Storm, In Interest of
| Decision Date | 13 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 2--57024,2--57024 |
| Citation | 223 N.W.2d 170 |
| Parties | In the Interest of Charles Hanlen STORM, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Smith, Peterson, Beckman, Willson & Peterson, Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Lorna Lawhead Williams, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, UHLENHOPP, REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ.
The question in this case is whether the trial court properly ordered the sheriff of Pottawattamie County, Iowa, to deliver Charles Hanlen Storm, age 19, to a representative of the California Youth Authority for return to that state under the interstate juvenile compact, § 231.14, Code 1973.
Charles was born June 20, 1954. While living in California he become involved with the law. On December 11, 1967, when Charles was 13, the California juvenile court found him to be within § 602 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code, adjudged him a ward of the court, and committed him to the California Youth Authority. That court has not since modified or set aside its order. The order constitutes an adjudication of delinquency. In re S, 10 Cal.App.3d 944, 89 Cal.Rptr. 685.
From that time to the present, § 607 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code has provided in pertinent part, 'The court may retain jurisdiction over any person who is found to be a ward or dependent child of the juvenile court until such ward or dependent child attains the age of 21 years.' The California Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Traynor, construed § 607 to mean, People v. Sanchez, 21 Cal.2d 466, 470--471, 132 P.2d 810, 813.
On December 12, 1972, Charles signed a parole agreement with the Youth Authority, specifying certain conditions. The agreement recited, the parole or released Charles from it.
In March 1973, Charles again became involved with the law in California. The Youth Authority charged him with violating three conditions of his parole agreement. Before disposition of those charges, Charles absconded. On August 31, 1973, local authorities apprehended him in Pottawattamie County, Iowa. He was then 19.
Both California and Iowa have in force the interstate juvenile compact. Code 1973, § 231.14; Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1300. The California Youth Authority, proceeding in the Pottawattamie juvenile court under article V of the compact, requisitioned the return of Charles. The court appointed an attorney to represent him.
Charles objected to the proceeding on the grounds that (1) the Pottawattamie juvenile court had no jurisdiction and (2) the interstate compact creates an unconstitutional classification of juveniles for interestate transfer purposes.
After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the requisition. Charles appealed, asserting the same two grounds here.
I. Jurisdiction. Article V(a) of the compact states that the demanding state (California) shall present its requisition to the 'appropriate court' of the responding state (Iowa). That court then orders the 'delinquent juvenile' taken into custody. The officer brings the juvenile before that court, which informs him of the demand from the other state, appoints counsel, and allows a reasonable time for testing the legality of the proceeding. If that court then finds the proceedings proper, it delivers the juvenile over to the representative of the demanding state.
Article III of the compact contains the definitions applicable to the whole compact. The article states that "court means any court having jurisdiction over delinquent, neglected or dependent children'. This of course would be our juvenile court. Cf. Matter of Chin v. Wyman, 41 Misc.2d 641, 246 N.Y.S.2d 306 ().
Charles contends, however, that while the appropriate court is the juvenile court, such court has no authority to act in this instance because he, the subject of the proceecding, is 19 and the Iowa juvenile court has jurisdiction only over persons under 18.
Charles relies on various sections of chapter 232 of the Iowa Code. He cites § 232.2(3) which defines a 'child' as 'a person less than eighteen years of age'; § 232.63 which provides that the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings 'concerning any child alleged to be delinquent'; § 232.67 which directs that the juvenile court ordinarily retains jurisdiction until 'the minor becomes eighteen years of age'; and § 232.36 which requires that juvenile court orders ordinarily be enforced until the minor becomes 18.
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that the cited sections have reference to domestic cases--Iowa juvenile cases. Had Charles at age 19 been brought before the Pottawattamie juvenile court under chapter 232 on a charge of delinquency here, that court would not have had authority to act as such. But Iowa is not seeking to have Charles adjudged delinquent. The juvenile proceeding occurred in California; Iowa is merely the responding state in a compact proceeding for the return of the person. We therefore look to § 231.1 of the Code, which establishes the Iowa juvenile court, and to the compact.
Section 231.1 of the Code provides:
There is hereby established in each county a juvenile court within the district court, which, shall have and exercise the jurisdiction and powers Provided by law. (Italics added.)
The juvenile compact is part of The Iowa law, having been adopted by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor in 1965. 61 G.A. ch. 214, § 1. The question therefore is whether the compact, as Iowa law, encompasses a youth such as Charles, thus giving the juvenile court jurisdiction.
The preamble of the compact states that the compact 'shall be reasonably and liberally construed' to carry out the ...
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