Stoppelli v. United States

Citation183 F.2d 391
Decision Date23 October 1950
Docket NumberNo. 12373.,12373.
PartiesSTOPPELLI v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

J. W. Ehrlich, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Attorney, Joseph Karesh, Asst. U. S. Attorney, San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, BONE, Circuit Judge, and GOODMAN, District Judge.

Writ of Certiorari Denied October 23, 1950. See 71 S.Ct. 88.

GOODMAN, District Judge.

Stoppelli and four others were named defendants in a three count indictment. The first count charged the sale of heroin. Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2553, 2557. The second count charged the concealment of heroin. Jones-Miller Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 174. The third count charged conspiracy to commit the offenses charged in the first two. All defendants were convicted by a jury on all counts. The District Judge granted Stoppelli's motion for a new trial as to the third (conspiracy) count. Stoppelli appeals from the judgment and the concurrent sentences of five and six years imprisonment imposed on the first and second counts.

Stoppelli's co-defendants participated in the attempted sale in Oakland, California, of a non-original unstamped package containing 12 envelopes of the same size, color and appearance, each containing part of a total quantity of 10 ounces and 436 grains of heroin. The package of heroin was brought from New York by one Tony Sapoli. Stoppelli had been in New York and came to the jurisdiction of the trial court to surrender after the indictment was filed and a warrant of arrest issued. On one of the envelopes was appellant's fingerprint. The government's fingerprint expert testified that the fingerprint was placed on the envelope at a time when it contained a powdery substance. Heroin is a powdery substance. The expert testified that in his opinion Stoppelli held the envelope, with a powdery substance in it, in his left hand, the print being that of the ring finger of the left hand. The print, the expert said, was placed on the envelope not more than four weeks, at the most, prior to his examination. He gave to the jury a detailed and technical explanation of his reasons for concluding that Stoppelli held the envelope in his hand at a time when it contained a powdery substance.

Stoppelli was present during the trial, was represented by counsel, but himself remained mute throughout.

His main point on this appeal is that the fingerprint evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. What he really means is that the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal upon the ground that there was no substantial evidence upon which the jury could have made a finding.

The fingerprint evidence was, of course, circumstantial. The precise question tendered is: Was it sufficient evidence to show Stoppelli "to have or to have had possession" of the heroin in the envelope? 21 U. S.C.A. § 174. (Emphasis added.)

The trial judge fully and accurately instructed the jury upon the doctrine of inferences as it applies to circumstantial evidence.1

The testimony of the fingerprint expert was sufficient to go to the jury if its nature was such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether inferences other than guilt could be drawn from it. It is not for us to say that the evidence was insufficient because we, or any of us, believe that inferences inconsistent with guilt may be drawn from it. To say that would make us triers of the fact. We may say that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict only if we can conclude as a matter of law that reasonable minds, as triers of the fact, must be in agreement that reasonable hypotheses other than guilt could be drawn from the evidence. Curley v. U. S., 81 U. S.App. D.C. 229, 160 F.2d 229, 230. In the cited case, Judge Prettyman pertinently observes: "If the judge were to direct acquittal whenever in his opinion the evidence failed to exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt, he would preempt the functions of the jury. Under such rule, the judge would have to be convinced of guilt beyond peradventure of doubt before the jury would be permitted to consider the case." 160 F.2d at page 233. See also U. S. v. Perillo, 2 Cir., 164 F.2d 645.2

In this case, a reasonable jury mind might well have inquired: What was Stoppelli doing with this particular envelope anyhow? No doubt, flights of fancy, to infer innocent possession, could be indulged in. Stoppelli might have had powdered sugar in the envelope to feed his pet canary. But in that event, how did it get into the package of heroin? A reasonable mind would have to discard its common sense to indulge in such capricious vagaries. It is such speculation and caprice that juries are instructed to avoid in resolving the question of reasonable doubt.3

The experienced presiding judge below, before whom the trial picture unfolded, believed that the inference of guilt could rationably be drawn from the evidence. Upon the argument on motion for a new trial, he aptly stated: "* * * if at the time the defendant had it (the envelope) in his possession there was a powdery substance in it, and when captured by the officers it had a powdery substance, which consisted of heroin, isn't it rational to draw the inference that at the time the defendant had it in his possession it had heroin in it."

We are of the view that any possible objection to the expert's testimony would go to its weight.4 Its weight or credence was within the exclusive province of the jury to evaluate. The jury had the right to pass on the evidence. Felder v. U. S., 2 Cir., 9 F.2d 872, 875; Crono v. U. S., 9 Cir., 59 F.2d 339, 340. It could not justly be excluded entirely as being of no substance.

Furthermore, under the charging statutes, the sometimes troublesome elements of intent are not here involved, for possession alone is sufficient for conviction.5

We are not able to conclude as a matter of law that the jury, pursuant to the court's instructions, could not reasonably draw the inference of guilt from the fingerprint evidence. In fact, it is the strongest kind of evidence. Parker v. King, 14 C.L.R. 681, 3 B.R.C. 68, High Court of Australia.

The true administration of criminal justice needs self-restraint on the part of the reviewing court in what is unfortunately sometimes a "ferreting out" quest for errors in a "cold record." The search for justice must not degenerate into a pursuit of complete abstract inerrancy — an unattainable goal when dealing with human beings.

We see neither the play nor the actors, but only the printed word — cold and colorless.6 If justice is to be done, it is substance above all which must control our decision. We must weigh the evidence, not as triers of fact, but only to the extent necessary to determine whether it should have gained admission to the forum. The temptation to "try the facts" is strong; it must be resisted as if it were Satan.

Appellant claims he was deprived of a fair trial by the alleged misconduct of the government fingerprint witness, Greene, in volunteering answers. The portion of the record pertaining to this matter follows:

"Q. Now how did you come to that conclusion that the print on the envelope is the print that belonged to John Stoppelli, the defendant?

"A. We have a national book every district supervisor in the country, in the Narcotics Bureau, has a national book published by the Narcotics Bureau, all of the major known —"

"A. In my opinion he grasped it this way (indicating) which would be the natural way for placing something in the envelope with the right hand and, after all, men of experience of that type —."

There is no merit in this complaint. The trial judge fully covered the matter by immediate appropriate instructions. We hold the incident to have had no substantial adverse effect upon the fairness of the trial. It was but a transitory incident not proximately derogating from the intrinsic fairness of the trial. In a similar situation, the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit ruled as we do. United States v. Curzio, 179 F.2d 380. See also, Marsh v. U. S., 3 Cir., 82 F.2d 703.

The venue is attacked for the first time on this appeal in an amendment to the "Statement of the Points on which Appellant intends to rely." It is claimed that the venue was in the Southern District of New York and not the Northern District of California. The venue point is without merit, in view of the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237.7 See Killian v. U. S., 58 App.D.C. 255, 29 F.2d 455.8

There is nothing at all about this case indicative of injustice or substantial error. In fact we believe a just result was achieved. It should not be disturbed.

Affirmed.

DENMAN, Chief Judge (dissenting).

I dissent from the decision of this court on an appeal from a conviction had on circumstantial evidence, here a single isolated fact unsupported by direct testimony, that "It is not for us to say that the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury because we, or any of us, believe that inferences inconsistent with guilt may be drawn from it."

The exact reverse has been held in our recent case of Karn v. United States, 9 Cir., 158 F.2d 568, 570, and in the following cases from the indicated circuits: Kassin v. United States, 5 Cir., 87 F.2d 183, 184; Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States, 8 Cir., 173 F. 737, 740; Nosowitz v. United States, 2 Cir., 282 F. 575; Graceffo v. United States, 3 Cir., 46 F.2d 852, 853; Leslie v. United States, 10 Cir., 43 F.2d 288; all cases later considered.

These cases establish that it is our duty in this criminal appeal to determine whether a single circumstantial fact upon which the conviction was had warrants the inference of innocence as much as it warrants one of guilt. If the single fact warrants two such conflicting inferences, the appellate court must set aside the judgment of conviction.

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