Stoots v. The State

• Decision Date: 11 December 1886
• Docket Number: 13,190
• Citation: 9 N.E. 380,108 Ind. 415
• Parties: Stoots v. The State
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

9 N.E. 380

108 Ind. 415

Stoots v. The State

No. 13,190

Supreme Court of Indiana

December 11, 1886

From the DeKalb Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

H Colerick, D. D. Moody and W. L. Penfield, for appellant.

F. T Hord, Attorney General, H. C. Peterson, Prosecuting Attorney and C. Emanuel, for the State.

OPINION

Niblack, J.

Stoots, the appellant, was prosecuted in the court below, upon affidavit and information, under section 2098, R. S. 1881, for selling intoxicating liquor on Sunday to be drunk as a beverage. A jury found him guilty as charged, and a judgment of conviction was rendered upon the verdict.

When the cause was called for trial, and a jury was about to be empaneled, it was admitted by counsel for the State that the appellant was, at the time the offence was charged to have been committed, and still was, engaged in the business of selling intoxicating liquors by retail, under a license issued to him by order of the board of commissioners of DeKalb county. One William J. Bowman was then called as a juror, and, after being duly sworn to answer questions touching his qualifications to act in that capacity, one of the appellant's attorneys inquired of him as follows: "I will ask you to state whether, if the defendant were to testify in his own behalf in this cause, you would allow less weight and credit to his evidence, in his own behalf, than you would if he were not engaged in the business of selling liquors?" To this Bowman answered: "I think I should." Thereupon counsel for the appellant challenged Bowman for cause, but the circuit court held that the answer thus given did not disqualify him from serving as a juror in the trial of the cause, and overruled the challenge. The circuit court also refused to permit a similar question to be propounded to two other persons called to serve as jurors, to which exceptions were reserved.

The pertinency of the question so addressed to Bowman, and the materiality of his answer as affecting his competency as a juror, have been made questions for decision upon this appeal.

Our statute makes it a misdemeanor to sell intoxicating liquor on Sunday to be drunk as a beverage, and imposes many other restrictions upon the sale of intoxicating liquor not imposed upon other branches of business. It has always been the policy of the law in this State to treat the business of selling intoxicating liquors as exceptional, and as one requiring regulation and restraint, and it is a matter within the common knowledge of all that the propriety of permitting the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, under any circumstances, has long been, as it still is a subject of very earnest discussion, and upon which there is a great diversity of opinion. The mere fact, therefore, that a man may be opposed to the policy of permitting the sale of intoxicating drinks, and may have some prejudices against those engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors, does not necessarily disqualify him from serving as a juror in a prosecution for the unlawful sale of that class of liquors. This has been, in effect, heretofore held by this court. Chandler v. Ruebelt, 83 Ind. 139; Shields v. State, 95 Ind. 299. The same doctrine has also been recognized by the Supreme Court of Illinois. See Robinson v. Randall, 82 Ill. 521; Meaux v. Whitehall, 8 Brad. Rep. 173. But, so far as we are advised, it has never been held that a person called to serve as a juror, who admits that his prejudices against a business, recognized as lawful, are so fixed that he might not, and probably would not, give to the testimony of a party engaged in it as much weight and credit as he would if the party were employed in some other business, is a competent juror to try a cause involving the business against which such prejudices are admitted to exist. On the contrary, the fair inference, from the drift of the authorities bearing on the general subject, is, that a...