Stovall v. Finney

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Stokes
• Citation: Stovall v. Finney, 152 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App. 1941)
• Decision Date: 26 May 1941
• Docket Number: No. 5305.,5305.
• Parties: STOVALL et al. v. FINNEY.

152 S.W.2d 887

STOVALL et al. v. FINNEY.

No. 5305.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.

May 26, 1941.

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1941.

Appeal from District Court, Hale County; C. D. Russell, Judge.

Action by J. A. Finney against Robert C. Stovall and wife, in trespass to try title to land, wherein the defendants filed a crossaction. From an adverse judgment, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

P. B. Randolph, of Plainview, for appellants.

Ernest Tibbets and Griffin & Morehead, all of Plainview, for appellee.

STOKES, Justice.

This is a suit in trespass to try title instituted by appellee, J. A. Finney, against appellants, Robert C. Stovall and wife, in which appellee sought to recover the title and possession of 215 acres of land located in Hale and Lamb Counties. Appellants answered by general denial, plea of not guilty, and specially pleaded their right of possession of the land under the terms of a written contract with which they alleged they had fully complied and under which they contended they were entitled to such possession for a period of five years from the 1st day of January, 1939. They also set up a cross-action against appellee for damages which they alleged had accrued to them by the unlawful acts of appellee in dispossessing them of the land under a writ of sequestration.

A jury was impaneled to try the case, but at the conclusion of the testimony the court gave to the jury a peremptory instruction to return a verdict in favor of appellee and upon the return of such verdict by the jury, judgment was entered in favor of appellee, the plaintiff in the case, and denying appellants recovery upon their cross-action. Appellants duly excepted to the judgment, gave notice of appeal, and have brought the case to this court for review.

The peremptory instruction was based upon the conclusion of the trial judge that the rental or lease contract under which appellants contended they were in lawful possession of the land was void under the statute of frauds. Upon this ground the court sustained the objection of appellee to its introduction in evidence and the contract being the basis of appellants' claim to the land, if the court was correct in this ruling, no basis remained for a judgment in their favor. Appellants' contentions here are based principally upon the action of the court in refusing to permit them to introduce the contract in evidence. They assert that the evidence showed they had entered upon a specifically designated tract of land; had performed all of their agreements under the contract; had paid all rentals due under its terms; that they had obligated themselves for money borrowed to pay appellee for livestock and personal property which he required that they purchase from him as part of the consideration for the contract, and that, under these circumstances, it would amount to the perpetration of a fraud upon them to permit appellee to plead and take advantage of the provisions of the statute of frauds, § 4, Art. 3995, R.C.S.1925.

It was stipulated that appellee was the common source of title and the controlling question, in so far as these contentions of appellants are concerned, is whether or not the contract was admissible in evidence as a muniment of appellants' title under the statute of frauds. The contract was written on a form provided by the United States Department of Agriculture and used by the Farm Security Administration. It was dated December 10, 1938, and it purports to run for a term of five years from January 1, 1939. It provides that it shall remain in force from year to year unless written notice of termination is given by either party to the other on or before the 15th of October before expiration of the lease or of any renewal thereof. Obviously, this provision is unintelligible because it is impossible to say, from the language used, whether or not the contract shall remain in force from year to year after the five-year period has expired, or whether the written notice and termination may be given by either party on or before October 15th of any year during the five years of its rental term. However that may be, the contract was not admissible in evidence under the provisions of the statute above mentioned because the description of the land purported to be leased for a period of five years is wholly inadequate. The land is described as being "located in Hale County, State of Texas; parts of Sections 15 & 16, Block O-2, and consisting of 215 acres, more or less, together with all buildings and improvements thereon and all rights thereto appertaining." The rule has been established and consistently adhered to by all the courts in Texas throughout its entire judicial history that, with certain exceptions not here involved, a transaction affecting real property must be evidenced by a writing which contains a description of the land sufficiently definite that its identification may be established with reasonable certainty without resort to oral testimony. When the contract is for the conveyance of land, the writing must furnish in itself or by reference to some other writing, the means or data from which the land to be conveyed can be identified, and if it fails in these respects it is void under the provisions of Art. 3995, § 4, R.C.S.,1925, commonly known as our statute of frauds. Paschal v. Hart et al., Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 337; White et al. v. Glenn, Tex.Civ.App., 138 S.W.2d 914; Smith v. Griffin et al., 131 Tex. 509, 116 S.W.2d 1064; Francis v. Thomas et al., 129 Tex. 579, 106 S.W.2d 257; McMurrey v. Standley, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 557; Id., Tex.Com.App., 1 S.W.2d 592; Hill v. Hunter, Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W. 247.

The contention of appellants that the court erred in excluding the contract from evidence because it was shown that they entered upon a specifically designated tract is not borne out by the record. Nowhere in the statement of facts do we find any specific description of the land in controversy and, assuming that proof of entry upon a specifically designated tract would, under some circumstances, cure a defect in the description of the land contained in such a contract, which, in view of its indefiniteness, we do not concede in this case, that rule would not avail appellants in this case because it was not shown what tract of land was appropriated by them under the contract.

Appellants contend in this connection that, to permit appellee to avail himself of the provisions of the statute of frauds, would amount to the perpetration of a fraud upon appellants because they borrowed $1,175 and obligated themselves in a loan therefor in order to obtain money with which to pay appellee for certain livestock and personal property which they were required by him to purchase before he would enter into the contract of rental with them. It is held in many cases that, in order to relieve a parol contract for the sale of land from the operation of the statute of frauds, three things are necessary, viz., payment of the consideration; possession by the vendee, and the making by the vendee of valuable and permanent improvements upon the land with the consent of the vendor. It is also held that if such improvements are not made, then it must be shown that the transaction would amount to a fraud upon the purchaser if it were not enforced. The requirement of appellee that appellants purchase livestock and their allegation that they did purchase it and obligated themselves for money with which to pay for it,...