Stovic v. R.R. Ret. Bd. & Soc. Sec. Admin.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14-1251,14-1251
• Parties: Chris Stovic, Petitioner v. Railroad Retirement Board and Social Security Administration, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

826 F.3d 500

Chris Stovic, Petitioner

v.Railroad Retirement Board and Social Security Administration, Respondents.

No. 14-1251

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 14, 2016

Decided June 24, 2016

Rehearing En Banc Denied July 18, 2016.

Burden H. Walker, appointed by the court, argued the cause as amicus curiae for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jonathan D. Hacker and Jason Zarrow.

Chris Stovic, pro se, filed the briefs for petitioner.

Debra Chesnin, General Attorney, Railroad Retirement Board, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert D. Kamenshine, Attorney, and Karl T. Blank, General Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board. Dana J. Martin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

Before: Henderson, Roger s, and Kavanau gh, Circuit Judges.

Kavanaugh, Circuit Judge:

In 1995, after working in the railroad industry for more than 30 years, Chris Stovic retired. Upon his retirement, Stovic was entitled to retirement benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act. For covered railroad workers, that Act's benefits system in essence substitutes for the Social Security benefits program.

The distribution of retirement benefits under the Act is overseen by the Railroad Retirement Board, a federal government agency within the Executive Branch. In 1996, the Board initially calculated the amount of Stovic's retirement benefits. Not satisfied with that calculation, Stovic pursued a series of administrative appeals. In 1999, the Board issued a final decision confirming its initial calculation. Stovic did not seek judicial review of the Board's 1999 decision within the Act's one-year statute of limitations.

In March 2014, Stovic requested that the Board reopen its 1999 decision concerning the calculation of his retirement benefits. Board regulations allow the Board to reopen initial benefits determinations at any time, under certain circumstances. In this case, the Board promptly denied Stovic's request to reopen.

Stovic has petitioned this Court to review the Board's denial of his request to reopen the 1999 benefits determination. The Board responds first that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Stovic's petition for review. In particular, the Board argues that the Railroad Retirement Act does not provide for judicial review of Board decisions denying requests to reopen initial benefits determinations. In the alternative, the Board argues on the merits that its decision not to reopen Stovic's initial benefits determination was reasonable.

We conclude that the Railroad Retirement Act grants the Court jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying requests to reopen initial benefits determinations. However, the Board's decision to deny Stovic's request to reopen was reasonable. Therefore, we deny Stovic's petition for review.

I

We must first decide whether this Court possesses jurisdiction over Stovic's petition for review.¹ The Board argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board's denial of a request to reopen an initial benefits determination. The courts of appeals are divided on that question. We conclude that the relevant statutory provisions provide for judicial review of Board denials of requests to reopen.

Under the Railroad Retirement Act, courts review decisions of the Board “in the same manner” as they would review Board decisions under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. 45 U.S.C. § 231g. In turn, Section 5(f) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act sets forth the following conditions on judicial review: “Any claimant , or any railway labor organization organized in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. ], of which claimant is a member, or any base-year employer of the claimant, or any other party aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section, may , only after all administrative remedies within the Board will have been availed of and exhausted, obtain a review of any final decision of the Board ....” Id. § 355(f) (emphases added).

The Board does not dispute that Stovic is a “claimant” who has exhausted “all administrative remedies within the Board.”

The key question in this case is whether Stovic is seeking “review of any final decision of the Board.” Id. The Board says no. But the Board's position does not square with the text of the statute. Section 5(f) provides for judicial review of “any final decision of the Board.” Id. (emphasis added). The Board's denial of Stovic's request to reopen is a “decision of the Board.” And that decision is “final.” See Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. , –––U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1807, 1813, 195 L.Ed.2d 77 (2016) (agency action “final” when it marks “the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process” and determines legal “rights or obligations”) (quoting Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 177–78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) ). Therefore, the text of Section 5(f) provides for this Court's review of the Board's denial of Stovic's request to reopen the Board's 1999 benefits determination.

The Board attempts to end-run that straightforward interpretation of Section 5(f) by reading into the statute an implicit limitation on the kinds of Board decisions that are judicially reviewable. According to the Board, when Congress wrote that any “claimant” may “obtain a review of any final decision of the Board,” Congress meant to limit judicial review to only final decisions made “under subsection (c) of this section.” Here, the Board's interpretation would allow judicial review only of initial benefits determinations, not of denied requests to reopen, because Section 5(c) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act primarily encompasses initial benefits determinations. Section 5(c) does not encompass Board decisions denying requests to reopen initial benefits determinations. See 45 U.S.C. § 355(c).

The Board offers three justifications for tacking that implicit limitation onto the text of Section 5(f). None warrants departure from Section 5(f)'s text.

First , the Board points out that Section 5(f) uses the term “final decision” twice—first in setting out one of the four categories of petitioners who may seek judicial review, and second in defining the kinds of decisions subject to review for all the categories of eligible petitioners. See id. § 355(f) ( “any other party aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section, may ... obtain a review of any final decision of the Board”) (emphases added). According to the Board, because Section 5(f) limits one of the four categories of eligible petitioners to parties “aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section,” the statute's subsequent use of the term “final decision”—which describes the kinds of decisions that may be appealed by any eligible petitioner—must be similarly limited.

But the Board has it backwards. It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that, when “Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). That presumption applies with special force in this case given that the term “final decision” is qualified differently within the same subsection of Section 5. Had Congress intended to limit judicial review in Section 5(f) to initial benefits determinations, it could have easily done so by employing the phrase “under subsection (c)” when setting out the kinds of decisions subject to judicial review. But Congress did not do so.

Moreover, Congress granted the Board the power “to establish, by regulations or otherwise, such procedures as it may deem necessary or proper for the determination of a right to benefits.” 45 U.S.C. § 355(b). Yet Congress declined to place a limit on what final Board decisions are reviewable. That further suggests that Congress wanted courts to review final decisions flowing from the Board-created procedures.

Second , the Board argues that Section 5(f) should be interpreted in the same way as a separate judicial review provision in the Social Security Act, Section 205(g). That section of the Social Security Act provides for judicial review of certain Social Security benefits determinations: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party , irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days....” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) (emphases added). Note that Section 205(g) does not provide for judicial review of “any final decision of the Secretary,” but only of “any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party.” As we will explain, that text is critical to understanding why the Board's reliance on Section 205(g) is misplaced.

The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 205(g) to prohibit judicial review of agency refusals to reopen initial determinations of Social Security benefits. See Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S. 99, 107–08, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). In reaching that conclusion, the Sanders Court emphasized the text of Section 205(g). The Court reasoned that Section 205(g) “clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a ‘final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing.’ ” Id. at 108, 97 S.Ct. 980. Because the Social Security Act does not require a hearing for requests to reopen, the Court held that denials of requests to reopen were not reviewable under Section 205(g). Id. The Court went on to note that judicial review of denials of requests to reopen “would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in § 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary's...