Straka v. Voyles
| Decision Date | 03 January 1927 |
| Docket Number | 4297 |
| Citation | 252 P. 677,69 Utah 123 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | STRAKA v. VOYLES |
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; M. C Harris, Judge.
Action by Joseph Straka against E. B. Voyles. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
AFFIRMED.
J. D Skeen, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
J. W McKinney and Powers, Riter & Cowan, all of Salt Lake City, for respondent.
This is an action for malicious prosecution.
Plaintiff in his complaint, in substance, alleged that the "defendant falsely, maliciously, and without probable cause" made oath to a complaint in which he "falsely, maliciously, and without probable cause" alleged that he believed that the plaintiff "was insane and a fit subject for care and treatment in the State Mental Hospital," and that the defendant "falsely, maliciously, and without probable cause" procured plaintiff's arrest; that the plaintiff was arrested and confined in the Salt Lake county jail for the space of three days; that thereafter, pursuant to said arrest, he was taken before one of the judges of the district court of Salt Lake county, and after a "trial and examination" said judge "adjudged plaintiff not insane" and ordered plaintiff discharged from said arrest, whereupon plaintiff was discharged; that, by reason of said arrest and imprisonment, plaintiff suffered damages. Plaintiff prayed for actual, as well as punitive, damages.
Defendant in his answer to the complaint admitted that he swore to and filed the complaint referred to in plaintiff's complaint; admitted that plaintiff was arrested, as alleged in the complaint, and that, upon "an examination, plaintiff was found not to be a proper subject for care and treatment in the State Mental Hospital." The defendant denied that the "charge was false or malicious, and that it was without probable cause." It is further denied that plaintiff was injured by reason of said complaint or arrest and denied that he was damaged thereby.
Upon substantially the foregoing issues, the case was tried and submitted to a jury which found for the plaintiff and awarded him actual damages in the sum of $ 300 and exemplary damages in the sum of $ 200. Judgment was duly entered on the verdict, and defendant appeals.
A number of errors is assigned. It is contended that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for nonsuit upon the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove a cause of action, and for the further reason that it was shown, as a matter of law, defendant had probable cause to make the complaint, and that he was actuated by good motives and without malice.
While it is true that the defendant produced sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury, that he had probable cause for filing the complaint and that he acted without malice, yet there was also ample evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted without probable cause, and that he was prompted to act through legal malice. In this connection it must suffice to say that, in view that we must construe the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, we cannot say, as matter of law, that the district court erred in denying the motion for nonsuit. True it is, as contended by defendant's counsel, the question of probable cause, where the facts are not in dispute, is for the court, and in case they are in dispute it is still a question for the court to instruct the jury what constitutes and what does not constitute probable cause. That such is the law in malicious prosecutions has so often been declared by this and other courts that the citation of authorities is wholly unnecessary.
The difficulty in this case, however, is that although the defendant produced evidence of his good motives and that he had probable cause, yet his own conduct was such that the jury were justified in believing that he did not, in good faith, believe that the plaintiff was insane, and in believing that he was actuated by legal malice. For example, the defendant testified that he was caused to initiate the insanity proceeding because he was afraid that the plaintiff might do him, the defendant, bodily harm or cause him injury by setting the building on fire which the plaintiff had rented from the defendant, and which the former was occupying as a tenant at the time he was arrested pursuant to the defendant's complaint. He also proved at the trial that he was informed by others in whose judgment he had confidence that the plaintiff was insane and was a fit person for treatment in the State Mental Hospital. In view of defendant's conduct, however, the jury were justified in disregarding his good faith in the premises. For instance, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant testified that he believed plaintiff insane, he commenced a civil action against him and attached his bank account. Plaintiff's counsel therefore argue, and the jury had a right to believe, that the defendant did not believe the plaintiff insane or he would not have sued him as a sane person and attached his money in the bank. Then, again, the plaintiff was brought before the judge of the district court for examination upon the defendant's complaint. The latter was present, but he offered no evidence whatever in support of his complaint; nor did he make any protest against the discharge of the plaintiff, nor offer any explanation why he instituted the lunacy proceeding. Evidently he was satisfied to permit the plaintiff to go at large so long as the defendant had his claim secured by the attachment of the plaintiff's money. Moreover, the defendant not only did not offer any evidence in support of his complaint, but urged the plaintiff to remain as a tenant in defendant's building. The jury were thus justified in believing that the defendant did not fear or have any cause to fear that the plaintiff would harm him, or that he was a fit or proper subject for treatment in the State Mental Hospital. The defendant's conduct thus afforded the jury ample reason to disbelieve his statements of good faith, etc.
As before stated, while the question of probable cause is ordinarily one of law, or, at least, one of mixed law and fact as it is sometimes said, yet, when, as in this case, a defendant's motives or belief are in issue, it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether or not he was actuated by proper motives, and whether or not he had sufficient cause to believe and did believe the plaintiff insane. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 at 187-194, 25 L.Ed. 116; Jenkins v Gilligan, 131 Iowa 176, 108 N.W....
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...12 L.R.A. 104; Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378; Brown v. Selfridge, 224 U.S. 189, 32 S.Ct. 444, 56 L.Ed. 727; Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah 123, 252 P. 677; Puutio v. Roman, 76 Mont. 105, 245 P. 523; Griswold v. Griswold, 143 Cal. 617, 77 P. 672. See also, Note, 145 A.L.R. 711, et se......
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