Strang v. People

• Decision Date: 31 October 1871
• Citation: 24 Mich. 1
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph Strang v. The People

24 Mich. 1

Joseph Strang v. The People

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 31, 1871

Heard October 20, 1871

Error to Hillsdale circuit.

Joseph Strang and George H. Williamson were charged, on the information of the prosecuting attorney of Hillsdale country before the circuit court for the county of Hillsdale, with the offense of rape, committed upon Lovisa Towers. Strang was tried separately and convicted; and judgment having been entered on the verdict, the case comes into this court by writ of error.

Conviction affirmed.

E. L Coon and C. A. Stacey, for plaintiff in error.

Dwight May, Attorney General, for The People.

OPINION

Cooley, J.:

The defendant and George H. Williamson were jointly informed against as principals in a rape upon one Lovisa Towers. This defendant was tried separately and convicted, and he now brings the record to this court, assigning fifty-three errors. A number of these were not insisted upon on the argument, but those which were are so numerous that it will be convenient to consider them in connection with a statement of the proceedings as they took place on the trial.

Lovisa Towers, the prosecutrix, being placed on the stand, testified that she knew the defendant and had resided in his family. She was then asked what relation the defendant was to her, if any. This question was objected to, but allowed, and she replied that he was an uncle by marriage.

The reason assigned for the objection to this question is, that the relationship is an immaterial fact, but that the tendency of the proof of it must be to excite a prejudice against a defendant whom the nature of the charge always places sufficiently at a disadvantage, and whom it should be aim of the law to guard against any circumstances, which, by possibility, might prevent a calm and dispassionate investigation of the charge by the jury. We think, however, that the danger of creating prejudice by such evidence is not sufficiently imminent to excite alarm. The relationship may be a fact of importance in the case, as bearing upon the reasonableness of the woman's story, and upon the probability of the resistance having been all that was to have been expected if her complaint is well founded. We have no doubt it was a proper circumstance for the prosecution to prove.

The witness proceeded to state that Williamson came to her mother's house on the evening of the fifth day of June, 1870, and asked her to go with him to meeting. She consented, and they started in a buggy. About half a mile north of the house, they met the defendant, who stopped the horse and told Williamson to get out. Witness jumped out of the buggy, and the defendant caught her and told her to get in again. She said she did not want to, but wanted to go home. He said she had got to go with him. The defendant took hold of her arm and went to push her into the buggy, and then she got in. Defendant made Williamson get out, and told witness he had got her where he wanted her, and she should go with him. Williamson said he would go home, and started to do so, as witness supposed, and defendant drove up to the woods and stopped, and told her to get out. She said, "What are you going to do with me?" and he said she would soon find out when she got out of there. He took her out, took his coat off and laid it on the ground, took hold of her and laid her down on it. He told her to take off her drawers, and not daring to do different, she took them partly off. Defendant told her before she got into the woods that if she did not go with him and do as he wanted her to, he would take her where no one would know her fate. He said this more than once. She commenced to halloo at the edge of the woods, and he said it would be of no use to halloo; it would be all the worse for her. No house was in sight. She was then sixteen years old. She took off her drawers because she did not dare to do otherwise. Then he had intercourse with her. She was then asked what he did or said immediately after the intercourse. This question was objected to as immaterial, but very properly allowed. She replied by narrating the facts of his compelling her to submit to the embraces of Williamson, who soon came up as if by concert.

The witness was further asked why she allowed Strang to have intercourse with her. The question was objected to, but allowed, and she replied that she did not dare do any other way, because he said he would take her where she would not get back home again. She was afraid he would take her off and kill her. The question and answer were entirely proper, as showing the state of mind of the witness, and explaining why she made no physical resistance.

The witness further testified that she told her mother what defendant had done to her, when she got home. On her cross-examination she said she worked for defendant two years previous to the trial. She had not seen him to speak to him from December 9, 1869, to the time of this occurrence; did not remember testifying on the examination of defendant, before the justice, that she had connection with defendant because he threatened her, not then, but at another time; did not remember testifying that he did not say he would take her where no one would know her fate, on the fifth of June; but he did say so on the ninth of December; did not remember that she told defendant if he would take her right home he might have connection with her. She asked defendant to take her home, and he said he would if she would let him have connection with her, and he immediately after that had connection with her. The two men took her home in the buggy; did not remember talking about getting a dress at Litchfield when they were going home, and that she owed a dollar and eighty cents for it; and wanted defendant to let her have the money to pay for it; but she did speak about the dress before she started. The witness was then asked whether she had not slept with one Whitehead, and had sexual intercourse with him, and she replied that she had not.

Sophronia Towers, the mother of the prosecutrix, testified to her coming on the evening of the fifth of June, and that she looked as though she was badly abused, and entirely exhausted and frightened. She complained of the abuse; said defendant had abused her, and told what he had done. Witness sat up with her all night. She looked feeble and did not sleep. All this evidence was objected to by defendant, but we think it admissible both on reason and on authority. The fact of immediate complaint is always of importance in these cases, and the appearance of the woman, and whether she bears upon her person marks of violence or other indications of an outrage of the nature complained of, may also be shown: McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643; State v. Knapp, 45 N.H. 148; 1Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill & Edwards, 148. The particulars of the complaint were not called for in this case, so that no question arises concerning the propriety of permitting the mother to state them.

The prosecutrix was then recalled and recapitulated some of the facts of the case, and was also allowed, under objection, to state that she was afraid of defendant because it run in the family to kill folks, and because she had seen him abuse his wife so. We think any evidence which would show reason in the witness for fearing danger to life or limb from the violence of the defendant should have been received.

If she had seen him treat his wife with violence that fact would naturally tend to put her in fear of him, and incline her to believe the threats he made against her were serious. What the nature of the abuse of his wife was, or what the witness meant by its running in his family to kill folks, we do not know; but the defense could have called out an explanation had they desired it. What we understand from the evidence is, that the witness believed the defendant to be a dangerous man, who inherited violent passions or homicidal inclinations.

The witness was then asked to state fully the particulars of what occurred on the ninth of December. This was objected to, but allowed, and she stated the facts of a rape which she said was committed upon her on that day by the defendant, and added, that she immediately communicated the particulars to two women, whom she named, but by their advice refrained from mentioning it further. This rape was accomplished by threats of personal violence. We think the evidence admissible as explaining, to some extent, the fear the witness was under, and as tending to account for her submission to his will when he took her to the woods on this occasion. In submitting it to the jury, the judge instructed them that they were to regard it for that purpose only.

For the defense, Whitehead, with whom the prosecutrix had denied having had sexual intercourse, was called, and testified that he did have such intercourse in the fall of 1869, being then engaged to marry her. He was then asked whether he did not on a certain occasion lie on the bed with her and take improper liberties with her person. On objection by the prosecution the court overruled the question. The argument for its admission was, that an affirmative answer would tend to render more probable his evidence of actual intercourse. The fact of such intercourse, however, was collateral to the issue on trial, and the court went quite as far as the law would sanction in allowing him to testify to it. The prosecutrix could not be supposed to have come prepared to meet charges of this character, and though the defense might question her regarding them, the right to go into proof of particular facts is not very clear. See People v. Jackson, 3 Park. 391; McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643; McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 332; State v. Jefferson, 6 Ired. 305; State v....