Stoskin v. Prensky
Citation | 256 Md. 707,262 A.2d 48 |
Decision Date | 10 February 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 186,186 |
Parties | Laura STOSKIN v. Elaine PRENSKY. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
McInerney, Latham & Layne, Bethesda, on the brief, for Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
Don F. Ryder, Jr., Bethesda (Schroeder & Ryder, Bethesda, on the brief), for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.
In September 1963, Laura Stoskin came from Massachusetts to Maryland to accept a teaching position with the Montgomery County public school system. She had arranged to stay with the Prensky family in Silver Spring. On the first day of school, Mrs. Prensky set out for the Woodlin Elementary School with her two children and Miss Stoskin in the Prensky station wagon. Mrs. Prensky, who was driving, and Miss Stoskin were in the front seats. The Prensky children were in the rear.
Miss Stoskin said that she was unaware that Mrs. Prensky had placed a carton of six small Coca-Cola bottles and two sixteen ounce Coca-Cola bottles under the seat which Miss Stoskin occupied. When the station wagon reached the Woodlin School, according to Miss Stoskin's version of the incident, she opened the right front door. When she put her right foot on the ground, one of the Coca-Cola bottles rolled out. Miss Stoskin stepped on the bottle with her left foot, fell and fractured her sacrum. She sued Mrs. Prensky in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for damages alleged to have been occasioned by Mrs. Prensky's negligence in placing two loose bottles under the seat of the car and in parking the car on an incline at the Woodlin School.
Mrs. Prensky moved for a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiff's case and renewed her motion at the end of the entire case. The trial court reserved its rulings on the motions, and permitted the case to go to the jury, which returned a $5,000 verdict in Miss Stoskin's favor. Mrs. Prensky's motion for a judgment n. o. v. was granted and judgment was entered in her favor for costs.
Miss Stoskin would have us reverse the action of the trial court, arguing that the court substituted its evaluation of the evidence for that of the jury and misstated the facts in the opinion filed when the judgment was entered. In deciding whether a defendant's motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment n. o. v. should have been granted, we shall, as we must, consider the evidence together with all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be deduced therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Smith v. Aulick, 252 Md. 268, 250 A.2d 534 (1969); Wood v. Johnson, 242 Md. 446, 219 A.2d 231 (1966); Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 205 A.2d 260 (1964); Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 174 A.2d 53 (1961). Accordingly, for the purposes of this opinion, we have adopted Miss Stoskin's version of the accident.
The difficulty about this case, as we see it, is that there was no clear evidence of negligence on Mrs. Prensky's part. Judge Shure intimated this when he considered the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiff's case 'THE COURT: Gentlemen, I have reviewed this situation and I must confess that I have never encountered a case just like this one.
As we see the case, Mrs. Prensky's motion for a directed verdict could have been granted at the end of the plaintiff's case, and, if denied then, should have been granted when her counsel renewed the motion at the end of the entire case.
We find it hard to accept the idea that there is anything inherently dangerous about placing two Coca-Cola bottles on the floor of a car, particularly in view of Mrs. Prensky's uncontroverted testimony that she placed the two loose bottles under the right-hand seat, between the transmission 'hump' and the carton containing six bottles. This clearly met the standard of reasonable care to which Mrs. Prensky is held. Dashiell v. Moore, 177 Md. 657, 11 A.2d 640 (1940). See also Grossfeld v. Braverman, 203 Md. 498, 101 A.2d 824 (1954).
The manner in which the accident occurred was developed in Miss Stoskin's testimony on cross examination
'
Since we conclude that the case should not have gone to the jury in the absence of a showing a negligence on Mrs. Prensky's part, there remains the question whether it should have gone to the jury on res ipsa loquitur. Miss Stoskin's counsel, perhaps troubled by the lack of evidence of primary negligence, asked the court to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. The court charged the jury on negligence, contributory negligence and damages at some length and then addressed itself to res ipsa loquitur:
'The Plaintiff's theory of the case, briefly, is that the car in which she was a passenger was under the exclusive control of the Defendant; that the Defendant had put the bottles in the car and the Defendant had exclusive management and control of the bottles, as well as the car, and that if she, the Defendant, had exercised due care, the accident would not have happened.
Counsel for Mrs. Prensky excepted, and we think quite properly, to the portion of the charge which dealt with res ipsa loquitur.
Chief Judge Bond, in a memorable dissent which he filed in Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 40-41, 152 A. 633 (1930) spoke of res ipsa loquitur:
Perhaps influenced by Chief Judge Bond's antipathy, our predecessors have shown great restraint in the application of res ipsa loquitur and have not extended it beyond the classic factual patterns where it has proved particularly useful, Howser v. Cumberland & Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 80 Md. 146, 30 A. 906, 27 L.R.A. 154 (1894) (...
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