Stoneham v. Rushen

• Decision Date: 24 May 1984
• Citation: 203 Cal.Rptr. 20,156 Cal.App.3d 302
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Elvry STONEHAM et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Ruth RUSHEN, as Director of the California Department of Corrections, Defendant and Appellant. George DENTON, Director, California Department of Corrections, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Marin, Respondent; Elvry STONEHAM, an individual, and Prison Law Office, etc., Real Parties in Interest. A021730, A023754.

Page 20

203 Cal.Rptr. 20

156 Cal.App.3d 302

Elvry STONEHAM et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Ruth RUSHEN, as Director of the California Department of Corrections, Defendant and Appellant.

George DENTON, Director, California Department of Corrections, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Marin, Respondent;

Elvry STONEHAM, an individual, and Prison Law Office, etc., Real Parties in Interest.

A021730, A023754.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

May 24, 1984.

Certified for Partial Publication.

Hearing Denied Aug. 8, 1984.

John K. Van de Kamp, State Atty. Gen., Karl S. Mayer, Thomas P. Dove, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant and petitioner.

Michael Satris, Donald Specter, Charles S. Bishop, San Quentin, Paul Comiskey, Smith, Snedeker & Comiskey, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and respondents and real parties in interest.

RACANELLI, Presiding Justice.

In these consolidated proceedings, we consider certain questions left undecided in Stoneham v. Rushen (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 729, 734, 737, 188 Cal.Rptr. 130 [Stoneham I] and the validity of a contempt order based upon an alleged noncompliance with the trial court's mandamus order affirmed in Stoneham I.

In Stoneham I we held that the Director of Corrections (Director) was required to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as codified (Gov.Code, § 11342 et seq.) in promulgating regulations dealing with a newly established standardized classification point-scoring system relating to prison placement. During the pendency of that appeal the Director promulgated amended Regulation 3375 (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 15, § 3375) incorporating the classification scoring process. Upon further hearings following remand, the trial court found that the adopted regulation, characterized as nothing more than a "policy statement," was inadequate in failing to provide sufficient details concerning the operation and effect of the implementing classification scoring system. In denying the Director's motion for an order discharging the writ of mandate, the trial court entered a further order that the Director "proceed further with adoption of a regulation to comply with [its] mandate." The Director appeals from the order denying discharge. ¹

Thereafter, contempt proceedings were initiated against the Director charging willful noncompliance with the terms of the mandamus order as modified.

On June 15, following argument of counsel, the trial court entered a minute order finding the Director, George Denton, in contempt and imposing a fine of $1,000, with execution stayed for a period of 60 days. ² Thereafter, upon the Director's petition, we issued the writ of certiorari, continued a previous stay of the contempt order and consolidated the related matters for decision.

The Appeal (A0 21730)

The Director contends, in essence, that the subject regulation (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 15, § 3375) ³ was properly adopted consistent with APA requirements and is in full compliance with the terms of the original order of mandate. Generally, the Director argues that the trial court's actions were procedurally defective and in excess of its jurisdiction.

It is undisputed that the regulation provides only broad outlines of the classification scheme itself. Details of the point scoring system bearing upon custody placement decisions have been relegated to administrative bulletins contained in the classification manual without independent review under the APA. Although the parties focus their arguments principally upon the validity of the regulation itself, two interrelated questions are presented for decision: 1) whether Regulation 3375 is valid notwithstanding the absence of specific details concerning the operation of the classification point-scoring system; 2) and whether implementation of the point-scoring system contained in the administrative bulletins is conditioned upon preliminary compliance with the APA, a question we answered affirmatively in Stoneham I, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 729 at p. 736, 188 Cal.Rptr. 130.

I

Under the relevant APA provisions governing the adoption of regulations by administrative agencies, the regulation--in order to be valid and effective--must be "within the [agency's] scope of authority ...." (Gov.Code, § 11342.1) and "consistent ... with the statute and reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute." (Gov.Code, § 11342.2.) Any interested person may test the validity of a regulation by bringing an action for declaratory relief on grounds that: (1) the agency substantially failed to comply with the various notice and hearing procedures; (2) the record does not support the agency's determination that the regulation was reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute; and (3) in the case of an emergency regulation, the facts do not constitute an emergency. (Gov.Code, § 11350.) ⁴

The Director argues, convincingly, that the quality or substance of the regulation is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry and that review on appeal is limited to a determination whether 1) the agency complied with statutory procedures and 2) the regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose. We agree.

"The court's role in reviewing administrative regulations adopted pursuant to the former Administrative Procedure Act is a limited one. 'First, our task is to inquire into the legality of the challenged regulation, not its wisdom. (Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 737 [63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697].) Second, in reviewing the legality of a regulation adopted pursuant to a delegation of legislative power, the judicial function is limited to determining whether the regulation (1) is "within the scope of [the] authority conferred" ( [former] Gov.Code, § 11373) and (2) is "reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute" ( [former] Gov.Code, § 11374). Moreover, "these issues do not present a matter for the independent judgment of an appellate tribunal; rather, both come to this court freighted with the strong presumption of regularity accorded administrative rules and regulations." (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 172, 175 [70 Cal.Rptr. 407, 444 P.2d 79].) And in considering whether the regulation is "reasonably necessary" under the foregoing standards, the court will defer to the agency's expertise and will not "superimpose its own policy judgment upon the agency in the absence of an arbitrary and capricious decision." (Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 832 [27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83].)' (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 411 [128 Cal.Rptr. 183, 546 P.2d 687]; see also Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 111 [172 Cal.Rptr. 194, 624 P.2d 244]; International Business Machines v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 26 Cal.3d 923, 931, fn. 7 [163 Cal.Rptr. 782, 609 P.2d 1].) .... [p] Where the Legislature has delegated to an administrative agency the responsibility to implement a statutory scheme through rules and regulations, the courts will interfere only where the agency has clearly overstepped its statutory authority or violated a constitutional mandate." (Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 355-356, fn. omitted, 185 Cal.Rptr. 453, 650 P.2d 328.)

Respondents neither argued below nor on appeal that the agency contravened a constitutional mandate or exceeded its statutory authority. Thus, once the regulation was officially filed, it is presumed that it was "duly adopted" in compliance with the APA (Gov.Code, § 11343.6) and in the language of the published text (Gov.Code, § 11344.6, formerly § 11343.7). Without a record of the agency's rule making proceeding for purposes of judicial review (Gov.Code, § 11347.3), the presumption of regulatory stands unrebutted and is controlling on appeal.

Under the statutory scheme, review of the sufficiency or qualitative substance of the regulation is delegated to the executive branch and, in the absence of arbitrariness is beyond the scope of judicial oversight. (See Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 355, 185 Cal.Rptr. 453, 650 P.2d 328; see also Gov.Code, § 11350, subd. (c).) ⁵

Since the record demonstrates that Regulation 3375, as amended, was adopted in full compliance with the APA and transgresses neither constitutional nor statutory limitations, we conclude that the challenged regulation is legally valid in its existing form.

II

We next consider the remaining issue whether the Director may implement Regulation 3375 by use of the classification scoring system contained in either administrative bulletins or classification manual without APA compliance. As earlier noted, we have previously determined that precise question in Stoneham I where we held that the point scoring system represents a rule of general application which must be adopted in compliance with the APA. (Stoneham I, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at pp. 736-737, 188 Cal.Rptr. 130.) We also determined that the classification scoring system did not fall within the limited exemptions provided under Government Code section 11342, subdivision (b). (Id., at p. 736, 188 Cal.Rptr. 130; cf. Hillery v. Rushen (9th Cir.1983) 720 F.2d 1132 [guidelines relating to prison inmates' property subject to APA compliance].) Our determination is fortified by the recent enactment of Government Code section 11347.5 (effective January 1, 1983) which expressly provides that "[n]o state agency shall issue, utilize, enforce, or attempt to enforce any guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule, which is a regulation as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 11342, unless the guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule has been adopted as a regulation and filed with...