Story v. Bunstine
Decision Date | 11 December 2017 |
Docket Number | No. E2015-02211-SC-R11-CV,E2015-02211-SC-R11-CV |
Citation | 538 S.W.3d 455 |
Parties | John Howard STORY, et al. v. Nicholas D. BUNSTINE, et al. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
David A. Stuart, Clinton, Tennessee, and Mark N. Foster, Madisonville, Kentucky, for the appellants, John Howard Story and David Bruce Coffey.
Darryl G. Lowe, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Nicholas D. Bunstine, Brent R. Watson, and Jerrold Lance Becker.
Unpublished Text Follows End of Unpublished Text
Roger A. Page, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., and Cornelia A. Clark, Sharon G. Lee, and Holly Kirby, JJ., joined.
The defendant attorneys in the instant legal malpractice case, Nicholas D. Bunstine, Brent R. Watson, and Jerrold L. Becker, individually and d/b/a Bunstine, Watson, McElroy & Becker, represented the plaintiffs, John Howard Story and David Bruce Coffey, in a lender liability lawsuit. In the underlying lender liability lawsuit, the trial court ultimately dismissed the case against two of the lender defendants, and the claims against the remaining lender defendant were later voluntarily dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant attorneys alleging legal malpractice. The trial court partially dismissed the case based on the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations for filing a complaint for legal malpractice. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(c)(1). Later, in response to the defendant attorneys' motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claim, determining that the claim was also barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted this appeal to address: (1) whether this Court's opinion in Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1995), in which we set forth a discovery rule for when the statute of limitations begins to run in a legal malpractice action, should be overruled; (2) whether an interlocutory ruling in underlying litigation constitutes a legally cognizable injury; (3) whether this Court should adopt either the continuous representation rule or the appeal-tolling doctrine for tolling the statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions; and (4) whether a subsequent action of an attorney that renders an interlocutory order final amounts to a separate and discrete act of malpractice such that the statute of limitations for that action does not begin until said action is taken. Following our review, we conclude that Carvell v. Bottoms is the accurate analysis for determining when a claim of legal malpractice accrues. In addition, we decline to adopt the two tolling doctrines proposed by the plaintiffs, and we further decline to hold that the trial court's final judgment in the underlying case is required before there is an actual injury for purposes of the accrual of a claim for litigation malpractice. Nevertheless, we conclude that, in the case before us, the complaint fails to establish an actual injury prior to the date of the trial court's final judgment in the underlying case. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss and in determining that the plaintiffs' legal malpractice claims were time barred. Finally, we conclude that the trial court also erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. In this case, the defendant attorneys' alleged negligence, which purportedly rendered the interlocutory order in the underlying case final, constituted a distinct act of malpractice, and as such, the statute of limitations had not run on that claim at the time the plaintiffs filed this legal malpractice action. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this legal malpractice action, John Howard Story and David Bruce Coffey (collectively, "Plaintiffs") appeal from the intermediate appellate court's decision to affirm the trial court's dismissal of their case against their former attorneys Nicholas D. Bunstine, Brent R. Watson, and Jerrold L. Becker, individually and d/b/a Bunstine, Watson, McElroy & Becker (collectively, "Defendants"). The issue before us is whether the legal malpractice action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations under the facts of this case. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
From 2011 to 2013, Defendants represented Plaintiffs in their lender liability suit against Scott Thompson, First National Bank of Oneida, and People's Bank of the South. According to Plaintiffs, prior to filing the underlying suit, one of the defendant attorneys, Mr. Becker, represented that Plaintiffs had a strong case with a high likelihood of a six-figure settlement. Nevertheless, on May 7, 2013, the ChanceryCourt of Scott County, Tennessee, granted summary judgment in favor of two of the underlying defendants, Scott Thompson and First National Bank of Oneida.
Prior to trial on the claims against the remaining bank, Mr. Becker advised that the damages evidence necessary to prosecute the case was not ready and that Plaintiffs should, therefore, voluntarily dismiss the case. According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Becker advised that the case could be refiled within one year but failed to inform Plaintiffs that the voluntary dismissal would render the prior summary judgment order final. Thus, the remaining claims were dismissed by Defendants, on Plaintiffs' behalf, and the trial court entered an order reflecting the voluntary dismissal on November 13, 2013.
Plaintiffs failed to appeal the order granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Thompson and First National Bank of Oneida, and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against those underlying defendants were permanently barred.1 Plaintiffs did not refile their voluntarily dismissed claims against the remaining bank.
Rather than refiling their nonsuited claims in the underlying lender liability suit, on September 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this legal malpractice action against Defendants in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Tennessee. In their legal malpractice complaint, Plaintiffs alleged, in relevant part:
Plaintiffs alleged...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Dondlinger v. Nelson
...of appeals" approach adopted by some states, e.g., Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins , 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991). But see Story v. Bunstine , 538 S.W.3d 455 (Tenn. 2017) (rejecting inter alia the appeal-tolling doctrine). Under this approach, a statute of limitations does not commence until all ......
-
Church Joint Venture v. Earl Benard Blasingame, Margaret Gooch Blasingame, Martin A. Grusin, Mag Mgmt. Corp. (In re Blasingame), Case No. 08-28289-L
...The date of accrual of a legal malpractice action is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. Story v. Bunstine, 538 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Tenn. 2017). For determining when a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues, the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a discovery rul......
-
Church Joint Venture v. Blasingame (In re Blasingame), Case No. 08-28289-L
...The date of accrual of a legal malpractice action is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. Story v. Bunstine, 538 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Tenn. 2017). For determining when a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues, the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a discovery rul......
-
Anderson v. Lauderdale Cnty.
...... requires us to presume that the allegations in the complaint. are true. See Story v. Bunstine, 538 S.W.3d 455, 462. (Tenn. 2017). . . [2] Tennessee Code Annotated section. 8-8-302, entitled "Suits against ......
-
Medical Monitoring – 50-State Survey
...did not purport overrule prior district court precedent rejecting no-injury medical monitoring in Tennessee. Moreover, Story v. Bunstine, 538 S.W.3d 455 (Tenn. 2017), a post-Sutton legal malpractice case, reaffirmed that a plaintiff alleging negligence “must suffer legally cognizable damage......