Stoner Mfg. Corp. v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Aurora

• Decision Date: 24 January 1958
• Docket Number: Nos. 34483,34577,s. 34483
• Citation: 13 Ill.2d 162,148 N.E.2d 441
• Parties: STONER MFG. CORP., Appellant, v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF AURORA et al., Appellees. The CITY OF AURORA ex rel. Paul EGAN et al. v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF AURORA et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 441

148 N.E.2d 441

13 Ill.2d 162

STONER MFG. CORP., Appellant, v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF AURORA et al., Appellees.

The CITY OF AURORA ex rel. Paul EGAN et al. v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF AURORA et al., Appellees.

Nos. 34483, 34577.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 24, 1958.

Rehearing Denied March 19, 1958.

Sears & Streit, Aurora (Barnabas F. Sears, Edward F. Streit, Richard L. Johnston, and John E. Dreyer, Aurora, of counsel), for appellant.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., Reid, Ochsenschlager & Murphy, and Charles A. Darling, Corporation Counsel, Aurora (William C. Wines, Chicago, Lambert M. Ochsenschlager, and Robert B. Hupp, Aurora, of counsel), for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The two appeals consolidated for this opinion come to us from the circuit court of Kane County and are sequels to City of Aurora ex rel. Egan v. Young Men's Christian Association of Aurora, 9 Ill.2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347, which was an action to set aside a deed whereby the city conveyed certain real property to the association. The land in question had been deeded to the city nine years previously 'to hold and use and to permit the use for public purposes, either by the the grantee or by the State of Illinois as the grantee may determine,' and was conveyed by the city to the Y. M. C. A. for a high bid of $25,000, under authority thought to exist in the Revised Cities and Villages Act. We held that section 59-I of the act, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1953, chap. 24, par. 59-I) did not permit the sale of municipal property held on express trust and reversed the decree which had upheld the sale on that theory. However, on the basis of evidence showing the impracticability and impossibility of exactly fulfilling the donor's intent and in view of the further fact that a counterclaim of the vendee prayed for general relief, we found that the trial court, under the traditional and broad powers accruing to equity over charitable trusts, would have been justified in decreeing a sale of the property and in imposing the same trust on the proceeds thereof under the doctrine of cy pres. Accordingly, we remanded the cause for proceedings consistent with our view and directed that if the court, in the exercise of its powers over trusts, should approve the sale previously made to the Y. M. C. A. then it should determine how the proceeds of such sale should be applied for city purposes under the cy pres doctrine of trusts.

Upon remandment the cause was redocketed and the Y. M. C. A. filed an amended counterclaim, in which the city joined, specifically praying (1) approval of the prior sale; (2) determination as to the disposition and use of the proceeds; and (3) the execution of a proper deed by the mayor and city clerk. Because a charitable trust was involved the Attorney General of Illinois was made a party and he subsequently filed an answer asking the court to approve the sale to the Y. M. C. A. and to impress the proceeds with the trust. At this juncture Stoner Mfg. Corp., an Illinois corporation owning land across the street from the trust property, sought leave to intervene and also moved that the cause be consolidated with an action it had filed against the city and Y. M. C. A. approximately a year earlier, and before our opinion, seeking to set aside the sale and deed to the Y. M. C. A. Before such motion was acted upon, the manufacturing corporation instituted a completely new action, adding the other owners of abutting lands and the Attorney General as parties defendant, in which it attacked the power and discretion of equity to order a sale of the premises and sought an injunction, prayed for damages to the city and abutting owners resulting from alleged illegal building activities of the Y. M. C. A. on the premises, and in the alternative, asked the court to order the premises restored to their original condition and to decree a new sale for which the corporation tendered a minimum advance bid of $100,000.

On February 6, 1957, the chancellor denied the corporation leave to intervene in the remanded cause and the following day, on motion of the Attorney General, dismissed the company's new action for want of equity. Thereafter the court conducted a hearing and culminated the original proceeding by approving the sale to the Y. M. C. A., and ordering the execution of a deed, but reserved the question relating to the disposition of the proceeds. The Stoner Mfg. Corp., hereinafter referred to as appellant, has appealed both from the order denying it leave to intervene in the original cause and from the decree dismissing the complaint in the separate proceeding.

The common and decisive question in both appeals is whether appellant has an interest in the trust property different from that of the public generally, and it is conceded that if such special interest does not exist, then appellant has no standing to sue and the litigation is properly within the charge of the Attorney General. See: Stowell v. Prentiss, 323 Ill. 309, 154 N.E. 120, 50 A.L.R. 584; Barker v. Hauberg, 325 Ill. 538, 156 N.E. 806; Newberry v. Blatchford, 106 Ill. 584; Art Institute of Chicago v. Castle, 9 Ill.App.2d 473, 133 N.E.2d 748; Kolin v. Leitch, 343 Ill.App. 622, 99 N.E.2d 685; People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson, 327 Ill.App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 794; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, vol. 2A, sec. 414.

Pertinent facts gathered from the records filed in this court disclose that the trust property was vacant and unimproved when deeded to the city. Although an unsuccessful attempt had been made to convey the land to the State of Illinois Armory Board, the city had not, prior to the conveyance to the Y. M. C. A., either made or formally authroized any specific public use of the trust property. It had, however, tolerated one corner of it to be improved and used as a parking lot by industries in the area. Appellant is the owner of one such industry, its offices, factory and some parking facilities of its own being located across from the parking lot on the trust property, and it is alleged that appellant's employees, customers and tradespeople use the trust property for parking purposes. Based upon these facts, and upon the circumstances that the donor's deed dedicated the trust property to 'use for public purposes,' appellant asserts that it has a special interest distinct from the public, first, because it is the...