Stones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist.

• Citation: 572 F. Supp. 1072
• Decision Date: 28 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. CV 82-5995-ER(Px).,CV 82-5995-ER(Px).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Phyllis S. STONES, Plaintiff, v. LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

572 F. Supp. 1072

Phyllis S. STONES, Plaintiff, v. LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. CV 82-5995-ER(Px).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

September 28, 1983.

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Bruce M. Stark, Long Beach, Cal., for plaintiff.

Office of General Counsel, Los Angeles Community College Dist., Mary L. Dowell, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

RAFEEDIE, District Judge.

This matter was tried to the court sitting without a jury commencing July 13, 1983. Bruce M. Stark appeared for plaintiff Phyllis Stones, and Mary L. Dowell, Office of General Counsel, Los Angeles Community College District, appeared for the defendants. Having fully considered the evidence presented, and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby renders its decision as follows.

I

This is an action for injunctive and compensatory relief brought by Phyllis Stones against the Los Angeles Community College District (the "District"), Leslie Koltai and Mary E. Lee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. Plaintiff is a black woman, currently employed by the District as an Assistant Dean of Instruction. Plaintiff was first employed by the District when it was part of the Los Angeles Unified School District in 1962. She has served as a teacher, a college instructor, a Department Chair, an Administrative Intern, a Coordinator of Community Services, and an Assistant Dean of Instruction. She has been an Assistant Dean of Instruction at Los Angeles Valley College since 1978.

Since 1978, and at all times relevant to this action, each college in the District has had three deans. The deans constitute the second highest administrative level at a college, and report directly to the college president. In about 1978, plaintiff applied for the position of Dean. It was determined she met the minimum qualifications for the position, and she since then has been part of the "Dean's pool," a list of approximately 180 persons who meet the minimum qualifications to be a Dean, and who are all considered for each opening for Dean as openings occur. Whenever an opening for a dean has occurred, and has been filled from the pool (rather than by administrative transfer of another permanent Dean), plaintiff's application and references have been reviewed.

When a vacancy occurs for the position of Dean, the selection process leading to a permanent replacement begins with the appointment by the College President of a search committee. Typically, the search committee for an appointment at the Dean's level is composed of the President himself or herself, members of the faculty, members of the administration at the college who will interact often with the Dean and possibly a student. The search committee reviews all applications in the Deans' pool from applicants interested in the particular deanship and particular college, and the references submitted on confidential "tracers" solicited from each candidate's supervisors or references, in order to determine which candidates to invite for an interview. However, the District's procedure permit this initial review to be performed by the college president himself or herself, or by one or more designees. This is done on occasion.

After reviewing the applications, the college president and/or committee invite for interview, those candidates who appear to be the most outstanding available, taking into consideration such factors as the particular needs of the college, the particular area of administration involved (e.g. instruction, administrative services or student services), and the District's commitment to affirmative action. The interview committee sees the candidates invited, and then recommends two candidates to the Chancellor and the Board of Trustees. The Chancellor reviews the qualifications of the two candidates recommended, and may consult the college president. The Chancellor may recommend one candidate to the Board of Trustees, or may recommend both candidates as equally suited for the position. The Board of Trustees may accept or reject the Chancellor's recommendation. The Board of Trustees makes the final decision regarding appointment of a Dean.

Plaintiff's application for a position as Dean was reviewed in conjunction with the hiring process conducted by the District for each of the four positions for Dean of Instruction that became available in 1979, 1980, and 1982. The persons who were invited to interview for the position at East Los Angeles College were deemed by the selection committee to be better qualified than plaintiff, and the person selected, Noel Korn, was deemed by the interview committee to be better qualified. The persons who were invited to interview for the position at Los Angeles Mission College were deemed by the selection committee to be better qualified than plaintiff, and the person selected, Raul Cardozo (who is Hispanic), was deemed by the interview committee to be better qualified. The persons who were invited to interview for the position at Los Angeles Valley College were deemed by the selection committee to be better qualified than plaintiff, and the person selected, Dr. Edwin Young, was deemed by the interview committee to be better qualified. The people who were invited to interview for the position at Los Angeles Pierce College were deemed by the selection committee to be better qualified than plaintiff, and the person selected, Jean Loucks (who is a woman), was deemed by the interview committee to be better qualified.

Plaintiff contends that her failure to attain the position of dean at one of the community colleges is a result of racial discrimination directed against her by the individual defendants and by the system implemented by the District. Plaintiff claims that the individuals violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by depriving her of her right to contract for employment on the same basis as whites in the terms and conditions of her employment. Plaintiff alleges that the District violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by acting under the color of state law and depriving plaintiff of her civil rights to public employment on the same basis as whites in seeking promotion within the District.

II

Before addressing the merits of plaintiff's claims, the Court must first examine whether or not the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prohibits, in full or in part, the type of action presently being sustained by plaintiff. The Eleventh Amendment states:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

Although the Amendment does not provide by its specific terms, the courts have consistently held that it has the effect of prohibiting a state's own citizens (or another state's citizens) from instituting suit against the state without the state's consent. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Vaughn v. Regents of the University of California, 504 F.Supp. 1349, 1351 (E.D.Cal.1981).

Furthermore, it is clear that the Eleventh Amendment is not limited to actions against the states qua states. If the action is essentially one that will, if successful, require the payment of sums out of the state treasury, then it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Put another way, the question is whether the state is the real party in interest. In this case, that question depends on whether the entity sued herein (the District) is such an agency of the State of California thereby making the State the real party in interest. If so, the District would be entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit.

The question of whether the state is the real party in interest is a question of federal law, but the federal courts are instructed to consider the manner in which the state law treats the entity under examination. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir.1981). Whether under state law the entity is treated as the state; if it is permitted to sue and to be sued; and if it essentially operates independently of the state are relevant criteria in making the determination. Rutledge, 660 F.2d at 1349. The crucial factor is whether the named defendant has such independent status that a judgment against the defendant would not impact the state treasury. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d at 1350 citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 664, 94 S.Ct. at 1356.

Neither the state nor the federal courts have ruled on the Eleventh Amendment status of the state's community college system, but several courts have held, in analogous situations, that the state college systems are "alter ego's" of the state and thus accorded immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d at 1350 (the California State Colleges and Universities are state agencies and enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); Vaughn v. Regents of University of California, 504 F.Supp. at 1351-1354 (Regents are a state agency immune from suit); Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d at 1349 (Regents and the University are state agencies immune from suit). Other circuits are in accord with this position.¹ Despite the authority in support of the immunity argument in this context, the court must nevertheless consider the status of this particular college system to conclude whether it is immune by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment. In doing so, it must consider the treatment given by the state courts, the relevant considerations cited above, and the particular function at issue in this litigation.

Under California law, the education of the citizenry is an exclusive state function that cannot be delegated. Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 181, 302 P.2d 574 (1956). The...