Stovall v. City of Memphis, No. W2003-02036-COA-R3-CV (TN 8/20/2004)

• Decision Date: 20 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. W2003-02036-COA-R3-CV.,W2003-02036-COA-R3-CV.
• Parties: SARA BETH STOVALL v. THE CITY OF MEMPHIS.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

SARA BETH STOVALL v.THE CITY OF MEMPHIS.

No. W2003-02036-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Jackson.

May 19, 2004 Session.

Filed August 20, 2004.

A Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County; No. CT-007317-01; The Honorable Robert L. Childers, Judge.

Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.

Jack V. Delany of Memphis for Appellant, Sara Beth Stovall

Robert L. J. Spence, Jr., City Attorney; Steven D. Townsdin, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee, The City of Memphis

W. Frank Crawford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Alan E. Highers, J. and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.

OPINION

W.FRANK CRAWFORD, Presiding Judge, W.S.

This case arises from the trial court's grant of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment based on interpretation of T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a).Finding that T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) requires couples to obtain a marriage license for a valid marriage in Tennessee and that Marriage by Estoppel does not apply, we affirm.

The material facts are undisputed.On November 3, 1998Sara Beth Stovall("Ms. Stovall,""Appellant," or "Plaintiff") and Mr. John C. Stovall, Sr.("Mr. Stovall" or "Decedent") participated in a marriage ceremony at the home of Dr. E. Lowell Adams.Prior to that ceremony, the couple neither obtained nor presented a valid marriage license.On December 19, 1998 another ceremony took place in Mississippi, this time accompanied by a valid marriage license issued by officials in Desoto County referencing the December 19, 1998 ceremony.¹

Mr. Stovall died on December 6, 2000.As a retired City of Memphis firefighter with 28 years of service, Mr. Stovall was an eligible participant in the City of Memphis retirement plan and was drawing benefits from the City of Memphis("Appellee").Ms. Stovall applied for survivor's benefits but was denied such benefits based upon Article IV § 25-40(a) of the City of Memphis Code, which provides that lawful surviving spouses are eligible for survivor beneficiary retirement benefits.The City of Memphis CodeArticle I § 25-1(40) defines a spouse as:

A lawful spouse of a participant, active or retired, who has had the status of a lawful spouse for an unbroken period of at least two (2) years immediately preceding the death of such participant.Common-law marriage shall not be recognized as valid regardless of the fact that such marriage may be considered lawful in a state or jurisdiction where the couple lives or formerly lived.

In her "Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts, and Answer to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," Ms. Stovall stipulates that if she does not meet the definition of spouse as defined by this Pension Ordinance, she is not entitled to claim Mr. Stovall's pension.

On December 5, 2001, Ms. Stovall filed a Complaint against the City of Memphis for a declaratory judgment giving her rights to Mr. Stovall's pension.Ms. Stovall further prayed that the City of Memphis be estopped to deny the validity of the marriage between her and Mr. Stovall on November 3, 1998.In support of her Complaint, Ms. Stovall included several affidavits of witnesses of the November 3, 1998 ceremony, the group insurance policy change of beneficiary forms, and a copy of the church directory, in which Ms. Stovall and the decedent are listed "John & Sara Beth Stovall."

In its Answer, the City of Memphis denies that a lawful marriage took place on November 3, 1998 pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a), which reads in relevant part as follows:

Before being joined in marriage, the parties shall present to the minister or officer a license under the hand of a county clerk in this state, directed to such minister or officer, authorizing the solemnization of a marriage between the parties.

Since no marriage license was obtained prior to the November 3, 1998 ceremony, the City of Memphis asserts that Ms. Stovall is not eligible to receive survivor's beneficiary retirement benefits because she was not the lawful spouse of the decedent for an unbroken period of at least two years immediately preceding his death, the requirement under Article I § 25-1(40).The Answer also denies that the Doctrine of Marriage by Estoppel applies to this case.

Ms. Stovall and the City of Memphis filed cross-motions for summary judgment.On July 18, 2003, the trial court granted the City of Memphis's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the November 3, 1998 ceremony was not a valid marriage because it was not accompanied by a license and, therefore, Ms. Stovall and the decedent were not lawfully married for two years prior to the his death.Therefore, under the terms of the pension plan, Ms. Stovall did not meet the eligibility requirement for survivor's beneficiary retirement benefits.

Ms. Stovall appeals and raises three issues for review, as stated in her brief:

1.Does the failure to obtain a marriage license affect the validity of a marriage?

2.Is the Doctrine of Marriage by Estoppel applicable in this case?

3.Did the trial court correctly decide that a widow of a retired Memphis fireman did not qualify for deceased husband's pension benefits on the grounds that the first of two marriage ceremonies on November 3, 1998 was not a lawful marriage without a license and, therefore, the parties had not been married for at least two full years prior to the decedent's death on December 6, 2000?

Before turning to Ms. Stovall's issues, we first note that a motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.SeeTenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden on demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists.SeeBain v. Wells,936 S.W.2d 618, 622(Tenn.1997).On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence.Seeid.

Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion.SeeCarvell v. Bottoms,900 S.W.2d 23, 26(Tenn.1995).Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment.SeeBain,936 S.W.2d at 622.Therefore, our review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.SeeWarren v. Estate of Kirk,954 S.W.2d 722, 723(Tenn.1997).

There is no factual dispute.Summary judgment is an "efficient means to dispose of cases whose outcome depends solely on the resolution of legal issues."Byrd,847 S.W.2d at 216(citations omitted).Because construction of a statute involves legal issues, it is particularly suited to disposition by summary judgment.SeeKing v. Pope,91 S.W.3d 314, 318(Tenn.2002).

1.Does the failure to obtain a marriage license affect the validity of a marriage?

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-103(a) provides in relevant part:

Before being joined in marriage, the partiesshall present to the minister or officer a license under the hand of a county clerk in this state, directed to such minister or officer, authorizing the solemnization of a marriage between the parties.

Id.(emphasis added).

Several aspects of § 36-3-103(a) indicate the necessity of obtaining a marriage license for a valid marriage.First, the title of this section is "License required," which indicates a legislative intent for a license to be mandatory.Furthermore, the statute includes the verb "shall," thus indicating a mandatory prerequisite under the rules of statutory construction.Stubbs v. State,393 S.W.2d 150, 154(Tenn.1965)("when the word `shall' is used in constitutions or statutes it is ordinarily construed as being mandatory and not discretionary.");Gabel v. Lerma,812 S.W.2d 580, 582(Tenn. Ct. App.1990)(citingStubbs).Therefore, as correctly noted by the trial court, T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) stands for the proposition that "it's not a marriage in Tennessee without getting the license first."

Relying on T.C.A. § 36-3-306, Ms. Stovall asserts that a marriage consummated by ceremony should not be invalidated by failure to comply with Tennessee's marriage laws, to wit:

Marriage consummated by ceremony not invalidated by failure to comply with law — Restriction — Failure to comply with the requirements of §§ 36-3-104 - §§ 36-3-111 shall not affect the validity of any marriage consummated by ceremony.No marriage shall be valid, whether consummated by ceremony or otherwise, if the marriage is prohibited in this state.

However, T.C.A. § 36-3-306 specifically limits its application to §§ 36-3-104 - §§ 36-3-111.The marriage license requirement is found at § 36-3-103, and thus § 36-3-306 is not applicable.Therefore, Ms. Stovall's argument is without merit.

In a factually similar case, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that a marriage license is a statutory requirement in Tennessee.Harlow v. Reliance Nat'l,91, S.W.3d 243, 245-246(Tenn.2002).In Harlow,the plaintiff sought spousal benefits under workers' compensation law.Ms. Harlow and the deceased previously had been married lawfully, but later divorced.However, the couple took part in a "remarriage" ceremony under the direction of a minister, but failed to obtain a marriage license either before or after the ceremony.The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel then reversed the trial court's award of spousal benefits, and held that "failure to comply with the statutory requirement for a marriage license, along with the knowledge of that deficiency, dooms Ms. Harlow's claim."Id. at 247.According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, allowing the purported wife to recover spousal benefits would certainly...