Story v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 12 June 1950
• Docket Number: No. 10202.,10202.
• Citation: 184 F.2d 454
• Parties: STORY v. SNYDER et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

184 F.2d 454 (1950)

STORY v. SNYDER et al.

No. 10202.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued December 6, 1949.

Decided June 12, 1950.

Writ of Certiorari Denied October 23, 1950.

Mr. Edmund D. Campbell, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Hugh H. Obear and Grissim H. Walker, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Harold S. Harrison, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Assistant Attorney General A. Devitt Vanech and Mr. Roger P. Marquis, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees.

Before EDGERTON, WILBUR K. MILLER and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.

Writ of Certiorari Denied October 23, 1950. See 71 S.Ct. 88.

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

The question presented is whether the Library of Congress Trust Fund Board is subject to suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia, on a cause of action alleged to have arisen in connection with the administration of the Board's duties.

The complaint states that plaintiff-appellant is and has been a duly licensed real estate broker in the District of Columbia. It alleges that prior to September 28, 1945, plaintiff was authorized by the Trust Fund Board to list and offer for sale, as its real estate and on its behalf, a parcel of real estate belonging to the Board and located in the City of Washington. Appellant offered the property to a prospective purchaser. Thereafter the latter and the Board entered into a contract of sale whereby the property was purchased for $600,000. It is further alleged that the Board made the sale without providing for payment to the plaintiff of any real estate commission; that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale; that the usual and customary commission for such a sale amounted to $19,000, and that this also represented fair and reasonable compensation to plaintiff for services rendered in procuring the sale. Judgment was sought in the amount of $19,000.

The defendant members of the Board moved the District Court for dismissal of the complaint, stating that "the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action for the reason that the defendants are an agency of the United States of America and this suit is in substance an action against the United States of America, which has not consented to be sued or waived its immunity from suit." The District Court sustained the motion and entered final judgment, dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction.

The Library of Congress Trust Fund Board was constituted pursuant to the act of March 3, 1925, c. 423, § 1, 43 Stat. 1107, 2 U.S.C.A. § 154. The Board is authorized by law to "accept, receive, hold, and administer * * * gifts, bequests, or devises of property for the benefit of, or in connection with, the Library of Congress, its collections, or its service * * *." 2 U.S.C.A. § 156. The trustees consist of "the Secretary of the Treasury, the chairman of the Joint Committee on the Library, the Librarian of Congress, and two persons appointed by the President * * *." 2 U.S.C.A. § 154. They serve without compensation. While their expenditures are normally to be reimbursed from the income of the trust funds which they hold, "any expenses of the Board * * * not properly chargeable to the income of any trust fund held by it, shall be estimated for in the annual estimates of the librarian for the maintenance of the Library of Congress." 2 U.S.C.A. § 155. Before the Board may accept a gift or bequest, approval must be given by the Joint Committee on the Library. 2 U.S.C.A. § 156. The Board must "submit to the Congress an annual report of the moneys or securities received and held by it and of its operations." 2 U.S.C.A. § 163. The statute creating the Board further provides:

"The board shall have perpetual succession, with all the usual powers and obligations of a trustee, including the power to sell except as herein limited, in respect of all property, moneys, or securities which shall be conveyed, transferred, assigned, bequeathed, delivered, or paid over to it for the purposes above specified. The board may be sued in the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia, which is hereby given jurisdiction of such suits, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of any trust accepted by it." Act of March 3, 1925, c. 423, § 3, 43 Stat. 1108, as amended January 27, 1926, c. 6, 44 Stat. 2, June 25, 1936, c. 804, 49 Stat. 1921, 2 U.S.C.A. § 159. (Emphasis added.)

Is the present suit authorized by the provision just quoted? If it is not, the District Court is without jurisdiction in the matter. For this is, as the appellant concedes, a suit against the United States, and express statutory authority must be found for its maintenance.¹ In the statute creating the Board, Congress provided simply and solely that suit could be brought against the Board "for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of any trust accepted by it." The meaning of that provision seems clear. The statute was passed to encourage the public to make gifts to the Library of Congress, and to assure donors that if the Board did not carry out the provisions of a trust accepted by it (e. g., the establishment of a special collection in the name and memory of an individual), the aid of the courts could be invoked in enforcing the terms of the gift, as accepted. Provisions of this kind serve an obvious purpose, and a definite need.

"We have no doubt that the receipt of gifts, testamentary and nontestamentary, is within the ambit of federal powers. Uninterrupted usage from the foundation of the Government has sanctioned it." United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 70 S.Ct. 503, 505. But gifts to the United States which involve any duty, burden, or condition, or are made dependent upon some future performance by the United States, are not accepted by the Government unless by the express authority of Congress. The national legislature, which controls the property of the United States (Const,. Art. IV, Sec. 3), is consulted in such a case. And Congress has on many occasions not only accepted conditional gifts, but has provided means for the future acceptance and encouragement of special gifts to be devoted to particular purposes. We have collected in an appendix to this opinion some of the statutes in this field. It will be seen that in some instances Congress has been content to provide that the accepting and administering officials shall observe the terms and conditions of the gift.² In others, it has gone farther, and provided means whereby the donor can through court action compel the administering official or agency to observe the terms and conditions of an accepted gift.

Under the statute here in issue, Congress gave donors to the Library of Congress Trust Fund definite assurance that judicial remedies would be available to compel the Trust Fund Board to observe the conditions of an accepted gift. But could Congress have meant, through this simple statutory promise, to furnish third party creditors of the Board with a remedy against the very trust funds which Congress was solemnly undertaking to devote to a specified public use? Or a remedy against the public treasury?

"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued * * * and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. * * * And consent, since it is a relinquishment of a sovereign immunity, must be strictly interpreted." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 590, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769, 85 L.Ed. 1058, per Stone, J. The basis for this is not far to seek. Whatever out-moded reasons may have been given in the past for the immunity of the sovereign,³ it is through harsh necessity that the legislature in a democratic community today retains ultimate control over public funds. If the Treasury were subject to the multifarious claims which may arise against the Government without the necessity of prior Government consent to suit, the Treasury could be depleted and governmental policy hampered. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209; Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, supra, 322 U.S. at page 53-54, 64 S.Ct. at page 876; Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall. 122, 126, 74 U.S. 122, 126, 19 L.Ed. 125; United States v. Lee, supra, 106 U.S. at pages 223, 226, 1 S.Ct. at pages 263, 265 (dissenting opinion). The interest of the citizen in obtaining redress against the Government is thus balanced against the need to protect the revenues and property of the United States.

The Library of Congress is, of course, an agency rendering service primarily to the legislative branch, though also to the other branches, of the United States Government. The Board was established to carry out a definite public purpose; it provides a means of supplementing the funds appropriated to the Library from the Treasury. Congress has retained close supervisory control over both the Library and the Board; both are its creatures and instruments. We must presume that the funds donated to and administered by the Board have been stamped by Congress with the characteristics of funds devoted to a public use. The same reasoning that precludes direct recovery against the general funds of the Treasury operates to preclude recovery against the specialized funds in the hands of the Board, in the absence of legislative consent. To impose liability upon the members of the Board in cases such as this involves either (1) personal liability of the members, which is not sought (and could hardly be sought) in this case, or (2) the obtaining from Congress of an appropriation of funds from the Treasury (Const. Art. I, § 9), or (3) the diversion of funds in the possession of the Board, possibly even funds previously dedicated to a different public use by some other donor. The practical difficulty which any of these possibilities would entail makes clear...