Strahan v. Strahan, Civ. A. No. 14120.
Decision Date | 22 September 1969 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 14120. |
Parties | Lyle E. STRAHAN v. William L. STRAHAN and Martha H. Strahan. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
J. Stanley Wagner, Robert G. Hebert, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.
Berry & Lee, Winnsboro, La., A. Leon Hebert, and David Donnell Moss, Hebert, Moss & Graphia, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants.
OPINION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The issue in this diversity case is whether the laws of Louisiana violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying the right of inheritance to an illegitimate child of a decedent, as against his legitimate heirs. Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, the alleged illegitimate son of the intestate whose property is the object of this suit, asserts that the rationale of Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968), and Glona v. American Guarantee Company, 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968), should apply to Louisiana succession laws. Those cases held that "children," as used in Louisiana Civil Code, art. 2315,1 (without further categorization,) included illegitimate children, reasoning that a child should not be "denied rights merely because of his birth out of wedlock."
We do not think those decisions have such a far-reaching effect.2 In the first place, the statutes in Levy and Glona created rights which never existed before their enactment. See dissent in Glona, 391 U.S. 76, 88 S.Ct. 1515 (1968). Without that law, no person — parent, collateral, or child (legitimate or illegitimate) — could recover for the wrongful death or suffering of another. Only through legislative grace are such actions maintainable. Conversely, laws regulating the orderly transmission of a decedent's property are founded on the most ancient legal principles.3 For centuries they have been the basis for establishment of clearly definitive disposition of estates from generation to generation.
It is axiomatic that "* * * the settlement and distribution of decedents' estates and the right to succeed to the ownership of realty and personality are peculiarly matters of state law." Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 450, 63 S.Ct. 354, 357, 87 L.Ed. 390 (1943). As such, the States are free to establish their own regulations and their only guideline is not arbitrarily or unreasonably to discriminate in enacting their applicable laws.
United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 91, 70 S.Ct. 503, 508, 94 L.Ed. 675 (1950).
The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children in the succession laws of Louisiana is not arbitrary or without reasonable legal basis. Louisiana has a paramount interest in encouraging the institution of marriage and discouraging the birth of illegitimate children. That it chooses to use its inheritance laws as one of its methods in that effort clearly is within its constitutional province. In providing for the welfare of its illegitimate children, Louisiana has distinguished between those illegitimates who may be acknowledged by their parents ("natural children"), and thus enjoy the possibility of sharing in succession property, and those whose rights include only a mere alimony,4 (unacknowledged illegitimates). Neither do these distinctions constitute invidious discrimination.
Since the Legislature of a State may "* * * limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction," Irving Trust Company v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562, 62 S.Ct. 398, 401, 86 L.Ed. 452 (1941); United States v. Burnison, supra, Louisiana could permissibly enact a law providing that a testator could leave no more than $10.00 to an illegitimate child. Such a law clearly would be within the State's power. Likewise, Louisiana may and does provide that an illegitimate child cannot inherit as against legitimate heirs from his intestate parents, or inherit under certain conditions only, and this does not do violence to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conceding for purposes of argument only and for no other reason, that the illegitimate child should share in Louisiana successions, the State has an even more powerful overriding and paramount reason for denying this right. We refer to the State's indisputable vital interest in the stability of its land titles.
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