Stott v. Haworth, s. 89-1032

Citation916 F.2d 134
Decision Date20 December 1990
Docket NumberNos. 89-1032,89-1037,89-1049,s. 89-1032
Parties, 18 Fed.R.Serv.3d 184 Bobby STOTT; Joseph Register; Lonnie Michael Cayton, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Howard H. HAWORTH, Individually, Defendant-Appellant, and James G. Martin, Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants. Bobby STOTT; Joseph Register; Lonnie Michael Cayton, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James G. MARTIN, Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants-Appellants, and Howard H. Haworth, Individually; James S. Lofton, In his official capacity as Secretary of Department of Administration; Grace J. Rohrer, Individually, Defendants. Bobby STOTT; Joseph Register; Lonnie Michael Cayton, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James T. BROYHILL; David T. Flaherty, Defendants-Appellants, and James G. Martin, Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants. Bobby STOTT; Joseph Register; Lonnie Michael Cayton, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Howard H. HAWORTH, Individually, Defendant-Appellant, and James G. Martin, Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants. Bobby STOTT; Joseph Register; Lonnie Michael Cayton, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James G. MARTIN, Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Bobby STOTT; Joseph Register; Lonnie Michael Cayton, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James G. MARTIN, Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants-Appellants. to 89-1052.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

John R. Wester, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., Charlotte, N.C., argued (David C. Wright, III, Thomas B. Griffith, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., Charlotte, N.C., Robert B. Byrd, Lawrence D. McMahon, Jr., Sam J. Ervin, IV, Byrd, Byrd, Ervin, Whisnant, McMahon & Ervin, P.A., Morganton, N.C., Arch T. Allen, III, Christopher J. Blake, Moore & Van Allen, Raleigh, N.C., Bynum M. Hunter, Michael A. Gilles, Smith, Helms, Mulliss & Moore, Greensboro, N.C., Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen., Jean A. Benoy and Isham B. Hudson, Jr., Sr. Deputy Attys. Gen., David Roy Blackwell, James Peeler Smith, Edwin M. Speas, Jr. and Tiare B. Smiley, Sp. Deputy Attys. Gen., Neill S. Fuleihan, Associate Atty. Gen., Sp. Litigation, North Carolina Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, N.C., John J. Burney, Jr., Burney, Burney, Barefoot & Bain, Wilmington, N.C., G. Eugene Boyce, Wallace R. Young, Jr., Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Raleigh, N.C., Wayne P. Huckel, Clarence W. Walker, Lisa Hyman Lane, Kennedy, Covington, Lobdell & Hickman, Charlotte, N.C., John S. Stevens, Elizabeth M. Warren, James W. Williams, Roberts, Stevens & Cogburn, Asheville, N.C., A. Lincoln Sherk, Winston-Salem, N.C., David C. Pishko, Elliot and Pishko, P.A., Winston-Salem, N.C., on brief), for defendants-appellants.

Melinda Lawrence, Donnell Van Noppen, III, argued (Davison M. Douglas, Martha A. Geer, on brief), Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James, Harkavy & Lawrence, Raleigh, N.C., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before RUSSELL, WIDENER, and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.

DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:

This controversy arose after the election of James G. Martin as governor of the state of North Carolina. Governor Martin, a Republican, succeeded Governor James M. Hunt, a Democrat. After taking office, Governor Martin and his cabinet officers made numerous personnel changes which resulted, inter alia, in the termination or demotion of government employees that held "exempt" positions as defined by the North Carolina legislature. That statute, the North Carolina State Personnel Act, N.C.G.S. Secs. 126-1 et seq., provides that "no permanent employee subject to [the Act] shall be discharged, suspended or reduced in pay or position except for just cause." N.C.G.S. Sec. 126-35. However, the Act exempts certain employees by its terms and allows the governor to designate as exempt from the provisions of the Act certain other policymaking or decisionmaking employees. 1 Each of the plaintiffs in this cause held an exempt position; that position having been so designated as policymaking or confidential by then Governor Hunt. 2

The named plaintiffs brought individual actions seeking damages and injunctive relief, alleging the violation of certain rights protected by the first amendment when each was discharged from an exempt government position for the sole reason of political affiliation. Named as defendants were the governor, his cabinet members and other state officials. The plaintiffs then moved for class certification of their cause pursuant to the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, purporting to represent over 130 North Carolina government employees, holding exempt positions, who were subject to adverse personnel action 3 in violation of both the Personnel Act and their constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought certification of a class defined as those individuals who:

(a) at any point during the period from 6 November 1984 through 7 January 1985 occupied a position designated as "exempt" from the State Personnel Act as provided in N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 126-5 in one of the nine cabinet departments; and

(b) have been or will be terminated, transferred, demoted, or had their resignations or retirements coerced by defendants since the first of November 1984, because of their political affiliation or activities.

After a hearing on the matter, the district court certified the class and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and add nine new defendants. 4

The defendants in turn moved for decertification of the class, recusal of the district judge and summary judgment. The defendants based their motion for summary judgment on alternate grounds: first, that each plaintiff was lawfully subject to discharge for political reasons; and, second, that all damage claims should be dismissed because each of the defendants was clothed with qualified immunity. The district court considered the motion and dismissed the claims of 55 class members but kept alive the claims of another 63 class members. In making its ruling, the court found that 46 of these claimants were absolutely protected from discharge for political reasons. The court deferred ruling on ten class members. In a lengthy opinion, the court noted that a decision as to the appropriateness of summary judgment could not be made without a review of the circumstances surrounding each class member. The court focused its inquiry on the job held by each plaintiff prior to the date of the alleged adverse action, as well as the specific action taken. Lastly, with respect to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court granted five defendants' motions, finding them to be immune from prosecution of the cause with respect to certain members of the class. Two defendants were dismissed. 725 F.Supp. 1365.

The defendants' motion for recusal was based on the following undisputed facts. During the course of discovery it was noted that Dr. Charles Cook, formerly an employee of the Department of Human Resources, was a member of the class. Discovery also showed that the district judge's wife, Judith M. Britt, had, for a time, worked under the supervision of Dr. Cook. It was further disclosed by the district judge that he had been a patient of Dr. Cook and that the Britt family had, some time in the past, maintained a social affiliation with him.

The defendants asserted that because Mrs. Britt had direct knowledge of the facts in the dispute regarding the claim of Dr. Cook and that these facts were central to defending against Dr. Cook's claim, she would be called as a material witness at trial. This, according to the defendants, mandated recusal. The district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455 5, reviewed the allegations of the defendants and denied the motion for recusal. The court based its decision upon a finding that Mrs. Britt was not a material witness in this case. The defendants' motion for class decertification was also denied, as the district court found that there was a central issue that predominated and was capable of class resolution. Specifically, the court found that the central issue in this case was whether the Martin administration engaged in a policy and practice of firing state government employees solely because of their political affiliation or activities.

Thereafter, the district court certified all orders entered for review by this court. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). After consideration of the record before us, we remand this cause of action to the district court with an order to decertify the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a).

I.

The facts comprising the cause before us are not complicated, yet they are in dispute. Governor Martin is, to this date, only the second Republican voted to the post of governor by the North Carolina electorate in the twentieth century. After winning the 1984 gubernatorial election, Governor Martin formed a transition team to facilitate the change of administration. This team advised the governor about policy matters relating to personnel decisions, assisted in implementing the governor's agenda, reviewed and reported to the governor about the efficiency of the nine governmental departments, and assisted the newly appointed department heads in implementing the governor's policies. Although the actual personnel policy established during the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
100 cases
  • Rouse v. Nielson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • 18 Marzo 1994
    ... ... , the magistrate judge determined that plaintiff's "alternative" first amendment claim was precluded based on the analysis set forth in Stott v. Martin, 783 F.Supp. 970 (E.D.N.C.1992) (" Stott II "), in which the district court held: ... If "plaintiff's position is indeed one for which ... Haworth, 851 F. Supp. 724 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir.1990) (" Stott I ") and applied on remand in Stott II. Plaintiff did not object to the utilization of ... ...
  • Jenkins v. Medford
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 7 Agosto 1997
    ... ... Page 1162 ... "mutual confidence and loyalty are of great importance," and approved Joyner's dismissal. 33 ...         In Stott v. Haworth, 34 yet another panel addressed politically-motivated dismissals of public employees. Stott refined the inquiry courts in this circuit ... ...
  • Alberti v. County of Nassau
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • 30 Septiembre 2005
    ... ... See Stott v. Martin, 725 F.Supp. 1365, 1434 (E.D.N.C.1989), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir.1990). Although the ... ...
  • Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 14 Septiembre 1998
    ... ... Circuit City introduced its own statistical experts, Drs. Joan Haworth" and Peter Kolesar, who refuted Harless' conclusions, and opined that his statistics showed no evidence of racial discrimination ...        \xC2" ... See Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 305 (4th Cir.1991) (citing Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir.1990); Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir.1986)). Issues such as class action manageability are ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT