Stout v. Bd. of Com'rs of Grant Co.

Decision Date16 September 1886
Citation8 N.E. 222,107 Ind. 343
PartiesStout v. Board of Com'rs of Grant Co.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Grant circuit court.

R. W. Bailey, Coffroth & Stuart, Jas. F. Frazier, W. H. Calkins, Baker, Hord & Hendricks, and W. F. Elliott, for appellant.

The intent of the legislature governs in the construction of a statute, and it is to be gathered from the language used, which is to be given its natural and obvious meaning. Waller v. Harris, 32 Amer. Dec. 590, and note, 597; State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 12 Gill & J. 399; S. C. 38 Amer. Dec. 317; Sedg. St. & Const. Law, 220; 1 Kent, Comm. 461; Taylor v. Board, 67 Ind. 383; Sedg. St. Law, (1st Ed.) 237, 243; Case v. Wildridge, 4 Ind. 54;Green v. Cheek, 5 Ind. 107;Huber v. Robinson, 23 Ind. 140;Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403;Johnson v. Hudson R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 455; Sedg. St. Law, (1st Ed.) 245, 246, 308, 309; Maxwell v. Collins, 8 Ind. 40;Lovejoy v. Robinson, Id. 399; Garrigus v. Board, etc., 39 Ind. 66;Catterlin v. City of Frankfort, 87 Ind. 45, 54;Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 97;Bidwell v. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 469, 479;Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Porter, (Ala.) 268, 269; Perry Co. v. Jefferson Co., 94 Ill. 214;Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 272.

Words or phrases ought not, under the guise of interpretation, to be added, interpolated, or imported into a statute. Everett v. Wells, 2 Scott, (N. R.) 531; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 97;Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 272;Brocaw v. Board, 73 Ind. 543. When the words of a statute, prescribing compensation to a public officer, are loose and obscure, and admit of two interpretations, that which is most favorable to the officer should be adopted. Blackw. Tax Titles, (1st Ed.) § 231, p. 742; U. S. v. Morse, 3 Story, 87;U. S. v. Collier, 3 Blatchf. 333;Chatfield v. Washington Co., 3 Or. 318.

There is nothing, either in the title or the body of this act of 1879, to indicate an intention on the part of the legislature to reduce official fees and salaries; and the plain meaning of the section under consideration is that the auditor of a county consisting of over 20,000 inhabitants shall receive for each 1,000 inhabitants in excess of 20,000 the sum of $100 in addition to both his fixed salary and the $125 already provided; making, in addition to his fixed salary, a total further sum of $225 for each 1,000 of such excess. This is not a proper case for the application of the rule of stare decisis. Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 691;Duff v. Fisher, 15 Cal. 382; Wells, Res Adj. c. 42.

Niblack, J.

The appellant, Joseph W. Stout, presented a claim against the county of Grant to the board of commissioners of that county, at its March term, 1884, for an alleged balance due him for services as former auditor of such county. The claim was presented in the similitude of a formal complaint, averring that the appellant was auditor of said county of Grant from the first day of June, 1880, until the first day of November, 1883; that during all that time said county contained a population of 24,000 persons, according to the last census taken by the United States; that the services of the appellant, as such auditor, had amounted to the aggregate sum of $9,652.05, on account of which he had received only the gross sum of $7,943.70, as illustrated by an accompanying bill of particulars; that the board of commissioners hereinabove named had only, from time to time, allowed the appellant, as a part of his salary, the sum of $100 for each 1,000 inhabitants in excess of 20,000, when he was, as he still is, entitled to receive, under the twenty-second section of the act of March 31, 1879, (Rev. St. 1881, § 5907,) concerning fees and salaries, the aggregate amount of $225 per year for each 1,000 inhabitants so in excess of 20,000. Wherefore the appellant demanded an allowance and judgment for $1,708.35 as a balance remaining due and unpaid to him.

The claim thus presented was rejected by the commissioners, whereupon the appellant appealed to the circuit court, where a demurrer was filed and sastained to the complaint, and where a final judgment upon demurrer was rendered against the appellant.

No formal pleadings are required in the presentation of a claim against a board of county commissioners. It is only necessary to file a written statement or account, giving the nature of the claim, and so identifying it as to bar another proceeding upon it. Board v. Adams, 76 Ind. 504;Board v. Emmerson, 95 Ind. 579. But where the parties elect to file formal pleadings upon such a claim, and to form issues of law upon the facts contained in any of such pleadings, the sufficiency of the facts thus pleaded may be ruled upon as in other cases. Board v. Ritter, 90 Ind. 362;Wright v. Board, 98 Ind. 108;Board v. Murphy, 100 Ind. 570.

The question intended to be presented, and upon which alone a decision is invoked in this case, is the same as the one involved in the cases of Edger v. Board Com'rs Randolph Co., 70 Ind. 331, and Parker v. Board Com'rs Wayne Co., 84 Ind. 340, and that is, to what annual compensation is a county auditor entitled, under the twenty-second section of the act of March 31, 1879, above referred to, for each 1,000 inhabitants, where the population of his county, as shown by the last census, exceeds 20,000?

The section in question reads as follows:

Sec. 22. The auditor of each county shall be allowed the sum of twelve hundred dollars per year for his services, and no more, except as provided for in this act. When the population of his county exceeds fifteen thousand, as shown by the last preceding census taken by the United States, the additional sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars for each one thousand inhabitantsin excess of fifteen thousand shall be allowed said auditor in addition to his salary of twelve hundred dollars; and, if the population of said county shall be more than twenty thousand, said auditor shall be allowed the additional sum of one hundred dollars for each one thousand inhabitants in excess of twenty thousand in said county. Each auditor shall be allowed one hundred dollars per year for making all reports required by law to the auditor of state. Such allowance shall be made in quarterly installments by the board of commissioners during their regular sessions in March, June, September, and December, and paid out of any county revenue of such county not otherwise appropriated, but payment shall not be made in advance of services rendered.”

In the cases named this court construed this section of the statute to mean that a county auditor was entitled to receive only an annual compensation of $100 for each 1,000 inhabitants in excess of 20,000, and hence counsel for the appellant concede that so far the weight of authority in this court is heavily against the more liberal construction of the section they are now seeking to obtain. It is nevertheless most earnestly, but respectfully, contended that the construction given as above was not a well-considered construction, but was and still is a construction placed upon a statute in palpable disregard of long-established rules for the government of courts in such and similar cases; and for that reason we are asked to reconsider the question now again presented, and to adopt a different, and so-called more liberal, construction in favor of county auditors. It is true, as contended, that in construing a statute the probable intention of the legislature must be kept constantly in view, and that, where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the expressed intention of the legislature must prevail, there being then no room left for construction. Case v. Wildridge, 4 Ind. 51; Busk. Pr. 353; Taylor v. Board Com'rs, 67 Ind. 383;U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399; 1 Kent, Comm. 460-468. It is also true that the courts cannot extend the plain meaning of a statute by the substitution or addition of words or phrases without encroaching upon the legislative department of the government. Trustees v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3. But the legislative intention, as collected from an examination of the whole, as well as the separate parts, of a statute, will prevail over the literal import of particular terms, and will control the strict letter of the statute, where an adherence to such strict letter would lead to injustice, to absurdity, or to contradictory provisions. Mayor v. Weems, 5 Ind. 547; Busk. Pr. supra; Middleton v. Greeson, 106 Ind. 18; S. C. 5 N. E. Rep. 755; Miller v. State, 106 Ind. 415; S. C. 7 N. E. Rep. 209. It is likewise true that the certificates of the speaker of the house of representatives, and of the president of the senate, respectively, that an act has passed both houses of the general assembly, are conclusive upon the courts, and hence cannot be impeached by the production of facts inconsistent with the truth of such certificates. Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514;Bender v. State, 53 Ind. 254;Board Com'rs v. Burford, 93 Ind. 383. But where a statute is of doubtful or uncertain meaning, by reason of obscurity in its phraseology, a recurrence to the circumstances...

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