Stoneking v. Bank of America, NA
Decision Date | 04 March 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 22,172.,22,172. |
Citation | 132 N.M. 79,43 P.3d 1089,2002 NMCA 42 |
Parties | Richard J. STONEKING and Dierdre J. Stoneking, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Stephen E. McIlwain, Stephen E. McIlwain, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.
William R. Keleher, Megan T. Muirhead, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
{1} Question: Does federal law preempt NMSA 1978, § 56-8-30 (1980), which prohibits banks from collecting prepayment penalties on home mortgages? Answer: Yes, when applied to federally-chartered thrift institutions and banks. Because this opinion interprets a statute important to New Mexico residential borrowers and banks, we issue it as a formal opinion.
{2} On April 3, 1998, Plaintiffs obtained a home loan from Bank of America, Federal Savings Bank, a predecessor to Bank of America, N.A. (Defendant). The loan was secured by a mortgage against Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs signed an Adjustable Rate Note containing a prepayment penalty clause providing that should the loan be paid off within thirty-six months, Defendant could charge a prepayment penalty of two percent on any amount prepaid in excess of twenty percent of the original principal. On May 19, 2000, Plaintiffs paid off the balance of the mortgage and were charged a prepayment penalty of $1,400.61.
{3} Plaintiffs sued Albuquerque Title Company, Inc. (not a party to this appeal) and Defendant in district court for unjust enrichment, fraud, prima facie tort, and unfair trade practices, claiming that Defendant violated the New Mexico Residential Home Loan Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 56-8-22 to -30 (1980, §§ 56-8-25 to -28 repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 44, § 1), and specifically Section 56-8-30, when it enforced the prepayment penalty provision contained in the Adjustable Rate Note. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that section 56-8-30 was preempted by the federal Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994) and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and this appeal followed.
{4} Dismissal is proper under Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA 2002 when the law does not support the claim under the facts presented. Wallis v. Smith, 2001-NMCA-017, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 214, 22 P.3d 682. We review a ruling on a grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and resolving all doubts in favor of the sufficiency of the complaint. Id.; see, e.g., Trigg v. Allemand, 95 N.M. 128, 133, 619 P.2d 573, 578 (Ct.App.1980) ( ).
{5} Under Article VI of the Constitution, the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause prohibits the application of state laws which conflict with federal laws. Home Mortgage Bank v. Ryan, 986 F.2d 372, 375 (10th Cir.1993).
{6} Section 56-8-30 of the New Mexico Residential Home Loan Act states that "No provision in a home loan, the evidence of indebtedness of a home loan, a real estate contract or an obligation secured by a real estate mortgage requiring a penalty or premium for prepayment of the balance of the indebtedness is enforceable." Defendant argues that Section 56-8-30 is preempted by the HOLA and the regulations promulgated pursuant to the HOLA. We agree.
{7} 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) gives the following power to the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS):
This broad language Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 161, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (quoting Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F.Supp. 903, 910 (C.D.Cal.1978)).
{8} It is well established that state laws may be preempted by properly promulgated federal regulations as well as through duly enacted laws. "Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes." Id. at 153. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2002) states that OTS "hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulations for federal savings associations." The regulation further provide that "the types of state laws preempted by [HOLA] include, without limitation, state laws purporting to impose requirements regarding ... initial charges, late charges, prepayment penalties, servicing fees, and overlimit fees." 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(5) (emphasis added). Specifically, OTS states in 12 C.F.R. § 560.34 (2002):
Any prepayment on a real estate loan must be applied directly to reduce the principal balance on the loan unless the loan contract or the borrower specifies otherwise. Subject to the terms of the loan contract, a Federal savings association may impose a fee for any prepayment of a loan.
(Emphasis added.)
{9} OTS, under the power granted to it by Congress,...
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