Stranahan v. Genesee Cnty. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1928
• Docket Number: No. 132.,132.
• Citation: 242 Mich. 413,218 N.W. 688
• Parties: STRANAHAN v. GENESEE COUNTY FARMERS' MUT. FIRE INS. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

242 Mich. 413

218 N.W. 688

STRANAHAN

v.GENESEE COUNTY FARMERS' MUT. FIRE INS. CO.

No. 132.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 3, 1928.

Error to Circuit Court, Genesee County; Edward D. Black, Judge.

Action by Willis L. Stranahan against the Genesee County Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Argued before FEAD, C. J., and NORTH, FELLOWS, WIEST, CLARK, McDONALD, POTTER, and SHARPE, JJ. George W. Cook, of Flint, for appellant.

Pulver & Bush, of Owosso, and Roy E. Brownell, of Flint, for appellee.

SHARPE, J.

Plaintiff is a resident of the village of Flushing, in Genesee county. A house on a farm owned by him, a few miles from the village, was destroyed by fire on October 17, 1925. It was insured in the defendant company. This action was brought to recover on the policy. Plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $5,177.78. Defendant seeks review by writ of error.

1. The record discloses that the barn on said farm, insured in the defendant company, burned in February, 1924, and that, about a week before the house burned, a fire occurred in the attic, which was extinguished. An assignment is based upon the refusal of the court to admit certain proofs, of which it is conceded the defendant should have the same benefit as though the witnesses had been called and interrogated relative thereto. The offer was thus stated by its counsel:

‘Now, I propose to prove, if the court please, that, prior to the burning of the barn, oats were taken away, hay was taken away, lumber was removed from the barn, his best harness was taken away. That the fire did not orginate where he said it did. It did not originate from the lantern that was placed where he said it was placed, but the fire was set or originated in the north end of the barn. That there was a heavy wind, and that it was sweeping to the south, and that he was the only person around there that could have caused the conflagration. That some of the best tools were out of the barn and in the yard at the time of the fire. That the stock was all let out in the orchard, had been out there for some considerable time, and the poorer tools, the worthless tools, were still in the barn. Now, that is what I propose to prove about that. Of course, there are a whole multitude of little things about this case that may have slipped my mind, but those are the essentials.’

This offer was made at the opening of defendant's case. Its counsel had theretofore been permitted to cross-examine plaintiff at length relative to the facts incident to the burning of the barn. It is the general rule that evidence that a person has done an act at a particular time is not admissible to prove that he has done a similar act at another time. There are well-recognized exceptions to this rule, however. In certain criminal cases in which intent is involved, prior acts of a similar character may be shown, and, in civil cases where misrepresentations are claimed, other fraudulent, transactions of a similar nature may be proven.

The purpose of the proof here offered was to establish the motive which actuated the plaintiff in the burning of the buildings on his farm. Defendant sought to show that the plaintiff had in mind that, after the buildings were burned and the insurance secured, he could dispose of his farm to better advantage than with the buildings upon it. To make such testimony admissible, it must appear that the facts were ‘sufficiently significant in character, and sufficiently near in point of time, to afford a presumption that the element sought to be established existed at the time of the commission of the offense charged.’ Commonwealth v. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42.

In State v. Graham, 121 N. C. 623, 28 S. E. 409, where similar proof was offered, it was said:

‘It is when the transactions are so connected or contemporaneous as to form a continuing action that evidence of the collateral offense will be heard to prove the intent of the offense...