Stote v. Roden

Decision Date13 October 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 01-cv-12139-IT
PartiesJOHN E. STOTE, Petitioner, v. GARY RODEN, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
ORDER

TALWANI, D.J.

I. Introduction

Petitioner John E. Stote's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenges his custody on the grounds that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were so unfair as to constitute a denial of due process and that Petitioner's counsel at trial and on appeal had actual conflicts of interest or potential conflicts that resulted in prejudice. Petitioner's Re-filed Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Second Amended Petition") 3-4 [#63]. For the following reasons, the petition is DENIED.

II. Procedural History

On June 23, 1997, Petitioner was convicted, after a trial, of first degree murder under theories of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought and extreme atrocity and cruelty. Supplemental Answer ("S.A.") 7.1 He appealed his conviction directly to the Supreme JudicialCourt ("SJC") pursuant to M.G.L. c. 278, § 33E. While the appeal was pending, Petitioner was granted leave by a single justice of the SJC to file a motion for a new trial, which he did, arguing that newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from a blood spatter expert corroborated Petitioner's trial testimony that the victim had attacked him. See S.A. 121-125. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner appealed the denial and that appeal was consolidated with his direct appeal in front of the SJC. See Commonwealth v. Stote, 433 Mass. 19, 20 (2000) ("Stote I").

In that consolidated appeal, Petitioner argued that, during closing argument, the Commonwealth made improper remarks about his self-defense claim and the victim's lack of involvement in organized crime. See id. at 27-29.2 The SJC affirmed Petitioner's conviction and the denial of the motion for a new trial and declined to exercise its plenary power under M.G.L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the degree of guilt. Id. at 20.

Petitioner was represented by John Bryson and William Walsh, Jr., at trial, see S.A. 644, and by Walsh on the motion for a new trial and on the consolidated appeal. See Commonwealth v. Stote, 456 Mass. 213, 214 (2010) ("Stote II").

On December 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [#1] with this court (Tauro, D.J.), which was stayed to allow him to exhaust state court remedies. See Report and Recommendations by Ch. Mag. Judge Marianne B. Bowler [#13]; Report and Recommendations by Ch. Mag. Judge Marianne B. Bowler [#16]; Status Report 1 [#18]; Order Adopting Report and Recommendation (July 7, 2003); Order Extending Stay (October 5, 2004).In 2005, the case was closed without judgment pending the resolution of the state court proceedings, to be reopened on the motion of either party. Order for Closure [#24].

Meanwhile, on February 13, 2003, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a second motion for a new trial in state court. See Status Report 1 [#18]. On May 27, 2003, represented by current counsel, he filed an amended (second) motion for a new trial raising, among other issues, a claim that Walsh provided ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal due to conflicts of interest resulting both from his personal relationship with the prosecutor, whom he had dated for two years in a relationship that ended amicably seventeen years prior to the trial, and from his personal relationship with an attorney working in the appellate division of the District Attorney's office, whom he dated while litigating portions of the first motion for a new trial and consolidated appeal.3 S.A. 11, 537-610. The court denied the motion on November 20, 2003, after a non-evidentiary hearing. S.A. 11, 644.

Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal the denial of the amended (second) motion for a new trial with the SJC on December 17, 2003. S.A. 17, 313-364. On February 28, 2005, after a conference, S.A. 18, the single justice allowed the petition "as to the issue of the alleged conflict of interest stemming from defense counsel's relationship with a member of the District Attorney's appellate division during the time that defense counsel was pursuing the defendant's direct appeal and the appeal of the denial of his first motion for a new trial" which couldpotentially entitle Petitioner to a new appeal. S.A. 658. On March 5, 2010, the SJC affirmed the denial of Petitioner's amended (second) motion for a new trial. See Stote II, 456 Mass. at 224. Petitioner's petition for rehearing was denied on April 28, 2010. S.A. 23.4

On June 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen Case [#25], which the court allowed on July 7. Order [#29]. On April 29, 2011, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody [#34]. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Because Grounds 12(A)-(B) are Unexhausted and 12(E)-(H) are Time-barred [#36]. Petitioner filed his Opposition [#49] on July 31, 2012. On September 27, 2013, the court granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss [#36] without prejudice to Petitioner amending his Petition so that it contained no unexhausted claims. Order [#59].

On November 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a Re-filed Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Second Amended Petition") [#63] containing two claims, labeled to correspond to the earlier versions of the petition as 12(C) and 12(D). Claim 12(C) relates to two allegedly improper remarks made by the Commonwealth at closing argument. Claim 12(D) relates to Attorney Walsh's alleged conflicts of interest. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Expand the Record [#74] and Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing [#75] as to his conflicts-of-interest claim, which the court allowed, Order [#78], but then vacated, Order [#81], and ultimately denied after reviewing further submissions from the parties. Order [#94]. On May 20, 2014, the case was reassigned. Elec. Notice [#102]. Petitionersubsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration [#120], which the court (Talwani, D.J.) denied. Order [#127]. Petitioner filed a second Motion for Evidentiary Hearing [#128] as to his conflicts-of-interest claim, which the court also denied. Order [#140].

In light of continuing disputes between the parties as to what claims were before the court, the court reviewed the procedural history and determined that only Petitioner's claims 12(C) and 12(D), brought through his Second Amended Petition [#63], remain pending. See Order [#146]. The parties thereafter submitted briefing. Petitioner's Amended Memorandum in Support of Amended Petition [#158]; Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [#159]; Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Memorandum of Law [#162]; Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petition [#180], treated as a Supplemental Memorandum per Elec. Order [#196].5 The record remains "limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." See Order [#175] (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)).

The court heard argument on the habeas petition on May 28, 2020.6

III. Facts
A. The Murder of John Regan

The SJC held that the jury was warranted in finding following facts:7

In July, 1994, the defendant purchased a bar in Springfield from the victim, John Regan and his brother, James. The defendant made a down payment of $80,000 and agreed to make monthly payments of approximately $2,500. The defendant soon fell behind in his payments, prompting the victim and James to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The resulting auction took place on September 27, 1995, where the victim and James repurchased the bar. After this repurchase, the victim and the defendant negotiated terms under which the defendant might reacquire the bar. The victim's wife testified that the victim and the defendant planned to meet at the bar on October 12, 1995, so that the defendant could repay what he owed the victim in arrears. On that day, the defendant dropped off his girl friend, Denise Arlen, to run errands, and then proceeded to the meeting. The defendant testified that at the meeting, after he informed the victim that he did not have the money to pay the victim, they engaged in an argument that escalated into violence. It ultimately resulted in the defendant stabbing the victim to death in the office of the bar. The defendant testified that he did so in self-defense, after the victim became belligerent and irate about the money, told the defendant, "I am going to teach you the last lesson of your life," and struck him on the shoulder with a baseball bat.
After the killing, the defendant grabbed the murder weapon and fled the scene to pick up Arlen. He confessed to her that he had killed the victim in self-defense. Arlen testified that the defendant looked "shaken up" and "scared." The defendant and Arlen opted not to go to the police because the defendant feared the victim's alleged associations with organized crime, and they felt that no one would believe them. Instead, the defendant disposed of the murder weapon andboth the defendant and Arlen parked the victim's car in a Hartford, Connecticut, garage. The defendant then borrowed a station wagon from his sister's friend and used it to dispose of the victim's body in the Connecticut River. Meanwhile, Arlen returned to the bar and began to clean the blood from the incident. On his return, the defendant joined Arlen, and together they cleaned the entire bar, including the office, using bleach and other chemicals. The following morning, they returned to the bar to finish cleaning. While they were cleaning, the victim's son came to the bar and knocked on the windows of the bar. The son testified that when he asked the defendant if the defendant had seen the victim, the defendant replied
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