Stormo v. City of Sioux Falls
| Decision Date | 21 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | 4:12-CV-04057-KES |
| Parties | ERIC STORMO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, R. SHAWN TORNOW, DAVE MUNSON, MIKE HUETHER, PAT KNEIP, DOUG BARTHEL, and JOHN DOE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Eric Stormo, filed this pro se lawsuit naming the City of Sioux Falls, R. Shawn Tornow, Dave Munson, Mike Huether, Pat Kneip, Doug Barthel, and John Doe as defendants. Defendants now move for summary judgment. Docket 186. Stormo filed a motion for summary judgment and numerous other motions. For the following reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, Stormo's motions to compel are denied in part and granted in part, and the court grants defendants leave to respond to Stormo's remaining motions.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this burden by presenting evidence that there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has not presented evidence to support an element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Denn v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 816 F.3d 1027, 1032 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)). For purposes of summary judgment, the facts, and inferences drawn from those facts, are "viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because the actions of the defendants involved in the removal of Stormo's lift were objectively reasonable. Docket 188 at 5. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any "person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state" causes thedeprivation of a right protected by federal law or the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The doctrine of qualified immunity, however, generally shields " '[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Smith v. City of Minneapolis, 754 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
To overcome a qualified immunity defense at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation." Howard v. Kan. City Police Dep't, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009). The court may analyze these two factors in either order. Hutson v. Walker, 688 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). But "[t]o deny the officers qualified immunity, [the court] must resolve both questions in [the plaintiff's] favor." Hawkins v. Gage County, 759 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2014).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Stormo's Fourth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment provides that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. " 'A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningfulinterference with a person's possessory interests in that property.' " Andrews v. City of W. Branch, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 150 (8th Cir. 1994)).
"The reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment applies to any seizure by the government in any context." Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 262 (8th Cir. 1994). Because Stormo's lift was undoubtedly "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, "[t]he question is whether there was anything unreasonable about the seizure which would place it among those prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1999). The reasonableness inquiry requires a "careful balancing of governmental and private interests." Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
Here, defendants allege that they were acting under a valid court order: the default judgment obtained in state court. The United States Supreme Court has stated in dicta that if "officers were acting pursuant to a court order, . . . a showing of unreasonableness on these facts would be a laborious task indeed." Id.
In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld as constitutional the seizure of a boat and a trailer by a deputy sheriff pursuant to "a valid writ of execution directing him to levy on personal property of a debtor corporation at the residence address of the corporation's secretary[.]" Johnson, 172 F.3d at 533. The deputy was told by plaintiff and his attorney that he could not levy onthe boat and trailer, but he did it anyway. Id. at 534. A week after the seizure, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Exemptions to the execution, and the court ordered the boat and trailer released to defendants. Id.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that the deputy's actions were "objectively reasonable under the facts." Id. at 536. The court noted that the deputy "execut[ed] a valid writ on property located at the given address, property which he had reason to believe was the same type of property handled by the debtor corporation[,]" he was told by his superior that plaintiff had no protection from the execution to satisfy the judgment, there was reason to believe that plaintiff was going to hide or move the boat soon, plaintiff could not prove he owned the boat, and the boat was levied upon during the day in a driveway. As a result, the Court found that the privacy concerns of the Fourth Amendment were not raised. Id. at 536-37.
Plaintiff argued that the seizure was unreasonable because the deputy was wrong to believe that he could levy on the boat and trailer. Id. at 537. The court rejected this argument, holding that the mistake itself did not make the seizure unreasonable, and the deputy was not obliged to follow plaintiff's attorney's legal advice. Therefore, the court found the seizure reasonable.
In Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First Nat'l Bank, 245 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2001), reconsideration en banc granted, judgment vacated (July 30, 2001), opinion reinstated sub nom. Audio Odyssey v. Brenton First Nat'l Bank, 286 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals explained that Johnson "didnot purport to immunize all errant seizures" but held that "an erroneous seizure of personal property is not necessarily an 'unreasonable' one, and that the officer in [Johnson] had a reasonable basis for seizing a boat and trailer that fell outside of a writ of execution." Id. The court explained that the real question was "whether the officer's mistake [was] objectively reasonable." Id.
Stormo argues that the default judgment obtained by Tornow was invalid. In the attachments to his motion for summary judgment, Stormo provided copies of the motions filed in the state court case that were served on Tornow in his capacity as a deputy city attorney prior to the City moving for default judgment and prior to the seizure of the lift. Docket 194-4; Docket 194-5. The City's motion for default judgment was based on the representation Tornow made in his affidavit that Stormo had "made no responsive answer, and/or appearance and is now therefore wholly in default[.]" Docket 194-6 at 3.
Stormo moved to set aside the default judgment on March 24, 2009, ten days before the lift was removed by defendants on April 3, 2009. Docket 194-3. Stormo's motions were found by the state court to constitute an appearance, docket 194-6 at 4, and the default judgment was vacated by the state court on September 10, 2009. Docket 194-6. Stormo has provided evidence to create a question of fact as to whether Tornow's affidavit in support of the default judgment was unreasonably mistaken, whether the default judgment was invalid, and whether the seizure was objectively reasonable. Stormo has alsoprovided evidence that suggests Tornow was aware of the invalidity of the default judgment because Tornow had been served with Stormo's motion to set aside the default judgment before the lift was removed by defendants. Stormo also alleges that Tornow told city employees that the default judgment was valid and directed them to seize Stormo's lift. Docket 34 at 15. Because questions of material fact exist, the motion for summary judgment on Stormo's Fourth Amendment claim is denied as to Tornow.
Stormo alleges that Pat Kneip and John Doe city employees violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by seizing his lift. Pat Kneip and other city employees' actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In Johnson, 172 F.3d at 537, the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that a deputy's seizure of property violated the Fourth Amendment because his belief that he could levy plaintiff's property was incorrect.
Stormo raises the same argument here. He has not put forth evidence showing that Kneip or the Does involved in the seizure of the lift knew any of the...
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