Stonkus v. City of Brockton School Dept.

• Decision Date: 14 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-2223.,02-2223.
• Parties: Frances STONKUS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CITY OF BROCKTON SCHOOL DEPARTMENT; Richard E. Zoino; Antonio M. Cabral, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

322 F.3d 97

Frances STONKUS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CITY OF BROCKTON SCHOOL DEPARTMENT; Richard E. Zoino; Antonio M. Cabral, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 02-2223.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Submitted January 27, 2003.

Decided March 14, 2003.

Michael M. Kramer, on brief, for appellant.

Rebecca J. Wilson, Sandra P. Criss and Peabody & Arnold LLP, on brief, for appellees.

Before LYNCH, Circuit Judge, STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge.

In this wrongful termination case, plaintiff-appellant Frances Stonkus appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employers, defendant-appellees City of Brockton School Department, Brockton High School Science Department Head Antonio M. Cabral and Brockton High School Housemaster Richard Zoino (collectively, "defendants"). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

The following facts are undisputed.¹ Stonkus was hired as a biology teacher at Brockton High School beginning September, 1994. She was fifty-two years old at the date of hire. She received satisfactory performance evaluations for her first two years of teaching, and was twice reappointed for successive year-long terms.

On or about October 2, 1996, while teaching a biology class, Stonkus and a male student engaged in a verbal exchange about the male reproductive organ. The student complained to Zoino, who conducted an investigation into the matter. The investigation included interviewing several students from the class and holding a conference with the student's parents. Cabral and Zoino also observed Stonkus's classroom performance and concluded that certain areas "needed improvement."

On or about February 5, 1997, Stonkus filed a grievance with the assistance of the Brockton Education Association alleging that Zoino's handling of the student's complaint violated the terms of an applicable collective bargaining agreement. In May, 1997, while the grievance process was still ongoing, Stonkus received notification that she would not be rehired for the following school year. In August, 1997, Stonkus entered into a "Memorandum of Agreement" with Brockton, in which it agreed to rehire Stonkus without tenure for the 1997-98 school year. The Agreement contained an explicit waiver of any and all claims Stonkus could bring to challenge a decision the defendants might later make not to reappoint Stonkus for the 1998-99 school year.

Stonkus alleges in her complaint that following her initial termination in May, 1997, Cabral hired two new female teachers, aged 21 and 30. Upon Stonkus's return to teaching in September, 1997, the classroom regularly assigned to her for the past three years was given to one of the new hires. Stonkus alleges that she was given as her space the corner of a small project room. According to her, as a result she had to use three carts to move her materials from room to room each day.

Stonkus's superiors found her teaching performance during the 1997-98 school year to be unsatisfactory, and she was not rehired for the following school year. In her complaint, Stonkus alleges that she has not been able to secure other employment. In her subsequent job search, she claims, two school systems advised Stonkus that she was their first choice for a position as a science teacher before calling Brockton for a reference. After the conversations with Brockton, Stonkus was not hired for either position. Later, the positions were re-advertised.

B. Procedural history

On February 2, 2001, Stonkus filed a complaint in the Massachusetts Superior Court alleging violations of the state constitution, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; breach of contract, both express and implied; age and gender discrimination in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B; wrongful termination; defamation by Cabral; and intentional interference with contractual relationships by Zoino. The defendants removed this action to the United States District Court.

On July 18, 2001, the district court conducted a scheduling conference and ordered the completion of all discovery by November 16, 2001, the filing of dispositive motions by April 19, 2002, and the filing of responsive pleadings by May 20, 2002. In November, 2001, near the end of the discovery period, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Extend the Scheduling Order Deadline, which the court allowed. This provided for the completion of discovery by April 19, 2002, the filing of motions by June 18, 2002, and the filing of responsive pleadings thirty days thereafter.

On June 18, 2002, the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of the claims set forth in Stonkus's complaint. Stonkus failed to file an opposition. On August 15, 2002, the District Court allowed the Summary Judgment Motion with the following order: "The Plaintiff has filed no opposition to this motion. Based on the undisputed facts as presented in the defendants' papers, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. Judgment shall enter for the defendants accordingly." On August 19, 2002, judgment entered in favor of the defendants on all counts.

Stonkus filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and for Late Filing of Responsive Pleading, which the defendants opposed. The District Court denied the motion, and Stonkus appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 60(b)(1) ruling

Stonkus contends that the district court erred in refusing to allow her to belatedly file her opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. She maintains, on appeal, that her failure to timely file was due to her counsel's confusion over the filing deadlines and "frenetic activity to complete discovery," and that these circumstances constituted "excusable neglect" warranting relief under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1).²

Rule 60(b)(1) provides, in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.... The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

Motions brought under Rule 60(b) are committed to the district court's sound discretion. Torre v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir.1994). Accordingly, we review orders denying such motions only for abuse of discretion. Id. Because Rule 60(b) is a vehicle for "extraordinary relief," motions invoking the rule should be granted "only under exceptional circumstances." Id. at 14-15 (quoting Lepore v. Vidockler, 792 F.2d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 1986)).

We interpret these authorities in light of Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), in which the Supreme Court explored the meaning of excusable neglect in the context of a parallel provision in the federal bankruptcy rules.³ Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir.2001). The Court held that "the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489. These circumstances include "the danger of prejudice to the [nonmoving party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id.

Even under the flexible standard prescribed by Pioneer, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision refusing to allow Stonkus to belatedly oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The stated reasons for the neglect — confusion over filing dates and busyness — hold little water. It is uncontested that Stonkus's counsel received several written documents, both from the defendants' counsel and from the district court, concerning the extended scheduling deadlines; that counsel engaged in telephone and in-person discussions concerning the extended deadlines; and that prior to filing the motion for summary judgment, defendants' counsel again advised Stonkus's counsel of their intent to file a summary judgment motion on June 18, 2002, and reminded Stonkus's counsel that he had thirty days to respond under the extended scheduling order.

We have repeatedly held this type of counsel error to be inadequate to support a determination of excusable neglect within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). de la Torre, 15 F.3d at 15 (fact that appellant's attorney was "preoccupied" with other matters did not constitute excusable neglect), and cases cited. "Most attorneys are busy most of the time and they must organize their work so as to be able to meet the time requirements of matters they are handling or suffer the consequences." Id. (quoting Pinero Schroeder v. FNMA, 574 F.2d 1117, 1118 (1st Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We question, too, the good faith behind these excuses: there is little indication, for example, of the "frenetic activity to complete discovery" Stonkus's counsel cites.⁴ And Stonkus never proffered a proposed opposition to summary judgment in her filings to the district court. As to prejudice, although there are no unusual circumstances in this case, the delay incurred by Stonkus's failure to respond serves to hamper the defendants' interest in certainty and resolution and to further diminish witnesses' memories concerning the events surrounding Stonkus's claims, now more than six years old. In sum, Stonkus's counsel's conduct simply does not warrant relief from judgment under an excusable neglect theory.

B. Summary judgment

Although we affirm the district court's decision to bar Stonkus's opposition...