Stoudemire v. Stoudemire

• Decision Date: 25 January 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 222896.
• Citation: 639 N.W.2d 274,248 Mich. App. 325
• Parties: Robert STOUDEMIRE, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Dale STOUDEMIRE, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

639 N.W.2d 274

248 Mich. App. 325

Robert STOUDEMIRE, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Dale STOUDEMIRE, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Docket No. 222896.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted November 5, 2001, at Detroit.

Decided November 16, 2001, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication January 25, 2002.

Chiamp & Associates, P.C. (by Carole L. Chiamp) and Hickey & Cianciolo, P.C. (by Margaret A. Cotant), Detroit, for the plaintiff.

Elaine R. Carlis, Detroit, for the defendant.

Before: RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, P.J., and METER and K.F. KELLY, JJ.

RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, P.J.

Defendant wife, Dale Stoudemire, appeals and plaintiff husband, Robert Stoudemire, cross appeals a judgment of divorce entered by the Oakland Circuit Court, Family Division. We affirm.

I

The parties were married in 1983 in Detroit. Plaintiff was forty-one years old at the time of the marriage and was employed as a laborer at Chrysler Corporation. Defendant, who was twenty-eight years old when the parties married, was employed as a nursing assistant. The parties had no biological children together.¹ After the marriage and until 1991, both parties worked and contributed to the payment of marital expenses. In September 1991, the plaintiff was driving his vehicle when it was struck by a disposal truck, causing plaintiff to suffer a severe closed head injury requiring brain surgery. Plaintiff's recovery was prolonged; defendant quit her job to assist in his recovery. Defendant obtained training in physical therapy in order to aid her husband, and she took care of his daily needs.

In February 1992, defendant was appointed plaintiff's guardian and conservator of his estate by Judge Martin Maher of the Wayne County Probate Court. A lawsuit was then filed against the disposal company in the Wayne Circuit Court (by defendant individually and as guardian and conservator) and the case was settled in June 1993 for $3.5 million. In her capacity as conservator, defendant stipulated a Wayne Circuit Court order that awarded her $1,330,492.88 for her loss of consortium claim, awarded a one-third attorney fee of approximately $1,166,666 to her personal injury attorney, and awarded plaintiff $1,000,000 in a structured settlement for his severe closed head injury. Contrary to the directions of Judge Maher, defendant did not obtain the approval of the Wayne County Probate Court before acceptance of the settlement.

A spending spree followed and the parties used the settlement monies to purchase expensive consumer items such as cars, jewelry, furs, and clothing. Defendant used a portion of the settlement proceeds to make a large "loan" to her church without plaintiff's consent or authorization. Although both parties participated in spending, plaintiff remained legally incapacitated until February 1995, when the probate court issued an order restoring his competency. Defendant continued to act as conservator until that time. Plaintiff evidently engaged in extramarital affairs during this period.

In March 1995, plaintiff filed for divorce in the Oakland Circuit Court and also filed an action in the Wayne County Probate Court seeking an accounting by defendant as conservator of his estate. The divorce action was held in abeyance by the circuit court until an accurate determination of the marital assets could be made. The probate court case was litigated over the course of the next 3½ years, resulting in findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as a final order issued by Judge Maher on December 17, 1998. The probate court found in pertinent part that defendant, as guardian and conservator, had breached her fiduciary duty to plaintiff as ward, that the settlement entered into by defendant as guardian and conservator "shocked the conscience" of the probate court, and that if defendant had proceeded properly in the personal injury action and sought damages for a loss of consortium claim, the proper measure of her damages for that claim would have been twenty-five percent of the total settlement award. The probate court accordingly reduced the award for loss of consortium to $557,623 and imposed a surcharge. The probate court further held that defendant was not entitled to any fiduciary fees for assisting plaintiff in pursuing his claim or fees for performance of caretaking duties. The net balance of the personal injury proceeds were awarded to plaintiff. No allocation was made for pain or suffering or lost wages in either the personal injury action or the probate litigation. Neither the circuit court personal injury settlement nor the probate court decision was ever appealed.

In May 1999, plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in the divorce action, alleging that Judge Maher's findings were res judicata regarding the separate assets of the parties and the issues regarding defendant's surcharge as conservator of plaintiff's estate. In June 1999, Judge Linda S. Hallmark of the circuit court family division granted plaintiff's motion, ruling that the probate court's findings regarding the distribution of the settlement proceeds and the accountings of the conservator were res judicata with respect to those issues. However, the court also held that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to apportion the marital estate or to determine whether the separate estate of either party should be invaded in the context of the divorce proceedings, either for an additional award of property or for spousal support. The parties were ordered to proceed to trial on the issue of division of joint property, including the marital home, its contents, a pension plan, and the issue whether the parties' separate property should be invaded.

A five-day trial ensued in June 1999. The circuit court found that both parties were equally at fault regarding the marital breakdown: plaintiff's affairs contributed to the breakdown of the marriage, and defendant's mishandling of the conservatorship also served to destroy the relationship between the parties. The primary issue in dispute was the distribution of proceeds from the personal injury action filed during the marriage. The circuit court determined that plaintiff had separate property consisting of proceeds for his pain and suffering, defendant had separate property consisting of proceeds for loss of consortium, and the lost wages portion of the settlement, determined to be approximately $17,000, was split evenly between the parties. In her twenty-eight page written opinion and order, Judge Hallmark made extensive findings regarding the circumstances of the marriage and the division of other assets. A judgment of divorce was entered on September 22, 1999.

II

On appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court erred in granting partial summary disposition in favor of plaintiff on the basis of its conclusion that res judicata applied with regard to the probate court judgment. Defendant maintains that the subject matter of the probate court proceedings was different from, and therefore not conclusive of, the issues raised in the divorce action; the probate court dealt only with a fiduciary's duties to the ward, and the breach thereof, and not with matters of divorce. Citing York v. Wayne Co. Sheriff, 157 Mich.App. 417, 424-425, 403 N.W.2d 152 (1987), defendant further argues that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable where one action is brought in a party's representative capacity and another subsequent action is brought in a party's individual right.

This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7)² de novo to determine whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Limbach v. Oakland Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs, 226 Mich.App. 389, 395, 573 N.W.2d 336 (1997). The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo. Ditmore v. Michalik, 244 Mich.App. 569, 574, 625 N.W.2d 462 (2001).

Judge Hallmark granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition, holding, in pertinent part, that (1) the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Wayne County Probate Court's final order of December 17, 1998, were binding on the parties as res judicata, (2) the property awarded to plaintiff by the probate court judgment was his sole and separate property, the property awarded to defendant was her sole and separate property, and the joint and separate property was part of the marital estate, (3) the parties were to proceed to trial on the division of joint property, including the marital home, its contents, and a Chrysler pension plan, and (4) the parties were to proceed to trial to determine the necessity of invading the separate property under M.C.L. § 552.23, including distribution of the future lost wages portion of the personal injury award of plaintiff and spousal support. In her subsequent opinion and order resolving the divorce action, Judge Hallmark further explained with regard to plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition:

Counsel for plaintiff brought a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition in the divorce action on May 26, 1999, urging this court to adopt Judge Maher's findings as res judicata regarding the separate assets of the parties and the issues regarding surcharge of Mrs. Stoudemire as conservator of Mr. Stoudemire's estate. This court determined that Judge Maher's findings regarding the distribution of the settlement proceeds and the accountings of the conservator were res judicata as to those issues. See Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating, 386 Mich. 37, 191 N.W.2d 313 (1971).... The Probate Judge lacked jurisdiction, however, to apportion the marital estate or to determine whether the sole and separate property of either party should be invaded pursuant to MCLA 552.23 or MCLA 552.401. See McCormick v. McCormick, 221 Mich.App. 672, [681], 562 N.W.2d 504 (1997). The issue of future spousal support was also...