Stott v. Martin

• Decision Date: 12 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 85-818-CIV-5-BR,86-650-CIV-5-BR and 86-683-CIV-5-BR.,85-818-CIV-5-BR
• Citation: 783 F. Supp. 970
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Bobby STOTT, Joseph Register, and Lonnie Michael Cayton, Plaintiffs, v. James G. MARTIN, et al., Defendants.

783 F. Supp. 970

Bobby STOTT, Joseph Register, and Lonnie Michael Cayton, Plaintiffs, v. James G. MARTIN, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 85-818-CIV-5-BR, 86-650-CIV-5-BR and 86-683-CIV-5-BR.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Raleigh Division.

February 12, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Melinda Lawrence, Donnell Van Noppen, III, Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy, Raleigh, N.C., for plaintiffs.

Lacy Thornburg, Atty. Gen. of N.C., Raleigh, N.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRITT, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on several motions for summary judgment filed by various defendants. The motions have been extensively briefed and oral arguments were heard on 6 January 1992. The matter is now ripe for disposition.

I. Facts

The facts of this case have been recited in numerous prior orders and opinions, both published and unpublished. See, e.g., Stott v. Martin, 725 F.Supp. 1365, 1380 (E.D.N.C.1989) (hereinafter "Stott I"), rev'd sub nom. Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir.1990) (hereinafter "Stott II"). For purposes of the pending motions, the pertinent facts can be briefly summarized as follows: In November 1984, Republican James G. Martin was elected to replace Democrat James B. Hunt, Jr. as Governor of North Carolina. Upon entering office in January 1985, Governor Martin and his cabinet secretaries made numerous personnel changes regarding state employees who were "exempt" from the job-protection provisions of the North Carolina State Personnel Act, N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 126-1 et seq. (1991).¹ Plaintiffs Bobby Stott, Joseph Register, and Lonnie Michael Cayton were all discharged from their exempt positions. At the time of their respective discharges, Stott was the Regional Office Manager for the Raleigh Regional Office of the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development, Register was the Director of Collision Reports and General Services within the Division of Motor Vehicles, and Cayton was the Director of the C.A. Dillon School, a residential treatment and rehabilitation center for juvenile delinquents.

II. Procedural History

Over the course of nearly seven years of litigation, this case has taken a variety of twists and turns. The case began when Stott, Register, and Cayton each filed a separate complaint naming himself and a class of similarly situated state employees as plaintiffs. The three complaints were eventually consolidated into this unified action. Plaintiffs alleged that the sole reason they were discharged was because they were affiliated with the Democratic party. They prayed for damages and injunctive relief to redress an alleged violation of their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to allege that they were also fired because they supported and contributed to Martin's Democratic opponent and did not support or contribute to Martin.

This court certified a class of about 120 plaintiffs and permitted plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add nine new defendants. Defendants moved for decertification of the class and for summary judgment. The motion for decertification was denied. The motions for summary judgment were granted with respect to Stott, Cayton, and 55 class members and were denied with respect to Register and the remaining class members. Stott I. The court granted summary judgment for all defendants on plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim, ruling that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence of an agreement among defendants to violate their rights. 725 F.Supp. at 1439. Finally, the court granted defendants' motions to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity eleven class members' claims for monetary relief; it denied defendants' motions regarding the remaining class members and the named plaintiffs. Id. at 1442. The court then certified all orders entered for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1990).

The Fourth Circuit, in a split decision, held that this court erred in certifying the class. Stott II, 916 F.2d at 145-46. It therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to decertify the class. Id. at 146. The court also vacated every other order from which appeal was taken due to the fundamental defect resulting from the improperly certified class. Id. Upon the return of the case to this court, the court decertified the class and issued notice to class members and putative class members of 1) the decertification; 2) their right to move to intervene in this action; and 3) their right to file independent actions. Thirty former and putative class members moved to intervene. Meanwhile, defendants filed a joint motion to reinstate the court's previous ruling dismissing plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim. The court denied the putative motions to intervene and granted defendants' motion to reinstate its ruling dismissing the civil conspiracy claim.

Defendants have now filed four motions which, if granted, will terminate this litigation: 1) a motion to reinstate the court's ruling dismissing Stott's claim; 2) a motion to reinstate the court's ruling dismissing Cayton's claim; 3) a renewed motion for summary judgment on Register's claim; and 4) a renewed motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief. The court is now ready to rule.

III. Discussion

A. The Fourth Circuit's Opinion

Plaintiffs read the Fourth Circuit's opinion to require a trial by jury on the claims of Stott, Register, and Cayton, notwithstanding this court's previous dismissal of Stott's and Cayton's claims.² Defendants read the very same opinion to require dismissal of all three claims, notwithstanding this court's previous denial of the motion for summary judgment on Register's claim. The irony of the matter is that the Fourth Circuit expressly stated that it did not intend "to make a determination about the merits of the claims brought by the plaintiffs." Stott II, 916 F.2d at 143-44. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's opinion does not require the court to grant or deny the instant motions.

The Fourth Circuit's opinion does, however, strongly suggest to this court that it should take a fresh look at all three plaintiffs' claims. First, at the time this court ruled on defendants' summary judgment motions, it rejected as "too broad" the First Circuit's test for evaluating the constitutionality of patronage dismissals under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Stott I, 725 F.Supp. at 1381; see Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S.Ct. 1888, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987). The Fourth Circuit, in laying the foundation for its ruling on the class certification issue, stated that "Elrod and Branti, read together, mandate" the First Circuit's test "in order to properly render a decision on the propriety of a patronage dismissal." Stott II, 916 F.2d at 141; see infra pp. 976, 977 (setting out test). It found that test "consistent with the generally accepted broad interpretation of Elrod-Branti and its progeny." Stott II, 916 F.2d at 142.³ Since this court rejected the First Circuit's test as overly broad, it did not evaluate plaintiffs' claims under the correct legal standard.

Second, at the time this court ruled on defendants' summary judgment motions, it examined "both the actual duties performed by the discharged employees and their job descriptions." Stott I, 725 F.Supp. at 1388 n. 10. The court reasoned that "an approach that completely ignores the actual duties performed within a given position by this particular employee and other employees is suspect and subject to abuse." Id. The Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, establishes that only the inherent functions of an office are relevant:

"We would note that in conducting this inquiry, courts focus on the powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the functions performed by a particular occupant of that office. `The relevant inquiry is to the function of the public office in question and not the actual past duties of the particular employee involved.' `Thus, if an officeholder performs fewer or less important functions than usually attend his position, he may still be exempt from the prohibition against political terminations if his position inherently encompasses tasks that make his political affiliation an appropriate requirement for effective performance.'"

Stott II, 916 F.2d at 142 (quoting Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242 (quoting Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir.1986) and Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir.1985))) (citations omitted).⁴

Finally, at the time this court ruled on defendants' summary judgment motions, it placed the burden of proof "on the defendants to show that political affiliation was necessary or essential to the effective performance of the positions involved." Stott I, 725 F.Supp. at 1381. However, the Fourth Circuit's opinion indicates that the classification of "exempt" in North Carolina's personnel policy scheme should be accorded great deference:

We believe the fact that each of the plaintiffs in this case held an exempt position, so designated by the governor, creates a presumption at law that discharge or demotion was proper.... While deference must be given to the decision to so designate those positions as exempt, or to reduce the number of exempt positions, that decision is not unreviewable. The matter is a question of law to be ultimately decided by the courts.

Stott II, 916 F.2d at 142-43. The parties hotly contest the meaning and correct application of this presumption. The Fourth Circuit did not articulate how it would apply to this case. However, Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir.1988), on which the Fourth Circuit relied in recognizing this presumption, suggests the appropriate application:

Both the interests of federalism and the conservation

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