Stovall v. State, 69331
| Decision Date | 23 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 69331,69331 |
| Citation | 340 N.W.2d 265 |
| Parties | David Lee STOVALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Patrick J. Kelly, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Roxann M. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William E. Davis, County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK, and McGIVERIN, JJ.
This appeal involves a question of whether a guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.
Applicant David Lee Stovall was previously convicted of a forcible felony, robbery. On the present occasion the prosecutor charged him with a second forcible felony, first-degree robbery with a firearm. The charge of the use of a firearm, if established, would subject Stovall to section 902.7 of the Iowa Code (1981):
At the trial of a person charged with participating in a forcible felony, if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is guilty of a forcible felony and that the person represented that he or she was in the immediate possession and control of a firearm, displayed a firearm in a threatening manner, or was armed with a firearm while participating in the forcible felony the convicted person shall serve a minimum of five years of the sentence imposed by law. A person sentenced pursuant to this section shall not be eligible for parole until he or she has served the minimum sentence of confinement imposed by this section.
Stovall tendered a guilty plea to the charge but refused to admit a factual basis for it. The district court therefore refused to accept the plea.
At trial on the charge the prosecutor and Stovall entered into a plea bargain. The prosecutor would recommend incarceration but would not recommend a factual finding of the use of a firearm so that the five-year mandatory incarceration would not be triggered. Stovall would plead guilty and admit a factual basis. The parties carried out the bargain.
The district court explained to Stovall that the plea bargain obviated the five-year ineligibility for parole, in this exchange:
The Court: I'll now ask the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, is this plea a result of a prior plea discussion or agreement?
Mr. Ottesen [prosecutor]: It is, Your Honor. Our agreement is that we will recommend incarceration for a term of twenty-five years, but will not recommend the imposition of the minimum sentence.
The Court: Do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: That means there won't be any five-year period that you have to serve before you're eligible for parole; do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes.
....
The Court: And this plea is a result of a plea agreement, which you are now presenting to the court. I'm going to read it to you, Mr. Stovall: In other words, they don't recommend that you serve five years before you're eligible for parole. Do you understand?
Defendant: Uh-huh.
(Emphasis added.)
The court accepted the plea bargain and Stovall's plea, and imposed sentence for no more than twenty-five years, pursuant to statute. Iowa Code § 902.9 (1981).
The second paragraph of section 906.5 of the Code provides regarding paroles:
If the person who is under consideration for parole is serving a sentence for conviction of a felony and has a criminal record of one or more prior convictions for a forcible felony or a crime of a similar gravity in this or any other state, parole shall be denied unless the defendant has served at least one-half of the maximum term of his or her sentence.
(Emphasis added.) Actually the times in both section 902.7 and section 906.5 can be shortened by good and honor time. See Iowa Code §§ 246.38 and .43. For convenience we use the figures five years and twelve and one-half years respectively.
After Stovall had been in prison for about a month a prison official informed him he would not immediately be eligible for consideration for parole. Stovall wrote his attorney to find out whether he should be ineligible. Eventually he discovered from the parole board that he would be ineligible...
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