Stotts v. State

• Citation: 274 N.E.2d 238,257 Ind. 8
• Decision Date: 21 October 1971
• Docket Number: No. 1269,1269
• Parties: Larry STOTTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 302.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 238

274 N.E.2d 238

257 Ind. 8

Larry STOTTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 1269 S 302.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 21, 1971.

HUNTER, Judge.

In his petition for rehearing, appellant contends this Court has contravened a ruling precedent of this Court established in Strickland v. State (1940), 217 Ind. 588, 29 N.E.2d 950. He asserts this case stands for the proposition that wording such as that contained in the safe burglary statute, IC 1971, 35--1--61--1 (Ind.Ann.Stat. § 10--702a (1956 Repl.)), must define two separate offenses. However, Strickland involves the separate and distinct offenses of forgery and uttering a forged instrument. Sec IC 35--1--124--1 (Ind.Ann.Stat. § 10--2102 (1956 Repl.)). Upon reading the forgery statute it is cogently clear that it cannot stand for the proposition appellant asserts. The first part of the statute which defines forgery specifies numerous different methods of committing forgery and they are stated in the disjunctive. So too in our construction of the safe burglary statute, there are different methods of committing the same offense stated in the disjunctive. The fact that the forgery statute also goes on to define another offense of uttering a forged instrument (also containing different methods of commission stated in the disjunctive) is of no consequence. Therefore, this petition for rehearing must be denied.

Petition denied.

ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.