Stormont-Vail Healthcare, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Shawnee Cnty.
| Decision Date | 13 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 112, 811.,112, 811. |
| Citation | 376 P.3d 93 (Table) |
| Parties | STORMONT–VAIL HEALTHCARE, INC., and Cotton–O'Neil Clinic, Appellees, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR SHAWNEE COUNTY, Kansas, Appellant, and City of Topeka, Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Richard V. Eckert and James M. Crowl, of Office of the County Counselor, of Topeka, for appellant.
E. Lou Bjorgaard Probasco, of Probasco & Assoc., P.A., of Topeka, for appellees Stormont–Vail and Cotton O'Neil.
Seth A. Lowry, assistant city attorney, and Shelly Starr, chief of litigation, of Topeka, for appellee City of Topeka.
Before BUSER, P.J., ATCHESON and SCHROEDER, JJ.
Deciding cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts, the Shawnee County District Court found Shawnee County rather than the City of Topeka liable for medical expenses owed Stormont–Vail Healthcare and Cotton–O'Neil Clinic for treatment provided to a man arrested on criminal charges. We reverse and remand for further proceedings because the stipulation left material issues of fact unresolved and liability could be imposed on Shawnee County only by drawing inferences against it—contrary to the rules governing summary judgment. We also find the stipulated facts do not support the government entities' arguments for a statute of limitations bar to the medical providers' action for payment.
Stormont–Vail Healthcare and Cotton–O'Neil Clinic filed a civil action in the district court on September 25, 2012, against Shawnee County and the City of Topeka for the cost of medical services provided to Jesse Dimmick. A fugitive from Colorado, Dimmick was shot as he was being arrested and taken into custody on September 12, 2009, in rural Shawnee County. The medical providers are united in interest and have been represented by the same lawyer. We have no reason to differentiate between them, so we simply refer to them as Stormont–Vail.
Stormont–Vail, the County, and the City each filed a motion asking the district court to enter judgment in its favor as a matter of law, obviating the need for a trial on the merits of the claim for payment. The lawyers worked out a stipulation of facts consisting of 35 paragraphs outlining circumstances relevant to Dimmick's capture, injury, and treatment. The stipulation formed the factual foundation for the summary judgment motions and supporting memoranda. None of the parties supplemented the stipulation with additional statements of uncontroverted fact. We do not recite the stipulation in full but summarize particular aspects of it for context.
Apparently on the lam from Colorado authorities, Dimmick stole a minivan in Geary County and got on I–70 headed east with a Geary County Sheriff's officer in pursuit. The Geary County officer yielded the chase to a Kansas Highway Patrol trooper. As we read the stipulated facts, Dimmick left I–70 in the vicinity of Dover, an unincorporated community in western Shawnee County. At some point, he drove the minivan over stop-sticks and eventually ended up in the front yard of a Dover couple.
Dimmick forced his way into the home and held the couple hostage. In the meantime, as stated in the stipulation: “A response team comprised of officers from the Kansas Highway Patrol, Topeka Police Department[,] and deputies with the Shawnee County Sheriff's Department ... responded to the residence.” The couple escaped when Dimmick fell asleep. Response team participants then went inside to arrest Dimmick.
The stipulation states: “Members of the response team repeatedly ordered Dimmick to lie down on the ground and to place his hands in a position where they were visible to law enforcement. .... Dimmick eventually complied with the order.” As a Shawnee County Sheriff's deputy “move[d] in to handcuff Dimmick,” a sergeant with the Topeka Police Department had a rifle pointed at Dimmick. According to the stipulation, the sergeant perceived Dimmick to move his hands, balking at being restrained. The sergeant then stepped on Dimmick's right wrist and forearm and ordered Dimmick not to move. As the sergeant attempted to get Dimmick to comply, the rifle discharged accidentally. The shot struck Dimmick in the back. The sergeant made a request to “emergency dispatch” for an ambulance. An ambulance arrived. The emergency medical personnel treated Dimmick and then transported him to Stormont–Vail, accompanied by a Shawnee County deputy.
Dimmick was treated at Stormont–Vail through September 29, 2009. During that time, Dimmick was not free to leave the hospital and was shackled to his bed. He was also under guard throughout his hospitalization. The stipulation states that Shawnee County deputies “did participate in guarding Dimmick.” But that paragraph is phrased in a way that at least implies law enforcement officers from other agencies may have guarded Dimmick some of the time. The stipulation notes that on September 23, Dimmick was charged in Shawnee County District Court with three serious felonies and several misdemeanors and was convicted in 2010 of some of the felony and misdemeanor charges. The stipulation states Stormont–Vail provided $33,834.82 in medical services to Dimmick at the applicable Medicaid rate and Cotton–O'Neil provided $8,731.60 in medical services. We know from the argument of counsel that those amounts are far less than the value of the services at the “usual and customary” rates.
There is a great deal we don't know based on the stipulation, and we cannot augment our review of the summary judgment ruling with information conveyed in the lawyers' arguments on appeal. The operative facts for purposes of summary judgment are confined to the stipulation.
As a result, we have virtually no information about the “response team” that effected Dimmick's capture (and injury). We have no idea if there is any sort of formal interagency agreement or even a custom and practice about the formation and operation of such teams. We don't know if the participating law enforcement agencies had an understanding—formal or informal—about allocating liability should a response team's actions go awry.
Specific to this response team, we have no indication how many officers participated, only that personnel from the Highway Patrol, the Shawnee County Sheriff's Department, and the Topeka Police Department were involved. The stipulation does not address how the participating officers parceled out duties at the scene. Did an officer from one of the agencies assume operational control and direct the others? Or was this a willy-nilly exercise by the officers acting in a mostly uncoordinated takedown of Dimmick? In other words, was there a captain of the team? Those are neither idle nor academic fermentations of an overactive appellate review given the statutory authority and pertinent caselaw governing the liability of law enforcement agencies for medical care provided to persons they have in custody.
In 2006, the Kansas Legislature passed K.S.A. 22–4612
to regulate the obligation of law enforcement agencies to pay for medical care provided individuals they hold or detain. The statute, in pertinent part, provides:
“[A] county, a city, a county or city law enforcement agency, a county department of corrections or the Kansas highway patrol shall be liable to pay a health care provider for health care services rendered to persons in the custody of such agencies the lesser of the actual amount billed by such health care provider or the medicaid rate.” K.S.A.2015 Supp. 22–4612(a)
.
The statute, however, does not define “custody” for purposes of triggering liability. The Kansas Supreme Court construed K.S.A.2015 Supp. 22–4612
in University of Kan. Hosp. Auth. v. Board of Comm'rs of Unified Gov't, 301 Kan. 993, 1006, 348 P.3d 602 (2015), and held the obligation to pay for medical care falls on “the entity having custody of the indigent offender at the time the decision is made to obtain medical treatment for the offender.” Ultimately, the stipulated facts do not directly address that point with sufficient clarity to warrant summary judgment.[1]
[1]A government entity is not liable for medical costs under K.S.A.2015 Supp. 22–4612
if an individual in custody has insurance or a similar contract right to have a third-party pay. There is no alternative payor in this case.
A party seeking summary judgment has the obligation to show, based on appropriate evidentiary materials, there are no disputed issues of material fact and judgment may, therefore, be entered in its favor as a matter of law. Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 289 Kan. 891, 900, 220 P.3d 333 (2009)
; Korytkowski v. City of Ottawa, 283 Kan. 122, Syl. ¶ 1, 152 P.3d 53 (2007). In essence, the movant argues there is nothing for a jury or a trial judge sitting as factfinder to decide that would make any difference. The party opposing summary judgment must then point to evidence calling into question a material factual representation made in support of the motion. Shamberg, 289 Kan. at 900 ; Korytkowski, 283 Kan. 122, Syl. ¶ 1. If the opposing party does so, the motion should be denied so a factfinder may resolve that dispute. In addressing a request for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference that might be drawn from the evidentiary record. Shamberg, 289 Kan. at 900 ; Korytkowski, 283 Kan. 122, Syl. ¶ 1. An appellate court applies the same standards in reviewing the entry of a summary judgment. The Kansas Supreme Court reiterated those principles in Thoroughbred Assocs. v. Kansas City Royalty Co ., 297 Kan. 1193, 1204, 308 P.3d 1238 (2013). Because entry of summary judgment amounts to a question of law-it entails the application of legal principles to uncontroverted facts—an appellate court owes no deference to the trial court's decision to grant the motion and...
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