Stouffer Hotel Co. v. Teachers Ins.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 87-1365-CIV-T-23B.,87-1365-CIV-T-23B.
• Citation: Stouffer Hotel Co. v. Teachers Ins., 944 F.Supp. 874 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
• Parties: STOUFFER HOTEL CO., Plaintiff, v. TEACHERS INSURANCE, Lincoln Property, and Lincoln-Urban Centre, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

944 F.Supp. 874

STOUFFER HOTEL CO., Plaintiff, v.TEACHERS INSURANCE, Lincoln Property, and Lincoln-Urban Centre, Defendants.

No. 87-1365-CIV-T-23B.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

May 3, 1995.

Marvin E. Barkin, Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A., Tampa, FL, Timothy J. Coughlin, Thompson, Hine & Flory, Cleveland, OH, Mary Lee Pilla, Solon, OH, Richard B. Wilkes, Gardner, Wilkes, Shaheen & Candelora, Tampa, FL, for Stouffer Hotel Co.

Eben G. Crawford, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Miami, FL, Wayne L. Thomas, Tampa, FL, for Teachers Insurance.

Karl L. Rubinstein, Jeffrey L. Wood, Rubinstein & Perry, LLP, Dallas, TX, Byron L. Woolley, Simpson, Woolley & McConachie, LLP, Dallas, TX, Wayne L. Thomas, Tampa, FL, for Lincoln Property and Lincoln-Urban Centre.

ORDER

MERRYDAY, District Judge.

The defendants have requested an award of attorneys' fees consequent upon the plaintiff's declining an offer of judgment.The defendant's motions under Rule 50,Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were granted at the close of the plaintiff's evidence.The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.Stouffer Corp. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America,20 F.3d 1174(11th Cir.1994).

The defendants' requests prompt an inquiry into the meaning and history of Section 45.061, Florida Statutes;Section 768.79, Florida Statutes;Rule 1.442,Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; and several decisions of Florida's appellate courts, including Timmons v. Combs,608 So.2d 1(Fla.1992), and related cases.However, the disposition of the defendants' requests is more accessible than (although entirely consistent with) a studied reconciliation of the admittedly confusing series of cases, statutes, and rules affecting the subject (characterized aptly by Mr. Barkin at oral argument as "one of the most oblique areas of rule and law that I think I have ever seen").

In short, assessed in light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff's rejection of the defendants' offer of judgment was not unreasonable.First, the plaintiff's grievance against the defendants is understandable, and the plaintiff's counsel advanced the grievance with skill and determination.A significant economic opportunity was lost to the plaintiff because of acts that the plaintiff viewed as wrong.Nonetheless, after hearing the plaintiff's evidence for several days, I concluded that no cause of action was available to the plaintiff under applicable law.I did not conclude either then or now that the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel proceeded frivolously, precipitously, malevolently, or even unwisely.I concluded after considerable analysis that the facts of this case fall outside the bounds of the alleged cause of action.Others might well disagree.The notion of tortious interference with a contract, prospective advantage, or business relation and the attendant defense of "privilege," among the most poorly defined areas of commercial law, remind the observer of "bad faith" and "commercial unreasonableness," other notions about which well-informed and reasonable persons mightily disagree.Although I found the...