Stout v. Hendricks

• Decision Date: 20 April 1964
• Docket Number: 62-C-326.,No. IP 61-C-236,IP 61-C-236
• Citation: 228 F. Supp. 568
• Parties: Bruce L. STOUT et al., Plaintiffs, v. Charles O. HENDRICKS, Secretary of State of the State of Indiana, et al., Defendants. Nelson G. GRILLS, Plaintiff, v. Matthew E. WELSH, Governor of Indiana, et al., as Members of the State Election Board, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

228 F. Supp. 568

Bruce L. STOUT et al., Plaintiffs, v. Charles O. HENDRICKS, Secretary of State of the State of Indiana, et al., Defendants.

Nelson G. GRILLS, Plaintiff, v. Matthew E. WELSH, Governor of Indiana, et al., as Members of the State Election Board, Defendants.

Nos. IP 61-C-236, 62-C-326.

United States District Court S. D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

November 8, 1963.

As Corrected April 20, 1964.

Robert D. Risch, Jerome M. Strauss, and John Wood, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiffs in Stout case.

Nelson Grills, Indianapolis, Ind., pro se.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants in both cases.

Before KILEY, Circuit Judge, and STECKLER and HOLDER, District Judges.

KILEY, Circuit Judge:

This is a three-judge court composed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2281 at the request of the District Court. The Court has before it two actions: Bruce L. Stout, et al. v. Charles O. Hendricks, Secretary of State of the State of Indiana, et al., filed August 2, 1961, and Nelson G. Grills v. Matthew E. Welsh, Governor of Indiana, et al., filed August 7, 1962. The actions were consolidated as to all proceedings and for trial of all matters in issue by the Court upon its own motion on November 27, 1962. Each action relates to the apportionment of the legislative branch of government of the State of Indiana.

The first action is a class action brought by the plaintiffs, Bruce L. Stout, John E. Hunter, John S. Griffin and David L. Matthews, upon their own behalf and upon behalf of all qualified voters in the respective counties in which plaintiffs live and in the state, who are similarly situated, as is permitted by Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The action is brought against certain named and unnamed defendants as members of the same class, all of whom are officials of the State of Indiana or of counties in the State of Indiana, and all of whom are sued in their official capacity.

Jurisdiction in the first case, the Stout case, is predicated upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, the Civil Rights Acts, and upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1392(a), which relate to jurisdiction and venue of district courts. The complaint, as amended and supplemented, seeks pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2201, a declaration of plaintiffs' rights and of the validity or invalidity of the statutes of the State of Indiana (Ind. Ann.Stats. §§ 34-102 and 34-104 (1949), hereinafter referred to as the "1921 apportionment statutes") which apportion the members of the Indiana General Assembly among the counties of the State, and further, injunctive relief as may be proper to prevent defendants from continuing to comply with the allegedly unconstitutional statutes.

The complaint in the Grills case is an action by plaintiff Nelson G. Grills against the members of the State Election Board, who are also defendants in the Stout case, and is also a declaratory judgment action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The action is said to arise under, and jurisdiction is apparently predicated on, Article 4, Section 4, and Article 6 of, and the Fourteenth Amendment to, the Constitution of the United States.

Although the theories of the two actions are not completely alike,¹ the basic issue presented by each action is whether election of members of the Indiana General Assembly from districts created by the present statutes apportioning the legislature, passed in 1921,² is in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. The first action, the Stout case, is now before the Court following a trial upon the merits and upon a motion to dismiss the action, and the second action, the Grills case, is before the Court upon the motion of the plaintiff for a summary judgment and upon an amended motion to dismiss the action, which motion to dismiss is to be treated as a motion for summary judgment under the provisions of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, since it contains matters outside the pleadings.

There is no dispute about the relevant facts. They have been stipulated into the record and, in part, judicially noticed. The Court's detailed statement of these facts is being filed contemporaneously herewith. It is deemed unnecessary to detail them in this opinion in view of the agreement by the defendants that these facts show that the 1921 apportionment statutes lack a rational basis. This agreement of the defendants sufficiently answers the vital question in these consolidated cases, i. e., "Do the 1921 apportionment statutes establish classifications predicated upon a rational basis or are they utterly arbitrary and lacking in rationality?"³ This agreement of the defendants also brings into play the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), under which the instant court is to take jurisdiction and dispose of the plaintiffs' suits. In respect to the latter, the Court finds and concludes, in fact and in law, that it has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in each action.

In view of defendants' agreement that there is no rational basis for the 1921 apportionment acts, the conclusion follows, Baker v. Carr, that the acts are unconstitutional since they deny equal protection to plaintiffs, and those represented by them, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Plaintiffs therefore are entitled to injunctive relief.

The Stout case was filed in August, 1961, and this three-judge court was appointed by Chief Judge Hastings on August 14, 1961. The Grills case was filed in August, 1962. On October 19, 1962, the Court declined, at Grills' insistence, to interfere with the November, 1962, election of members of the General Assembly. The Court at that time deemed it wise to abstain from action until after the General Session of the legislature in January and February of 1963. In that session, a reapportionment bill was passed by both houses of the General Assembly. It was vetoed by the Governor. The veto was sustained by the General Assembly. A Special Session was called by the Governor for April, 1963, and the call of the session included the subject of reapportionment. This Court again abstained from action with the expectation that appropriate reapportionment legislation would be adopted into law. Postponement of court action on both occasions was consistent with the wholesome doctrine of judicial abstention. To have done otherwise on either occasion would have been an unseemly judicial interference with a legislative function and responsibility.

The legislature in the Special Session adopted a resolution providing for a new basis of apportionment of legislative districts. The resolution, if it were to survive all necessary steps resulting in amendment of the Constitution, would not result in a legislature from reapportioned districts until the 1975 General Session.

In June, 1963, defendants conceded for the first time in this litigation that the Indiana apportionment statute of 1921 was, in effect, unconstitutional. The Court's duty thereupon became clear.

This Court cannot perform that duty by accepting the legislative resolution of April, 1963, as a satisfactory effort to establish a just and constitutional reapportionment of Indiana's present legislative districts having no rational basis. To accept the resolution as satisfactory would unduly delay justice for the citizens of Indiana.

This Court is urged by plaintiffs to direct an "at-large" election for members of the General Assembly. The Court is not disposed to burden the Indiana electors with the obvious confusing and disrupting consequences of ordering that relief, especially in 1964, the year of a presidential election. This "cure" could be worse than the "disease." Nor has the Court seriously considered declaring void the November, 1962, election of members of the General Assembly of Indiana upon the vain hope that "within thirty days" the members thereby rendered de facto would adopt a just and constitutional reapportionment statute. To grant this prayer would be reckless.

Finally, plaintiffs ask this Court itself to establish a just reapportionment. This relief the Court must grant in the absence of just and constitutional reapportionment legislation by the Indiana General Assembly.

It is unfortunate that federal courts in general have of necessity been drawn into assuming legislative responsibility because of the failure of representatives elected by the people to abide by their sworn duty under the constitutions of the states. This Court is concerned to afford to the citizens of Indiana every practical, possible opportunity to obtain a just and constitutional apportionment through the legislative processes established by them in their fundamental law.

We have decided, therefore, that we should suspend the effective date of the injunctive relief to be granted by this Court simultaneously with the filing of this opinion; and that we should defer court action to establish the appropriate reapportionment of legislative districts of the state. This is the middle path between accepting the legislative resolution of April, 1963, and granting the "atlarge" election or the "thirty-day" relief.

We think the electors of Indiana should have an opportunity in 1964 — with the aid of all other persons and groups interested in the problem — to select representatives for the General Assembly who may hold best promise of dedication to attaining the goal of a just and constitutional apportionment in the 1965 General Assembly. We cannot assume that, of necessity, the electors cannot successfully demand and receive from the political parties of their choice an opportunity to make such a selection.

It is our opinion, therefore, that the injunctive relief to be granted here should be made effective after the November, 1964, election, and that any court-established reapportionment of the State of...