Stonebraker v. State

• Decision Date: 19 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 985S389,985S389
• Citation: 505 N.E.2d 55
• Parties: Loretta STONEBRAKER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 55

505 N.E.2d 55

Loretta STONEBRAKER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 985S389.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 19, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 28, 1987.

Stephen L. Trueblood, Trueblood Harmon Carter & Cook, Terre Haute, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Gary Damon Secrest, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Loretta Stonebraker was convicted at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Parke Circuit Court of inducing a murder and of conspiracy to commit murder, a class A felony. She was sentenced to sixty (60) years for the former, and fifty (50) years for the latter, to be served concurrently. On direct appeal, she raises the following issues for our consideration:

1. whether Appellant was subjected to double jeopardy;

2. whether Appellant was denied her constitutional right to confront witnesses; and

3. prosecutorial misconduct.

In the summer of 1983, Appellant approached Helen Williams and John Sigler, and offered cash if they would kill her husband. Appellant sought to get out of debt, and no longer loved her husband. She approached Williams and Sigler a number of times with increasing cash offers. Appellant first suggested that Williams and Sigler use an ice pick to kill the victim, and showed them how to do it. Subsequently, the three decided to lure the victim to a hog farm on the pretext of stealing a hog, and to kill him there. On February 24, 1984, Williams, Sigler, and the victim drove to the hog farm. Sigler and the victim left the truck, and Williams drove around for approximately fifteen (15) minutes. When she returned to the farm, Sigler was alone and told her it was all "over with." Williams testified that she later turned herself in because she "couldn't live with it anymore" and because it was causing her to drink.

I

Appellant urges the trial court erred in entering judgment and sentencing her for both the offense of conspiracy and the offense of inducing a murder. Appellant was charged in two different causes which were consolidated for purposes of trial. In Cause No. 84-CR-68, Appellant was charged with conspiracy in violation of Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-5-2. This statute makes it a crime to agree with another person to commit a felony, and provides that to conspire to commit murder is a class A felony. The statute further provides that the State must allege and prove that either the defendant, or the person with whom the defendant agreed, performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. The charging information here, omitting formal parts, read:

"On or about the 4th day of February, 1984, in Parke County, State of Indiana, Loretta N. Stonebraker, John C. Sigler, and Helen Lee Williams did agree within and among each other for the object and purpose with the intention to commit a felony, to-wit: murder. Said Loretta N. Stonebraker offering Helen Lee Williams and John C. Sigler the sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) to induce them to kill Marion L. Stonebraker, Sr."

Appellant was charged in Cause No. 84-CR-69 with inducing a murder in violation of Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-4. This statute, in pertinent part, states: "A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense...." The information charging Appellant with this violation read as follows:

"On or about the 4th day of February, 1984, in Parke County, State of Indiana, Loretta N. Stonebraker did knowingly induce John C. Sigler to commit an offense, to-wit: murder, by shooting Marion L. Stonebraker, Sr. in the head with a certain deadly weapon to-wit: a rifle loaded with gun powder and a bullet, thereby inflicting a mortal wound upon said Marion L. Stonebraker, Sr., causing him to die and said John C. Sigler did commit the offense in the manner and form stated."

The verdicts of the jury found Appellant "guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, a class A felony" and "guilty of aiding or inducing or causing an offense namely murder, a class A felony," and the trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to fifty (50) years for the crime of "conspiracy, a class A felony" and sixty (60) years for "inducing an offense of murder," said sentences to run concurrently.

Appellant's claims that both of these charges and convictions find her guilty of the same crime or, at any rate, that conspiracy is an included offense of the inducing charge. As demonstrated by the record set out above, Appellant was properly charged in Cause No. 84-CR-68, convicted and sentenced for the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. The information charging conspiracy stated that Appellant entered into an agreement with Williams and Sigler, and offered them $3,000 to induce them to kill the decedent. This was a proper charge of conspiracy. The inducement statute, Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-4, does not name a separate crime of aiding, abetting, or inducing one to commit an offense. Rather, it provides a person doing so is guilty of the underlying offense. In Hoskins v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 419 Hoskins claimed he could not be found guilty of murder since the evidence showed he took part in a robbery but did not do the actual killing. We stated in that case:

"The evidence which tended to show that the Appellant himself did not actually commit the murders was introduced by Appellant in an effort to show that he was present and took part in the robbery but did not take part in any killings. The instructions on confederate liability were properly given by the trial court. They do not represent an additional charge nor a new theory in the cause. The trial court properly stated that there is no separate crime of being an accessory to a crime or aiding and abetting its perpetration. One can be charged as a principal and convicted on proof that he aided or abetted another in committing the crime. Instruction No. 3 was a recitation of the statute which states this to be so. Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-4 (Burns Repl.1979)."

Id., 441 N.E.2d at 425.

The charging affidavit for inducement contains the necessary information to comply with the aiding, inducing, or causing statute (Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-4), and states this was contrary to Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1(1), the murder statute. This Court has frequently upheld convictions where the charging affidavit used language similar to that here. Abner v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1254 (convicted of aiding reckless homicide); Champion v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 681 (pleaded guilty to aiding in the commission of a felony, robbery); Mauricio v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 88 (convicted of aiding felony murder); Shaffer v. State (1983), Ind., 449 N.E.2d 1074 (while reversed on other grounds, conviction was for inducing murder). All of these cases cite Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-4 as the foundation for the conviction. In Mauricio, supra, we said:

"The purpose of an affidavit is to advise the defendant of the particular crime charged so he can prepare a defense. Keel v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 579, 333 N.E.2d 328. A defect in an affidavit is grounds for reversal only where it prejudices substantial rights of the defendant. Thorne v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 70, 292 N.E.2d 607; Gabitz v. State (1977), 172 Ind.App. 343, 354, 360 N.E.2d 259, 267."

Id. 476 N.E.2d at 91.

It is apparent Appellant was aware she was charged with murder. She attempted to prevent the filing of a death penalty affidavit indicating she was aware she was charged with murder. Appellant's defense would have been no different if the charging affidavit had contained language charging her with murder itself. The essential elements and facts necessitating her repudiation of the charge would have remained the same.

We further reject the contention that conspiracy is an included offense of the inducing charge. The inducement charge under Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-4 requires that the offense actually be committed, while conspiracy requires only that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy be committed. The conspiracy could be completed without the occurrence of a murder and the facts constituting the conspiracy would not support a charge of murder. There is therefore no merit to Appellant's contention that she was subjected to double jeopardy.

II

Appellant next alleges she was denied her rights of due process and confrontation due to the trial court's limitation of cross-examination of key witnesses Helen Williams, Jan Bush, and Rhea Billingsly. Helen Williams was a co-conspirator who testified for the State, while the others were merely corroborating State's witnesses. Appellant sought to introduce evidence of drug usage, sales, and treatment on the part of all three witnesses. The trial court ruled that as to Williams, any evidence concerning drugs had to be confined to the time period of her alleged conspiratorial conversations with Appellant.

The conduct of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court, and only a total denial will result in an error of constitutional proportion. Komyatti v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 279, 282, reh denied (1986). Anything less than a total denial is viewed as a regulation of the scope of cross-examination by the trial court, and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. Appellant maintains this evidence was critical in that it showed Williams' bias and motive for testifying, and her inability to observe, perceive, recall, and relate events. The trial court did allow evidence to show Williams' bias and motive, in the form of testimony regarding her deal with the prosecutor. The trial court's limitation of cross-examination concerning drugs to the specific time period still allowed Appellant to show the witness' inability to perceive and recall events. The trial court's limitation simply confined certain testimony to pertinent times, and precluded any...