Stout v. United States, Case No. 15-cv-379-WPJ
| Decision Date | 15 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-379-WPJ |
| Parties | LANCE STOUT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant United States' Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 51), filed December 4, 2015. Having reviewed the relevant pleadings of the parties and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's motion is well-taken and therefore GRANTED as herein described.
Given the filings to date, the Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the factual allegations underlying this action. However, the Court highlights relevant procedural developments. The United States filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 51) on December 4, 2015. Plaintiffs Lance Stout and Barbre Stout ("Plaintiffs") filed a Response (Doc. 61) on January 15, 2016. The United States filed a Reply(Doc. 62) on January 22, 2016. Oral argument on the United States' motion was held on July 7, 2016.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of "show[ing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant meets this burden, Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). It is not enough for the party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment to "rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). To deny a motion for summary judgment, genuine factual issues must exist that "can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. A mere "scintilla" of evidence will not avoid summary judgment. See Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993). Rather, there must be sufficient evidence on which the fact finder could reasonably find for the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. That said, the court must resolve all reasonable inferences and doubts in favor of the non-moving party, and construe all evidence in the lightmost favorable to the non-moving party. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 550-55 (1999).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 8(a)(2), in turn, requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Thus, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although a court must accept all the complaint's factual allegations as true, the same is not true of legal conclusions. See id. Mere "labels and conclusions" or "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action" will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court should disregard all conclusory statements of law and consider whether the remaining specific factual allegations, if assumed to be true, plausibly suggest the defendant is liable." Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).
"Insofar as subject matter jurisdiction is concerned, it has long been recognized that a federal court must, sua sponte, satisfy itself of its power to adjudicate in every case and at every stage of the proceedings and the court is not bound by the acts or pleadings of the parties." Tafoya v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Law Enf't Assistance Admin., 748 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1984). "Jurisdictional questions are of primary concern and can be raised at any time by courts on their own motion." Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs for Garfield Cty., Colo. v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs' claim against the United States arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), alleging that the employees and agents of the United States had a duty to interveneand prevent other law enforcement officers from using excessive force. Plaintiffs allege that the employees and agents breached that duty when they failed to intervene to stop the firing of approximately 75 bullets at Stacey Stout ("Ms. Stout").
The United States presents three main arguments. First, Plaintiffs' claim is forever barred because Plaintiffs filed suit more than six months after the denial of their administrative claims. Second, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege facts to plausibly state a claim.
Third, Plaintiffs' claim cannot survive because there is no analogous action against private persons under Oklahoma law. The Court addresses each of the arguments in turn.
Plaintiffs presented two administrative claims to the United States Marshals Service under the FTCA. The first claim, dated August 1, 2013, was presented on behalf of Barbre and Lance Stout as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Stacey Michelle Stout. The second claim, dated August 1, 2013, was presented on behalf of Barbre and Lance Stout as Guardians of C.S., a minor child.
The United States argues that because Plaintiffs filed suit more than six months after the denial of their administrative claim, those claims are "forever barred." See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) requires that a tort claim against the United States be filed within six months after the date of mailing of the notice of final denial of the claim, or the claim is forever barred. As exhibits and an affidavit, the United States shows that Plaintiffs' administrative claim was denied June 17, 2014, and that Plaintiffs' original counsel received the denials by certified mail on June 20, 2014. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs did not file suit until April 8, 2015, almost ten months after the denial of their administrative claims. Thus, their claims are barred.
Plaintiffs argue that United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, recently decided by the UnitedStates Supreme Court, resolves the issue at hand. See 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015). There, the Supreme Court interpreted "forever barred" to mean that "[i]t does not define a federal court's jurisdiction over tort claims generally, address its authority to hear untimely suits, or in any way cabin its usual equitable powers." Id. at 1633. Because Section 2401(b) reads like an ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of limitations, Congress' separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not jurisdictional and therefore does not preclude tolling when circumstances warrant. See id at 1633-38. Plaintiffs argue that equitable tolling is appropriate in certain extraordinary cases. In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the lawyer in the case effectively abandoned his client and missed an important filing deadline. Holland involved a habeas corpus petition in a death penalty case. See id. at 634. The Supreme Court found equitable tolling applied where counsel had abandoned his client. See id. at 652. Plaintiffs, in their argument and in an attached affidavit of Barbre Stout ("Ms. Stout"), provide facts in support of their request that the Court find equitable tolling appropriate in this circumstance.
The United States, in its Reply, argues that the affidavits attached to Plaintiffs' Response are inadmissible and fail to show that Plaintiffs have demonstrated the diligence and extraordinary circumstances required for equitable tolling. However, the Court finds that at the July 7, 2016 hearing regarding the Order to Show Cause for Abandonment (Doc. 70) and Order to Show Cause for Sanctions (Doc. 71) directed at Plaintiffs' former counsel, testimony provided by Plaintiffs' former counsel and Ms. Stout sufficiently demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances existed and that Plaintiffs pursued their rights diligently. As outlined in detail in the Court's Order Finding Abandonment (Doc. 90), the Court finds both a factual and legal basis demonstrating that equitable tolling is appropriate in the unique circumstances pertaining to thiscase. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim, while filed more than six months after the denial of their administrative claims, is not "forever barred" under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), and that equitable tolling of the six-month period is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court declines to enter judgment on behalf of the United States based upon the six-month requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
The United States next argues that Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States notes that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 45) does not identify which officers could have intervened or the means by which they could have intervened, contains no allegations that the officers knew that any...
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