Stoney v. United States, 82-210.
| Decision Date | 28 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-210.,82-210. |
| Citation | 494 A.2d 1303 |
| Parties | Jacob STONEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Sidney R. Bixler, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, for appellant.
Charles W. Cobb, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Michael W. Farrell, and Steven C. Tabackman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellee.
Before NEWMAN and ROGERS, Associate Judges, and REILLY, Chief Judge, Retired.
Stoney was convicted by a jury of burglary, grand larceny, destruction of property, and obstruction of justice. He challenges his convictions on a number of grounds; we find only one meriting discussion. We hold that the convictions for obstructing justice must be reversed since neither the grand jury nor the United States Attorney (or his assistants) is an investigator duly authorized by the Mayor within the meaning of the D.C.Code § 22-703 (1981) (repealed 1982).1 We reverse the conviction for obstructing justice, affirm the other convictions, and remand for resentencing.2
Viewing the evidence in its light most favorable to the government, Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d 862, 864 (D.C. 1984), it shows that Stoney aided and abetted two juveniles in breaking and entering an apartment and stealing therefrom a television set, a backgammon board, eight shirts and four suits. The property had a value in excess of $100. After Stoney had been charged, he learned that one of the juveniles had been subpoenaed to appear before a Superior Court grand jury in this case. Stoney offered to pay the juvenile if he would not testify against him.
D.C.Code § 22-703 (1981), in pertinent part, read:
(a) Whoever . . . willfully
endeavors by means of bribery . . . to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication to an investigator of the District of Columbia by any person of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute in effect in the District of Columbia . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term . . . "investigator" means an individual duly authorized by the Mayor or his designated agent to conduct or engage in . . . an investigation.
At oral argument, we requested the parties to submit supplemental memoranda on the question of whether a Superior Court grand jury or the United States Attorney was an "investigator" "authorized by the Mayor" within the meaning of the statute. They did so. They are in agreement that the plain language of the statute as well as its legislative history shows that neither the...
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Wynn v. United States
...reversed. Appellant Wynn's conviction for CPWL is affirmed, and his case is remanded for possible resentencing. See Stoney v. United States, 494 A.2d 1303, 1304 (D.C.1985) (“We reverse the conviction for obstructing justice, affirm the other convictions, and remand for resentencing.”) (citi......
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Payne v. United States
...of a Washington Post newspaper reporter. Mozee and Diggs contend that, in light of this court's recent opinion in Stoney v. United States, 494 A.2d 1303 (D.C. 1985), their convictions for obstruction of justice must be reversed. Lastly, Diggs maintains that the trial court erred in denying,......
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Scutchings v. United States
...the former statute, § 22-722 proscribes attempts to influence a witness not to cooperate with the grand jury. See Stoney v. United States, 494 A.2d 1303, 1304 n. 1 (D.C. 1985). Appellant committed the crime during the period when the latter statute was in effect. Hence, the provisions of th......