Storm M.H. v. Charleston Cnty. Bd. of Trs.

• Decision Date: 12 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 27201.,27201.
• Citation: 400 S.C. 478,735 S.E.2d 492
• Parties: STORM M.H., a minor, by her parent, Gayla S.L. McSWAIN, and Gayla S.L. McSwain, pro se, Respondents/Appellants, v. CHARLESTON COUNTY BOARD OF TRUSTEES and Nancy J. McGinley, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Charleston County School District, Appellants/Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

400 S.C. 478

735 S.E.2d 492

STORM M.H., a minor, by her parent, Gayla S.L. McSWAIN, and Gayla S.L. McSwain, pro se, Respondents/Appellants,

v.CHARLESTON COUNTY BOARD OF TRUSTEES and Nancy J. McGinley, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Charleston County School District, Appellants/Respondents.

No. 27201.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 19, 2011.

Decided Dec. 12, 2012.

Kenneth L. Childs, John M. Reagle, Tyler R. Turner, all of Childs & Halligan, of Columbia, for Appellants–Respondents.

Gayla S.L. McSwain, of Goose Creek, pro se Respondents–Appellants.

Chief Justice TOAL.

In this declaratory judgment action, the parties appeal the circuit court's order authorizing Storm M.H. (“Student”), who resides in Berkeley County, to enroll in the Academic Magnet High School (“AMHS”) located in the Charleston County School District (“CCSD”) provided she purchase real property in the CCSD with a tax-assessed value of $300 or more. We affirm the order of the circuit court.

Factual/Procedural Background

AMHS is a countywide, taxpayer-funded school located in the CCSD. It is a “top ten,” nationally-recognized magnet high school.¹ In terms of admission requirements, the AMHS brochure/application states that “Students must be residents of Charleston County and complete an AMHS application.”

Student resides with her parents in Berkeley County, South Carolina. In January 2010, Student applied for admission to the 9th grade class at the AMHS for the academic year beginning on August 18, 2010. In her application, Student identified her Berkeley County address. Student was accepted by the AMHS on January 20, 2010, and required to confirm her intention to enroll by January 28, 2010. The Confirmation Form requested a “Charleston County Residence Address.” After seeing this request, Student's mother, Gayla S.L. McSwain (“Parent”), spoke with someone at the AMHS and explained that Student could not provide a Charleston County address because she did not “live in Charleston County yet.” As a result of this conversation, Parent completed the Confirmation Form by indicating that she would “provide [a Charleston County residence address] prior to enrollment.”

Beginning in March 2010, Parent exchanged e-mails with John Emerson, the General Counsel for CCSD, regarding CCSD's policies for nonresident students. ² Specifically, Parent inquired whether these policies required her to relocate the family to Charleston County in order for Student to attend the AMHS.

In his initial response, Emerson emphasized the “clear notification” that the AMHS is for Charleston County residents. However, Emerson appeared to concur in Parent's interpretation that section 59–63–30 ³ of the South Carolina Code would permit Student to attend the AMHS without charge if she purchased property in Charleston County with a tax-assessed value of $300 or greater. Additionally, Emerson acknowledged that section 59–63–490 ⁴ would permit Student to attend the AMHS if she would be better accommodated by the adjoining CCSD; however, he clarified that Student's enrollment at the AMHS would be contingent upon the consent of the BCSD's Board of Trustees and the CCSD's Board of Trustees. Finally, concerning Parent's inquiry as to whether she could “pay the difference in cost per pupil between the two districts” rather than change her family's residence, Emerson simply cited section 59– 63– 45,⁵ which provides a formula for these payments.

In a subsequent e-mail on May 5, 2010, Parent referenced the prior e-mail exchange and questioned whether she was required to sign an affidavit prior to registration attesting that Student was a Charleston County resident. Emerson responded by e-mail, stating, “Once you either buy land in your daughter's name or get consent from both boards, you won't have to sign it. Until then you do not have the requirements to be admitted without the affidavit. One of those things has to happen first.”

On May 11, 2010, Parent wrote to Nancy J. McGinley, the Superintendent of CCSD, requesting the CCSD's Board of Directors consent to Student attending the AMHS pursuant to section 59–63–490. According to Parent, McGinley called her two weeks later to inform her that the AMHS is reserved for Charleston County residents.

On June 7, 2010, Emerson wrote to Parent instructing her that Student could not be “admitted to the Academic Magnet unless she actually resides in Charleston County, in compliance with 59–63–30(a)–(b).”

On June 14, 2010, the CCSD Board of Trustees conducted a meeting in which it discussed numerous agenda items, including an “Academic Magnet Student Appeal.” By letter dated June 16, 2010, Emerson informed Parent that the Board “voted unanimously in open session to admit [Student] to the AMHS if [her] family establishes ‘residence and domicile’ in Charleston County before school starts.”

On June 27, 2010, Parent, on behalf of Student, filed a declaratory judgment action ⁶ against the CCSD Board and McGinley for the circuit court to determine whether Parent had to establish the family's domicile and residence in Charleston County prior to August 18, 2010, the start of the academic year at the AMHS. The next day, Parent filed a Petition to Appeal the CCSD's directive with the Board of Trustees.⁷

In the declaratory judgment Complaint, Parent disputed the residency requirement, arguing that Student was entitled to enroll in the AMHS if any of the following conditions were satisfied: (1) Parent paid tuition to the CCSD; (2) Student purchased real estate in Charleston County valued at $300 or more pursuant to section 59–63–30(c); or (3) Student's education would best be accommodated by the AMHS pursuant to section 59–63–490. Because she believed the Board's directiveconstituted a final decision, Parent asserted that she did not have to exhaust administrative remedies as any hearing before the CCSD would be “futile.”

The Board and McGinley (the “Board”) moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, arguing Parent did not state a cause of action and the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction as the Board had not entered a final, appealable order. In the alternative, the Board requested the court decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground Parent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

After conducting a hearing on July 19 and 22, 2010, the circuit court issued an order on July 28, 2010. Initially, the court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction to declare Parent's rights under section 59–63–30, but not section 59–63–490. In so ruling, the court found that a final order by the Board was not a prerequisite to Parent obtaining a declaratory judgment. Because the Board had never addressed Parent's reliance on section 59–63–30, i.e., whether payment of tuition or purchase of real property in Charleston County was sufficient for Student to enroll in the AMHS, the court explained that the Board “could not have issued a final ‘order’ regarding 59–63–30.”

In addition, the court rejected the Board's contentions that Parent failed to state a cause of action or exhaust her administrative remedies. Specifically, the court found Parent had presented a justiciable controversy that required a “speedy resolution” due to Student's impending enrollment date. Because Parent had not requested a Board decision with respect to the provisions of section 59–63–30, the court concluded that Parent did not have to exhaust administrative remedies in order to obtain a ruling in the circuit court.

Regarding Parent's claim under section 59–63–490, the court found it did not have jurisdiction because Parent had appealed the Board's decision to the circuit court; ⁸ thus, the court concluded that it “now has appellate jurisdiction only to review that decision and cannot exercise original jurisdiction to declare Plaintiffs' rights under 59–63–490.”

With respect to the merits of Parent's claim, the court held that the CCSD's policy of requiring domicile for a child to attend a CCSD magnet school violates section 59–63–30(c) “because domicile by a child and that child's parent or guardian is not required by the statute, only property ownership is required.”

Based on this ruling, the court rejected Parent's contention that, because Student had already been admitted to the AMHS, she should be allowed to pay tuition under section 59–63–30 rather than buy the requisite property in the CCSD. Although the court acknowledged that a nonresident child could pay tuition to attend school in a particular attendance zone within the CCSD, the court stated that the Board is authorized, via section 59–19–90(9), to choose in which school the child may enroll. The court emphasized that “a nonresident child who wants to be statutorily entitled to enroll at a magnet school must meet one of the residency requirements of 59–63–30.”

Finally, the court summarily dismissed Parent's claim that the Board's application of its policy requiring domicile as a prerequisite to an eligible nonresident student violated the equal protection clause.

Both parties appealed the circuit court's order to the court of appeals. Subsequently, Student purchased real property in Charleston County and enrolled in the AMHS on August 18, 2010, as the circuit court lifted the automatic stay of its order.⁹ The court of appeals denied the Board's petition to revoke the order lifting the automatic stay. This Court certified this appeal pursuant to Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.

Law/Analysis

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As a threshold issue, the Board contends the circuit court erred in ruling on Parent's declaratory judgment action. Specifically, the Board claims the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the school board action as it arose under a statutory scheme that provides for administrative appellate review. Because the Board of Trustees did not issue a final order regarding Student's enrollment at the AMHS, the Board...