Storey v. People of State

• Decision Date: 30 September 1875
• Citation: Storey v. People of State , 79 Ill. 45, 1875 WL 8566, 22 Am.Rep. 158 (Ill. 1875)
• Parties: WILBUR F. STOREYv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

79 Ill. 45

1875 WL 8566 (Ill.)

22 Am.Rep. 158

WILBUR F. STOREY

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1875.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. ERASTUS S. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding.

This was a proceeding, in the name of the People, in the criminal court of Cook county, against Wilbur F. Storey, for contempt of court, in the publication of certain articles in “The Chicago Times,” reflecting upon the action of the grand jury in finding indictments against him in said court. The court below found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to imprisonment in the county jail. The defendant brings the case here by writ of error.

Messrs. GOUDY & CHANDLER, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. CHARLES H. REED, State's Attorney, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

The several articles copied into the information, censure the action of the grand jury, and question its integrity, as a body, and one of them indirectly attacks the moral character of certain of the members of the grand jury. The information charges that these articles were published while the grand jury was in session, and, also, that respondent was charged with certain crimes and offenses, which were heard by the grand jury; but it is not alleged that the crimes and offenses so charged were pending before the grand jury for its action, at or subsequent to the time of the publication of the articles, or either of them. On the contrary, it is alleged that the articles were “of and concerning the grand jury, and the individual members thereof,” and of and concerning its action with reference to the complaint against the respondent, and “of and concerning its action with reference to other complaints presented to it”--all being in the past. And the respondent answers, to one of the interrogatories propounded to him, “that on the 13th day of March, 1875, and before any of said articles were so published, the grand jury * * returned into said court three indictments against him for libel, and one for publishing an obscene newspaper, and said indictments were the only matters referred to in said articles, or any of them. And he further says, upon information and belief, that, at the time said articles were written and published, there were no complaints against him pending before said grand jury, of any kind whatever, and he did not suspect that any other or further indictments would be returned against him by said grand jury, and he denies that said articles, or any of them, or any part thereof, referred to any complaints or charges then pending against him before said grand jury.”

There is no allegation that the publication of the articles is calculated to prevent the obtaining of a competent petit jury to try the respondent on the several indictments, or that the judge, whose duty it will be to preside during such trials, will, in anywise, be affected thereby in the discharge of his duty.

The only question, therefore, is, assuming the articles to be libelous, whether the publishing of a libel on a grand jury, or on any of the members thereof, because of an act already done, may be summarily punished as a contempt.

We do not understand the articles as having a tendency directly to impede, embarrass or obstruct the grand jury in the discharge of any of its duties remaining to be discharged after the publications were made. No allusion is made to any matter upon which the members were thereafter to act, and there could, therefore, of necessity, be no attempt to interfere with the exercise of their free and unbiased judgments as to such matters. No attempt is made to induce disobedience in officers or witnesses, and it does not appear that any direct interference with the administration of the law was in contemplation. All that it would seem could be claimed is, that the publications would cause disrespect to be entertained by the public for the grand jury, and for its action in the particular cases criticised, and thereby tend, to that extent, to bring odium upon the administration of the law. That this is a grave offense, deserving of prompt and severe punishment, might be conceded, without, in the slightest degree, strengthening the position that it may be treated and punished as a contempt of court. The law, presumably, provides an adequate punishment and mode of procedure to protect society against all offenses, and neither the magnitude of a crime, nor the probability of its frequent repetition, has ever been held to authorize the courts to depart from the mode of trial prescribed by the law, or to impose a different punishment from that which it sanctions.

It is not denied by the counsel for the respondent, that courts may punish, as for contempt, those who do any act directly tending to impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of the law; but they deny that any publication, however disrespectful, when applied to jurymen in regard to the manner in which they have already discharged a duty, does or is calculated to impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of the law.

Authority may be found in the text books, and in English and American cases, holding a doctrine at variance with this position. Thus, for instance, Blackstone says, in showing how contempts of court may be committed, it may be “by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges, acting in their judicial capacity; by printing false accounts (or even true ones, without proper permission,) of causes then depending in judgment; and by anything, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect which, when courts of justice are deprived of their authority (so necessary for the good order of the kingdom), is entirely lost among the people.” But the law in relation to contempts has never been held, in any case decided by this court, to be so indefinitely broad as it is thus stated by Blackstone. Our constitution and statutes certainly affect the question, to some extent, and it is only in determining precisely how far they do so, that we have any difficulty.

A statute of this State, in force for many years, provided that the circuit and supreme courts should have...