Strange v. Islamic Republic of Iran

• Decision Date: 05 June 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–435 CKK
• Citation: 46 F.Supp.3d 78
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Charles Strange, et al, Plaintiffs, v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Defendants.

46 F.Supp.3d 78

Charles Strange, et al, Plaintiffs

v.Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14–435 CKK

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Filed June 5, 2014

Larry E. Klayman, Law Offices of Larry Klayman, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR–KOTELLY, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' [11] Motion to Disqualify Judge Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. Plaintiffs move the Court to transfer this case to a different district court judge in order to prevent an “appearance of bias and prejudice” due to the undersigned judge being involved in “ongoing litigation” with Plaintiffs' Counsel. Pl.s' Mot. at 7. Upon a searching review of Plaintiffs' Motion,¹ the relevant legal authorities, and the record for purposes of this motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' [11] Motion. However, the Court will STAY this matter, except for service on Defendants, pending the resolution of Plaintiffs' recently filed Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit on March 18, 2014, on behalf of themselves and their sons and stepsons, alleging that the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hoseyni Khamenei, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, Hamid Karzai, the Afghan Operational Coordination Group, Khasa Amalyati Qeta/Qeta–e–Khas–e–Amalyati or the Afghan Special Operations Unit, the Afghan National Security Forces, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda violated Plaintiffs' and decedents' rights, engaged in racketeering and other prohibited activities, engaged in international terrorism, harbored and concealed terrorists, provided material support to terrorists and terrorist groups, directly and proximately caused the deaths of Plaintiffs' decedents, and directly and proximately caused mental anguish, severe emotional distress, emotional pain and suffering, and the loss of society, earnings, companionship, comfort, protection, care, attention, advice, counsel or guidance. Compl., ECF No. [1], at 3. The genesis of these allegations is the deaths of members of Navy SEAL Team VI and other Special Operations forces shot down in their helicopter by the Taliban on August 6, 2011. Id. ¶¶ 16–18.

This case was assigned to the undersigned judge on March 18, 2014. On March 19, 2014, Plaintiffs' Counsel filed a Motion to Transfer Case Pursuant to Rule 57.13(A) on the basis that Plaintiffs' Counsel was engaged in “ongoing litigation” with the undersigned judge. See ECF No. [3]. Based on the grounds stated in Plaintiffs' pleadings, the Court treated Plaintiffs' Motion as a Motion for Recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and denied the same on April 8, 2014. See generally Mem. Op. (April 8, 2014), ECF No. [5]. The Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion after finding that “a judge is not required to recuse him or herself merely because a party files suit against him” and that “[g]ranting a motion to recuse solely because a party has sued the judge would transform such motions to recuse into vehicles for judge shopping.” Id. at 2–3. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's April 8, 2014, Memorandum Opinion, which the Court denied. See Mem. Op. (April 15, 2014), ECF No. [10], at 3.

On May 8, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the [11] Motion to Disqualify Judge Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 presently before the Court. Before the Court was able to rule on Plaintiffs' Motion, Plaintiffs' Counsel filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit seeking to have the Court of Appeals compel the undersigned judge to remove herself from this case either by recusal or disqualification. See generally Notice of Petition for Writ of Mandamus, ECF No. [13 –1]. Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Mandamus remains pending before the Court of Appeals.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Recusal of a judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 is appropriate “[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. To recuse a judge under section 144, a litigant must submit, along with its motion, an affidavit stating “the facts and the reasons for [its] belief that bias or prejudice exists.” Id. Upon the filing of a “timely and sufficient affidavit,” section 144 mandates that the assigned “judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.” Id. ; see also Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 380 F.2d 570, 576 (D.C.Cir.1967) ( “The disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, is mandatory and automatic, requiring only a timely and sufficient affidavit alleging personal bias or prejudice of the judge.”). “Importantly, the mere fact that a party has filed a § 144 motion, accompanied by the requisite affidavit and certificate of counsel, does not automatically result in the challenged judge's disqualification.” Robertson v. Cartinhour, 691 F.Supp.2d 65, 77 (D.D.C.2010) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Miller, 355 F.Supp.2d 404, 405 (D.D.C.2005) (“disqualification is not automatic upon submission of affidavit and certificate”). Rather, recusal is required only upon the filing of a “timely and sufficient affidavit.” 28 U.S.C. § 144 (emphasis added).

The question of whether the motion and supporting affidavit is both timely and legally sufficient is for this Court to determine in the first instance. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 131 (D.C.Cir.1976) (“It is well settled that the involved judge has the prerogative, if indeed not the duty, of passing on the legal sufficiency of a Section 144 challenge.”); see also United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1272 n. 69 (D.C.Cir.1981) (noting that “under section 144... the transfer to another judge for decision is ‘at most permissive’ ”) (quoting Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 131 ). In determining whether the affidavit sets forth a legally sufficient basis for disqualification, the Court “must accept the affidavit's factual allegations as true even if the judge knows them to be false.” S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit Found., 392 F.3d 486, 496 (D.C.Cir.2004) ; see also United States v. Hanrahan, 248 F.Supp. 471, 474 (D.D.C.1965) (“when presented with an application and affidavit such as this one, a Court may not pass upon the truth or falsity of the allegations, but must accept them as true for the purpose of determining the legal sufficiency of the affidavit”). However, the affidavit “must state facts as opposed to conclusions, and while the information and belief of the affiant as to the truth of the allegations are sufficient, mere rumors and gossip are not enough.” Hanrahan, 248 F.Supp. at 475 (internal citations omitted). “The identifying facts of time, place, persons, occasion and circumstances must be set forth, with at least that degree of particularity one would expect to find in a bill of particulars.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Importantly, given the requirement that the Court accept the facts stated in the affidavit as true, the statute mandates that “the attorney presenting the motion [ ] sign a certificate stating that both the motion and declaration are made in good faith.” Loving Spirit Found., 392 F.3d at 496 ; see 28 U.S.C. § 144 (requiring that the affidavit “be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith”). The certification requirement is key to the integrity of the recusal process and “guard[s] against the removal of an unbiased judge through the filing of a false affidavit.” Loving Spirit Found., 392 F.3d at 496.

Once it is established that the affidavit has been properly certified by counsel of record² and that the facts set forth therein have been stated with sufficient particularity, the Court must then

ascertain[ ] whether these facts would fairly convince a sane and reasonable mind that the judge does in fact harbor the personal bias or prejudice contemplated by the statute. It is well established that the facts must give fair support to the charge of a bent mind that may prevent or impede impartiality. The basis of the disqualification is that personal bias or prejudice exists, by reason of which the judge is unable to impartially exercise [her] functions in the particular case. The factual allegations must establish by more than a prima facie case, but not beyond a reasonable doubt that the mind of the judge is closed to justice; that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the affiant which is of such a nature, and of such intensity, that it would render the judge unable to give the affiant the fair trial to which every litigant is entitled. Obviously, such a showing could rarely be made.

Hanrahan, 248 F.Supp. at 475–76 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Importantly, to be disqualifying, the alleged bias usually ‘must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.’ ” Robertson, 691 F.Supp.2d at 78 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966) ); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (predispositions developed during proceedings are rarely sufficient).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify must be denied because the facts set forth in Plaintiffs' supporting Affidavit, even if accepted as true, are legally insufficient to demonstrate actual bias warranting disqualification under section 144. Moreover, the Court has conducted its own independent review of the record in this case, including Plaintiffs' present Motion and Affidavit, and is satisfied that...