Stout v. Sutphen

• Citation: 29 A.2d 724,132 N.J.Eq. 583
• Decision Date: 11 January 1943
• Docket Number: 139/687.
• Parties: STOUT v. SUTPHEN.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

29 A.2d 724

132 N.J.Eq. 583

STOUT

v. SUTPHEN.

139/687.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Jan. 11, 1943.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The grant of letters of administration by a court of general jurisdiction upon notice to all parties then and now in interest or in privity, constitutes the complainant the administrator and the grant of the letters cannot be inquired into in this court, collaterally.

2. A husband by his arbitrary act in withdrawing all the funds from bank accounts in the name of himself and wife as joint tenants, following the mental incompetency and during the lifetime of his wife, and the commingling of her share of the funds with his own and his personal dominion over all as the sole owner thereof, demolished the unities essential to a joint tenancy, defeated his survivorship rights, and he thereupon became by operation of law a tenant in common with his wife of the credits then due them from the banks.

Suit by Charles T. Stout, administrator de bonis non of the estate of Marie Louise Wall, deceased, against William R. Sutphen, Jr., administrator of the goods, chattels of John M. Wall, deceased, to require defendant to account for moneys alleged to belong to the estate of plaintiff's decedent.

Decree advised in accordance with opinion.

Walter E. Cooper, of Jersey City, for complainant.

Bowers & Rinehart, of Somerville (Charles P. Saling, of Union City, of counsel), for defendant.

JAYNE, Vice Chancellor.

John M. Wall and Marie Louise Stout were married in 1899, and sometime thereafter bank accounts were constituted to the credit of Marie Louise Wall and John M. Wall and the survivor of them as joint tenants, in the First National Bank and the Bound Brook Trust Company, both in Bound Brook, New Jersey, and also in West Side Savings Bank in New York City. Other than the records of these banking institutions which disclose the character of the accounts, there is no proof of the circumstances accompanying and surrounding their creation. All parties now in interest assume from the words used that the original ownership of these accounts abided in Mr. and Mrs. Wall as joint tenants. New Jersey Title, etc., Co v. Archibald, 90 N.J.Eq. 384, 107 A. 472, affirmed 91 N.J.Eq. 82, 108 A. 434; Franklin National Bank v. Freile, 116 N.J.Eq. 278, 173 A. 93, affirmed 117 N.J.Eq. 405, 176 A. 167.

On December 29, 1936, Mrs. Wall, while residing in New York, was adjudged by the Supreme Court of that State to be a mentally incompetent person and incapable of conducting her economic affairs. Her husband was thereupon nominated "committee" to assume, in a fiduciary capacity, the custody of her property and the direction of her business requirements.

Pursuing the narrative of facts chronologically, it may next be disclosed that on March 9, 1937, Mr. Wall terminated the joint account in the Bound Brook Trust Company by withdrawing the entire credit and depositing the fund to his individual use in the same institution. On July 1, 1937, he likewise concluded the joint account in the First National Bank, and with the fund thus withdrawn, he simultaneously opened an account in his own name. Subsequently, on July 12, 1937, he collected the small joint account in the West Side Savings Bank.

Mr. Wall, in his capacity as the committee of his wife's estate, presented an account to the Supreme Court of New York which was apparently approved on March 28, 1938. This account reveals a balance in hand of $1,051.29. It is also evident that Mr. Wall additionally received in November, 1938, a sum of $974.82 of income due to Mrs. Wall.

Mrs. Wall died on February 8, 1938, intestate, and upon the verified petition of Mr. Wall and with due notice to all persons in interest, general letters of administration of the estate of Marie Louise Wall were duly issued to her husband, John M. Wall, by the Surrogate's Court of the County and State of New York. Mr. Wall never filed an account of his administration of his wife's estate. He died on January 25, 1941, also intestate, and letters of administration of his estate have been granted to the defendant by the Surrogate of Somerset County, New Jersey. The complainant was thereafter duly appointed administrator de bonis non of the estate of Marie Louise Wall by the Surrogate's Court of the County and State of New York.

Mrs. Wall was also survived by a sister, brothers, nephews and nieces, who under the provisions of the law of New York relative to the distribution of a personal estate of an intestate of such alleged dimensions, would have a beneficial interest.

This precursory sketch of events facilitates a perception of the factual field in which the present litigation is pursued. The complainant, as administrator of the estate of Marie, now constrains the administrator of John's estate to account for the moneys alleged to belong to the estate of Marie.

The initial point of resistance proposed by the defendant is that although Mrs. Wall was actually residing in the State of New York at and for some time prior to her death, nevertheless her domicile was in New Jersey, in which event, it is said, the complainant is without authority to prosecute this cause and the next of kin of Mrs. Wall have no beneficial interest in the funds sought to be captured. This point was naturally encountered during the progress of the final hearing upon the offer of the defendant to introduce supporting evidence. I then, in view of the adjudications of the Surrogate's Court of the County and State of New York relative to the appointments of the complainant and his predecessor, announced my ruling orally, and it will be expeditious to now extract it from the stenographic transcript:

"In view of the circumstances I may say that it is my present conclusion that the domicile of the decedent, Mrs. Wall, cannot be a controversial issue in this cause. If the purpose of the introduction of the evidence is to disclose that the domicile of Mrs. Wall was, in fact, in New Jersey, in order to collaterally attack the validity of the letters of general administration issued by the Surrogate's Court of the State of New York, to the complainant, such evidence I believe to be inadmissible. I have in mind our decisions.

"The decedent, John M. Wall, whom the defendant here represents, applied for letters of general administration for the estate of his wife, to the Surrogate's Court of New York, representing in the application that she was a resident of New York. As I understand it, all the parties in interest had notice of this application for letters, and were made parties to the proceeding.

"The principle, I think, is we established, that in the absence of fraud, a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction cannot be collaterally impeached if the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties. Jurisdiction in this sense is the power to hear and determine the cause. In the exercise of the power to hear and determine, the court will necessarily inquire to ascertain certain basic facts on which its jurisdiction to proceed necessarily depends. The determination of such matters by the court is conclusive. In the effort to attack the judgment in a collateral manner, if such facts on which such jurisdiction depends are not in the record, they will be presumed. I am speaking, of course, of courts of general jurisdiction, to which class, under the proof, the Surrogate's Court of New York belongs.

"The New York Court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, was required, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, to hear and determine the fact of the decedent's domicile, it seems to me, in order to determine whether general or ancillary letters should be issued to the petitioner, John Wall, at the time of his application.

"The court of New York issued letters of general administration, first to the decedent's husband, John Wall, and then to this present complainant. The determination of that issue by the Surrogate's Court of New York, insofar as the parties to that proceeding are concerned, and those in privity with them, precludes, I think, any further dispute between...