Stoneledge At Lake Keowee Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Imk Dev. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2015-000417,Opinion No. 5601 |
| Citation | 425 S.C. 268,821 S.E.2d 504 |
| Parties | STONELEDGE AT LAKE KEOWEE OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., C. Dan Carson, Jeffrey J. Dauler, Joan W. Davenport, Michael Furnari, Donna Furnari, Jessy B. Grasso, Nancy E. Grasso, Robert P. Hayes, Lucy H. Hayes, Ty Hix, Jennifer D. Hix, Paul W. Hund, III, Ruth E. Isaac, Michael D. Plourde, Mary Lou Plourde, Carol C. Pope, Steven B. Taylor, Bettie J. Taylor, and Robert White, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Respondents, v. IMK DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC, Larry D. Lollis, William C. Cox, Integrys Keowee Development, LLC, Marick Home Builders, LLC, Bostic Brothers Construction, Inc., Rick Thoennes, Defendants, Of Which Bostic Brothers Construction, Inc. is the Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Alan Ross Belcher, Jr., Elizabeth Wieters, and Paul Barry Trainor, all of Hall Booth Smith, PC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant.
Robert T. Lyles, Jr., of Lyles & Associates, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.
In this construction defect case, Bostic Brothers Construction, Inc. (Bostic) appeals several of the trial court's orders. Bostic argues the trial court erred by (1) denying its motion for a directed verdict based on the statute of limitations, (2) improperly setting off portions of the jury's verdict, and (3) denying its motion for a new trial. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The salient facts at issue in this complex construction litigation are discussed at length in this court's opinion in Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners' Assoc. v. IMK Dev. Co. , Op. No. 5600, 425 S.C. 276, 821 S.E.2d 509, 2018 WL 4905983 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 10, 2018) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 40 at 11-31). This case involves the first developer of the property, Bostic, which the jury found to be partially responsible for the damages Stoneledge suffered. Our opinion in Stoneledge I adequately addresses the second and third issues Bostic raises in this appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 220(c), SCACR, we reverse the trial court's set-off order and remand for entry of judgment consistent with our decision in Stoneledge I . Furthermore, we affirm the trial court's order declining to grant Bostic's motion for a new trial.
The only issue raised by Bostic that was not addressed in Stoneledge I is Bostic's motion for directed verdict based on the statute of limitations.
"When reviewing a motion for directed verdict, this court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and may only reverse a jury's verdict if the factual findings implicit within it are contrary to the only reasonable inference from the evidence." Maher v. Tietex Corp. , 331 S.C. 371, 376, 500 S.E.2d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 1998).
Generally, a cause of action for negligence or breach of implied warranties must be brought within three years or risk dismissal based upon the statute of limitations. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (2005). "The three-year statute of limitations ‘begins to run when the underlying cause of action reasonably ought to have been discovered.’ " Holly Woods Ass'n of Residence Owners v. Hiller , 392 S.C. 172, 183, 708 S.E.2d 787, 793 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Martin v. CompanionHealthcare Corp. , 357 S.C. 570, 575, 593 S.E.2d 624, 627 (Ct. App. 2004) ). "Under the discovery rule, ‘the three-year clock starts ticking on the date the injured party knows or should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence that a cause of action arises from the wrongful conduct.’ " Id . (quoting Martin , 357 S.C. at 575-76, 593 S.E.2d at 627 ). "The test for whether the injured party knew or should have known about the cause of action is objective rather than subjective." Id ."Therefore, this court must determine ‘whether the circumstances of the case would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded, or that some claim against another party may exist.’ " Id . (quoting Young v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. , 333 S.C. 714, 719, 511 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ct. App. 1999) ).
Bostic argues it was entitled to a directed verdict because the homeowners knew or should have known of issues pertaining to its actions as builder of the Stoneledge properties years before it was sued in February 2010. Bostic relies heavily on property owner Steven Taylor's testimony that he "observed water intrusion in various parts of [his] home, including the outside porch and crawlspace, both before and after Marick/IMK assumed control of the Project and created the HOA." Bostic also noted Taylor told Rick Thoennes, then a member of the HOA, of the defects in 2005. Bostic asserts these admissions indicate it should not be liable for any damages the HOA incurred because it had notice of the defects in 2005, and did not pursue any legal remedies at that time. We disagree.
Bostic argues this case is controlled by this court's decision in Barr v. City of Rock Hill , wherein this court found, "[a] party has constructive notice [of an issue] if the party knows of ‘ "facts and circumstances of an injury [that] would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right ... has been invaded or that some claim against another might exist." ’ " 330 S.C. 640, 645, 500 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Graniteville Co. v. IH Servs., Inc. , 316 S.C. 146, 148, 447 S.E.2d 226, 228 (Ct. App. 1994) ). This court held, "[f]ailure of the injured party to comprehend the full extent of damages ... is immaterial." Id .
The plaintiffs in Barr purchased a home in May 1987 from a development corporation associated with the City of Rock Hill. Id . at 642, 500 S.E.2d at 158. At that time, and each year until May 1990, the Barrs had the house inspected for termites. Id . Those reports indicated excessive moisture under the home and suggested repairs, "including adding vents, back-filling footers, and installing a polyethylene vapor barrier." Id . The Barrs did nothing to repair these items until 1992, when they were denied refinancing based on those issues. Id . at 642, 500 S.E.2d at 159. Thereafter, the Barrs contacted the city to request repairs. Id . at 643, 500 S.E.2d at 159. The Barrs contracted with an engineering firm to obtain a structural inspection, which revealed a number of problems including, "improper installation of floor joists and sills, improper support of floor sills, standing water under the house, no solid footing beneath a number of piers, and unacceptable moisture content in the floor joists." Id . The Barrs filed suit against the city in 1994, and the city raised a statute of limitations defense. Id . The circuit court granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment finding the statute of limitations had expired. Id . at 642, 500 S.E.2d at 158.
This court affirmed. Id . at 646, 500 S.E.2d at 159. The court declined to determine if the statute of limitations began to run after the first termite inspection or as a cumulative effect of the multiple termite inspections, instead finding the applicable statute of limitations would have run under either scenario. Id . at 645, 500 S.E.2d at 159. In so doing, this court noted, "[m]any of the problems listed [in the engineering reports] were also listed in the termite inspection reports." Id . The court stated, "[i]f the Barrs had exercised reasonable diligence and investigated the problems noted in the termite inspection reports, they could have realized the magnitude of the problem and brought suit before the statute of limitations ran." Id . at 646, 500 S.E.2d at 159.
The HOA, on the other hand, asserts this case is more similar to our supreme court's decision in Santee Portland Cement Co. v. Daniel Int'l Corp. , 299 S.C. 269, 384 S.E.2d 693 (1989), overruled on other grounds . In 1965, Santee entered into a contract with Daniel for the construction of a cement plant in Orangeburg. Id . at 270, 384 S.E.2d at 693. As part of the construction, Daniel built a cement storage silo complex. Id . In 1969, Santee discovered a small crack in one of the bins which was repaired by Daniel's sub-contractor. Id . In 1975, another crack formed in that bin and Santee worked with another company to fix the issue. Id . at 270, 384 S.E.2d at 694. That contractor characterized the work as a "permanent repair." Id . In 1980 a different bin ruptured causing extensive damage and killing two. Id . Santee filed suit against Daniel asserting its negligent work caused damages to Santee's plant. Id . Daniel argued the suit was barred by the statute of limitations, and the trial court agreed. Id . The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Id . at 274, 384 S.E.2d at 696.
The court found Santee introduced testimony that the defects in the silos were latent because the negligent work was within the concrete walls. Id . The court noted Santee had experienced cracking, but experts testified those issues were common in cement structures. Id . Furthermore, Santee had the silos inspected and fashioned a "permanent repair" for the issues. Id . The court found, "[a]ll of the evidence introduced went to the reasonableness of Santee's actions, which was an issue to be decided by the jury." Id .
Further, the HOA asserts its position is also supported by Judge Wooten's analysis in Centex Homes v. S.C. State Plastering, LLC , Case No 4:08-cv-2496-TLW, 2010 WL 2998519 (D.S.C. July 28, 2010). Centex was the developer, general contractor, and seller of a condominium complex in North Myrtle Beach. Id . at *1. The complex consisted of ten buildings; the dispute concerned Building 3, completed in June 2001, and Building 1, completed in April 2002. Id . The defendants were subcontractors on the project. Id . In 2002, Centex discovered water damage to Building 3, thought to have been caused by water intrusion at the intersection of decks and the outside walls of the units. Id . Two of the defendants performed repairs to the...
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