the hospital, but the Third Circuit reversed. In so ruling, the court noted the trend of a number of its recent decisions recognizing "diversity jurisdiction over an entire lawsuit in tort cases presenting closely related claims based, in principal part at least, on the same operative facts and normally litigated together, even though one of the claims, if litigated alone, would not satisfy a requirement of diversity jurisdiction," 392 F.2d 153. Frankly acknowledging that the Third Circuit's prior cases differed in some details, Chief Judge Hastie found it persuasive, as do we, that the claims against the defendants in Jacobson "arise out of a single injury sustained by a particular person" and that "most of the operative facts are common to the coupled claims."
Thus, in multi-claim diversity cases, the Third Circuit treads the path recently blazed by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed. 218, where guidelines were announced for the proper handling of state claims in federal question cases.2
In the latter type of case, the question is to what extent, under the doctrine of pendent...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Moor v. County of Alameda 8212 10
...Ins. Assn., 431 F.2d 1122, 1128 (CA6 1970); Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 415 F.2d 809, 816—817 (CA8 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (CA4 1968); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (CA5 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital, 392 F.2d 149, 153—154 (......
-
Hunter v. United Van Lines
... ... 179, 187-90, 54 S.Ct. 177, 180-81, 78 L.Ed. 254 (1933); Combined Communications Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 641 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.1981); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000, 93 S.Ct. 315, 34 L.Ed.2d 261 (1972); Alberty v. Western Surety Co., 249 F.2d ... ...
-
Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.
...requirement by adding to his diversity claim under Count I the amount of the recovery he is seeking under Count II. See Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1968); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1588, at pp. 805-06 (1972). Counts I and II each involve claims which cl......
-
Freeman v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc.
...Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6 Cir. 1970); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8 Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000, 93 S.Ct. 315, 34 L.Ed.2d 261 (1972); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital, 392 F.2d 149 (3 Cir. 1968); Wilso......